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I. Forward
Although not formally a part of the Pace Law Review's
Symposium, "The MacCrate Report: Ten Years Later," the sub-
ject of this article-proposing an experiential, performance-
based alternative bar exam-is deeply grounded in, and in-
spired by the content of the MacCrate Report' and its impor-
tance for legal education and the profession. The Report did not
call for change in the existing bar exam regime, but its ex-
traordinary exegesis of precisely what it is that lawyers do, and
must learn, provides a lens on the bar exam which finds its pre-
sent iteration lacking.
I was initially challenged to rethink the bar exam because
of its unacceptable disparate impact on non-majority2 takers,
1. A.B.A., LEGAL EDUCATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCA-
TIONAL CONTINUUM, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFES-
SION: NARROWING THE GAP (1992) [hereinafter MacCrate Report].
2. I use the term non-majority students rather than "minority" students or
"students of color" because of the implicit values I believe "minority" conveys in
reinforcing a Caucasian norm, and because of changing demographics which
deconstruct the notion of Caucasian or white students as a monolithic majority.
"Students of color" does not include immigrants from the former Soviet Union, the
Balkans, the Middle East or those of Arabic descent who may be categorized as
"white." By non-majority students, I mean those who differ significantly, usually
but not always by race or ethnicity, from the majority white, middle or upper-class
students who comprise the majority population of legal education today.
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but the more I explored the possibility of a different, non-dis-
criminatory bar exam, the more convinced I became of the equal
need for a better bar exam. By "better" I mean one that tests
more validly what bar examiners have always posited as the
bar exam's purpose, i.e. minimum competence to practice law
unsupervised. 3 Here the connection to the skills outlined in the
MacCrate Report-which the Report itself notes are necessary
before a lawyer accepts sole responsibility for a client-is un-
mistakable, and essential. The model I propose is explicitly de-
signed so that applicants can be evaluated on their performance
of each of the skills in a real life, real time setting. When one
understands the interconnection between those skills and the
MacCrate fundamental values, it becomes clear that the set-
ting-the court system-is also designed to further a commit-
ment to improving justice and to providing pro bono service.
A much abbreviated version of the need for such an alterna-
tive bar exam, and a description of what I have called the Public
Service Alternative Bar Exam or PSABE has been previously
published,4 but much of the research and thought which went
into that proposal were omitted because of space constraints.
Its publication, and release of the proposal for a pilot program
developed by Committees of the Association of the Bar of the
3. It is generally agreed that a major justification for the bar exam is to pro-
tect consumers of legal services from incompetent lawyers or, put differently, to
guarantee "minimal competence." In answer to the question, "how do you judge
minimal competence?," John Holt-Harris, a former Chair of the New York State
Board of Law Examiners gave an answer to which I would certainly subscribe,
although I do not believe it is in fact tested or ensured by the existing bar exam.
He said:
[Tihe more I thought about [the question] the more elusive the answer be-
came. I hereafter concluded and still maintain that the standard should be
compctence to practice law unsupervised. That standard is markedly differ-
ent from the previous criterion which was to demonstrate minimal compe-
tence viz-A-viz the members of the peer group taking the same examination.
More than seventy percent of all the 700,000 lawyers in the United States
are solo practitioners or are members of a practice constituted of three or
fewer lawyers; therefore it is vital that the standard be competence to prac-
tice law unsupervised.
Ann Fisher, Examining Ourselves: Observations of a Bar Examiner: An Interview
with John E. Holt-Harris, Jr., B. EXAMINER, May 1996, at 4.
4. Kristin Booth Glen, When and Where We Enter: Rethinking Admission to
the Legal Profession, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1696 (2002).
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City of New York and the New York State Bar Association,5
have generated many questions that this longer version ad-
dresses. I hope also that this article will be a useful beginning
resource for others thinking about how we admit lawyers into
the profession.6
The opportunity to publish the article in this issue of the
Pace Law Review seems especially serendipitous for two rea-
sons. First, of course, the connection and resonance with a cele-
bration of the MacCrate Report is obvious. I am honored to be
in the company of others who have thought so deeply and cre-
atively about this milestone in legal education. Second, Pace is
the location of a new Institute on Judicial Education, and, as
such, is more directly connected to the state judiciary than any
other law school in New York. Because my proposal looks to the
court system-and because the Court of Appeals is ultimately
responsible for setting the standards for admission to the bar-
the judiciary's willingness to consider experimentation concern-
ing the bar exam is critical. 7 The potential for synergy here is
obvious, and I hope this publication will advance the goal of
finding a better way to ensure competence in those admitted to
practice law, as well as to advance our commitment to a more
diverse and representative profession.
II. Introduction
Although the written bar examination is of relatively re-
cent vintage, for those of us who practice law or work in legal
5. THE COMMITTEE ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR OF THE
ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. AND THE N.Y. STATE BAR ASSOCIA-
TION, Public Service Alternative Bar Examination (2002) (proposing a pilot of the
PSABE) [hereinafter BAR COMMITTEE REPORT] (on file with author).
6. See Glen, supra note 4. The earlier article, like this one, is more a concep-
tion than a true proposal. A great deal of additional work by experts far more
knowledgeable and experienced than I in a number of fields will be necessary to
design and evaluate a pilot of the PSABE.
7. A study commissioned by the Court of Appeals in 1992, called for experi-
mentation to increase the skills tested by the bar examination and provided strong
support for an innovation like the PSABE. Jason Millman et al., An Evaluation of
the New York State Bar Examination (May 2003) [hereinafter Millman study] (on
file with author). The evaluation, and the particular ways in which it mirrors ar-
guments made here, are discussed in the penultimate section of the article which
is specifically directed to New York.
348 [Vol. 23:343
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol23/iss2/1
2003] THINKING OUT OF THE BAR EXAM BOX 349
education, it seems always to have been there.8 I have encoun-
tered the bar exam personally as a student, litigator, law
teacher, trial and appellate judge, and most recently as a law
school dean. I have also reflected on the bar exam as a member
of various bar association committees on legal education. 9
Throughout these experiences, my opinion, like that of many
other participant observers, is that the examination is both mis-
guided in terms of what it purports to do, and pernicious in its
effects. Yet despite the fact that lawyers are, above all, problem
solvers, 10 little has been done about the bar exam as a problem"
8. See, e.g., Robert M. Jarvis, An Anecdotal History of the Bar Exam, 9 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 359 (1996). The first written bar examination was given in Massa-
chusetts in 1885, although oral examinations continued in many states for many
years. Id. at 374; see also ALFRED Z. REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION
OF THE LAW 100-01 (1921). Until 1933, citizens of Indiana were permitted to prac-
tice law without taking a bar exam, written or oral, and without even graduating
from law school. Bernard C. Gavit, Indiana's Constitution and the Problem of Ad-
mission to the Bar, 16 A.B.A. J. 595, 595 (1930). Today, all states use written bar
exams. Jarvis, supra, at 374. However, Wisconsin still employs a diploma privi-
lege which permits graduates of the two Wisconsin law schools, University of Wis-
consin and Marquette, to gain admission to its bar without taking the Wisconsin
bar exam. See Beverly Moran, The Wisconsin Diploma Privilege: Try It, You'll Like
It, 2000 WIs. L. REV. 645, 646 (2000).
9. I served as a member of the Committee on Legal Education and Admissions
to the Bar of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York from 1993-95,
immediately after publication of that Committee's critical report on the bar exam.
See Comm. on Legal Educ. and Admission to the Bar, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of
New York, Report on Admission to the Bar in New York in the Twenty First Cen-
tury - A Blueprint for Reform, 47 THE RECORD 472, 484, 503-04 (1992) [hereinaf-
ter ABCNY Bar Report]. I also served as a member of the Committee on Legal
Education and Admissions to the Bar of the New York State Bar Association from
1995 through the present, and am currently Vice Chair of the Diversity Committee
of the ABA Section on Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar.
10. See Roy T. Stuckey, Education for the Practice of Law: The Times They are
A-Changin, 75 NEB. L. REV. 648 (1996) for an excellent application of the impor-
tance of problem-solving to practice, and discussion of teaching problem solving as
a "lawyering skill." See generally Paul Brest & linda Hamilton Tr-eger, Lawyers
as Problems Solvers, 72 TEMPLE L. REV. 811 (1999); Janet Reno, Lawyers as Prob-
lem Solvers: Keynote Address to the AALS, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 5 (1999).
11. As at least one commentator has noted, one of the perplexing things about
those who most vehemently question the current bar examination system-on a
variety of grounds-is that rather than arguing for its elimination, they instead
propose that it simply be altered. See Daniel R. Hansen, Do We Need the Bar Ex-
amination? A Critical Evaluation of the Justification for the Bar Examination and
Proposed Alternatives, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1191, 1228 (1995). But see, e.g.,
Trina Grillo, Anti-Essentialism and Intersectionality: Tools to Dismantle the
Master's House, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 16, 28-29 (1995) (calling for radical
change, and a "struggle against the tyranny we have permitted ... the Bar Exam-
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besides studies, 12 hand wringing and modest tinkering. 13 How-
ever, the problem has not gone unnoticed. In the last several
years, the Society of American Law Teachers (SALT) has under-
taken a re-examination of the bar exam, holding a national con-
ference, issuing a statement, and fostering several law review
articles.' 4 The Carnegie Foundation has begun a multi-year set
of studies on professional education which, in the initial volume
on legal education, examines and proposes changes in the bar
examination. 5
Much of the energy which could be employed to continue
and expand this initiative has, however, been deflected into a
defensive posture, in the face of a campaign to raise passing bar
scores 16 and thus lower the percentage of applicants who pass.
iners ... over decisions about.., who gets a job, who is thought of as smart, and
who thinks well of herself once having arrived."); Joan Howarth, Teaching in the
Shadow of the Bar, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 927 (1997) (collecting critiques of the bar
examination regime in memory of Grillo's work).
12. To my mind, the most comprehensive study done of a particular state bar
exam, with application for all existing bar exams, was done by the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York, Committee on Legal Education and Admissions to
the Bar. ABCNY Bar Report, supra note 9.
13. The three major changes which have occurred in the last three decades
are adoption of the Multi-state Bar Examination (the MBE), a six-hour, 200 multi-
ple-choice question exam prepared by the National Conference of Bar Examiners
(NCBE), which is now used in forty-eight states, the Multi-State Professional Re-
sponsibility Examination (MPRE), a two-hour, fifty question test, used in forty-
seven states, also prepared by the NCBE, and introduction of "performance test"
questions which have been utilized by California since 1983, and which, in a vari-
ation authored by NCBE, have now been adopted by twenty-five states. Jarvis,
supra note 8, at 374, 378, 384-85. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF BAR ExAMINERs & AMERI-
CAN BAR ASS'N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, COMPREHEN-
SIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSIONS REQUIREMENTS 2002, 21 Chart VI (Erica Moesor &
Margaret Fuller Corneille eds., 2002) [hereinafter COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE]. For
more extensive discussion of the MPT, see infra notes 296-309. None of these
changes has substantially affected the criticism of the bar exam made herein.
14. Soc'Y OF AM. LAW TEACHERS, Statement on the Bar Exam, 52 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 446 (2002). See also Andrea A. Curcio, A Better Bar: Why and How the
Existing Bar Exam Should Change, 81 NEB. L. REV. 363 (2002); Howarth, supra
note 11; Moran, supra note 8.
15. Judith Wegner, Study of Legal Education (forthcoming).
16. It should be noted at the outset that discussion of "bar pass rate" is almost
always about first-time pass rate, notwithstanding the fact that many applicants
pass on their second or subsequent takings. This is largely true because the ABA
requires law schools to report only first-time bar pass rates. See ABA, 2002 An-
nual Questionnaire, Part I, Section 11, Bar Passage Rates & Placement (Employ-
ment), available at www.abanet.org/ftp/pub/legaled/general.doc (on file with
author). Partly, however, it is because bar examiners do not uniformly collect-or
350
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Law professors and law deans have mobilized in Florida and
Minnesota and have, at least temporarily, halted the proposed
increases. 17 New York is in the midst of a proposal to raise its
bar pass score,'8 and other states can be expected to follow. The
serious flaws in the arguments for raising scores-which take
on a kind of "we're tougher than you are" competitive tone19-
have been well examined in an excellent recent article by
Professors Deborah Merritt, Lowell Hargens and Barbara
Reskin. 20
The movement to raise bar passage scores is linked,21 as
Merritt shows, to the current national obsession with "stan-
dards."22 This obsession is unjustified in the context of licensing
disseminate-statistics on second-time passage. John A. Sebert, Information that
Bar Admissions Authorities Should Share with Law Schools, Feb. 8, 2001, in Mem-
orandum from John A. Sebert, Consultant on Legal Education, ABA Section of Le-
gal Education and Admission to the Bar, to the Deans of ABA-Approved Law
Schools (copy on file with author). Noting that "a number of law schools have sug-
gested that the ABA-LSAC Official Guide contain data on both first-and second-
time bar passage results." Id. at 2. The ABA Consultant on Legal Education has
called on state bar examiners to separately report first, second, third and fourth
time or more takers because such data "is important both for accreditation review
and consumer information." Id.
17. Interview with Dean Joseph Harbaugh, Dean of Nova Southeastern Uni-
versity, in Seattle, Wash. (Feb. 9, 2003).
18. NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS, Report and Recommendation
of the New York State Board of Law Examiners to the Court of Appeals Regarding
the Passing Standard on the New York State Bar Examination (Mar. 2002) [herein-
after Report and Recommendation] (on file with author) (proposing an increase in
the passing score in New York from 660 to 675).
19. Wegner sees this as part of the increasing movement to "sort," rather than
to "weed," students/applicants. Wegner, supra note 15. See discussion infra note
106.
20. Deborah J. Merritt et al., Raising the Bar: A Social Science Critique of
Recent Increases to Passing Scores on the Bar Exam, 69 U. CIN L. REV. 929 (2001)
(criticizing recent discussions to raise bar passage scores for lacking sufficient evi-
dence that change was needed, as well as critiquing the social science model used
to justify such increases).
21. For an alternative explanation, see William C. Kidder, The Bar Examina-
tion and the Dream Deferred: A Critical Analysis of the MBE, Social Closure, and
Racial and Ethnic Stratification (Jan. 8, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, under
submission to LAW & SOCL INQUIRY, on file with author) [hereinafter Dream De-
ferred] (arguing that rather than increasing quality, changes in passing standards
are a response to a perceived oversupply of lawyers).
22. See, e.g. Glen, supra note 4, at 1700; PETER SACKS, STANDARDIZED MINDS:
THE HIGH PRICE OF AMERICA'S TESTING CULTURE AND WHAT WE CAN Do To
CHANGE IT (1999). For a critique of objective testing premised in the values of
opportunity and inclusion, see Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirm-
9
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lawyers 23 and, along with other disadvantaging factors, may
create an even greater and unjustified barrier to entry into the
profession for non-majority students than does the present bar
exam.24 This additional danger underscores the need to think
"out of the box"25 with regard to the bar exam.26
I have, for some time, been thinking in this more expansive
way about the bar examination and the role it plays-or doesn't
play-in legal education and admission to the profession. I
ative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REV. 953 (1996). I place
"standards" in quotes because I believe that the term is used, quite deliberately in
the political area, to connote rigor and excellence, while it actually refers to arbi-
trary results on standardized tests which have historically disadvantaged non-
whites and often women.
23. There has been no objective demonstration of a decrease in the quality of
lawyers admitted pursuant to existing standards, nor of any other specific problem
which the passing score is intended to address. See Merritt et al., supra note 20.
24. Id. at 930; Dream Deferred, supra note 21, at 33-36. I want to be clear
that the existing and potentially greater barrier to admission for non-majority stu-
dents is a result of the disparate impact of the current bar exam. I contend that
this is a problem with the test and not the test-takers. See discussion infra at
Section V.
25. See, e.g., John Sexton's provocative address to the Section on Legal Educa-
tion at the London 2000 meeting of the American Bar Association, John Sexton,
Thinking About the Training of Lawyers in the Next Millennium, THE LAW SCHOOL,
Autumn 2000, at 34, which resulted in the ABA Section on Legal Education and
Admissions to the Bar creating an "Out-of-the-Box" Committee, first co-chaired by
Dean Sexton and Dean John Attanasio of Southern Methodist Law School. In
2001, Dean Sexton resigned and was replaced by Diane Yu, a former chair of the
section.
26. Others are also proposing significant changes to the existing bar examina-
tion. For example, Judith Wegner argues for a three-stage "examination" begin-
ning in law school and concluding after the applicant has entered the profession
and amassed a "portfolio of professional references." Wegner, supra note 15. Bev-
erly Moran proposes expansion of the diploma privilege. Moran, supra note 8.
Meanwhile, Daniel Hansen argues for a post-graduation clerkship based on, and
modified from, the current Canadian system. Hansen, supra note 11. Curcio re-
views the possibilities for changing the bar exam through computer-based testing
(CBT). Curcio, supra note 14, at 394-98. The Dean and students at Arizona State
Law School are developing a proposal for an Americorps-like post-graduate prac-
tice year in lieu of the current bar exam. See Glen, supra note 4, at 1702 n.15.
This latter proposal is currently the subject of a Task Force convened by the Ari-
zona State Bar Association. Interview with Dean Patricia D. White, Arizona State
University College of Law Dean, Seattle, Wash. (Feb. 8, 2003). While I have some
concerns about the practicality of the latter idea, all these reforms have value. My
proposal, more like Wegner's, challenges the underlying justification for the ex-
isting process and attempts to create practical possibilities for bar examiners look-
ing to make the examination a more tailored and accurate measure of an
applicant's minimum competence to practice law.
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have slowly developed, "with a [lot of] help from my friends,"27 a
plan for modest, but potentially real change. My proposal is for
a new, experience and performance-based bar examination-
which, because it would be conducted in a public service setting,
I have called the Public Service Alternative Bar Examination
(PSABE). The PSABE is intended to avoid many of the
problems connected with the existing bar exam and, although
not intended to entirely supplant that test (hence, the "Alterna-
tive"), to better evaluate and certify law graduates' minimum
competence to practice law unsupervised.
28
Over the last several years, I have discussed the possibility
of a PSABE with lawyers, legal educators, bar examiners, bar
association officials, judges and others interested in the profes-
sion.29 These conversations, and the additional research they
prompted, have persuaded me that there is now a window for
real change. The combination of increasingly vocal criticism of
the profession,30 uncertainty within legal education,31 and in-
27. See THE BEATLES, A Little Help From My Friends, on SERGEANT PEPPER'S
LONELY HEARTS CLUB BAND (EMI/Capitol Records 1967).
28. See Fisher, supra note 3.
29. I have been informally discussing the idea of a public service alternative
bar exam with many friends and colleagues, since it was first suggested to me by
Alfred Lerner, then Presiding Justice, Appellate Division, First Department, New
York State Supreme Court. They include the CUNY School of Law faculty, law
deans from New York and New Jersey, judges and administrators in the New York
State Unified Court system, members of the Committee on Legal Education and
Admissions to the Bar of the New York State Bar Association and the Association
of the Bar of the City of New York, members of the site visit team of the Carnegie
Foundation Multi-Year Study on Professional Education, participants at the ABA,
AALS, LSAC Conference on Diversity held in Denver in October, 2000, partici-
pants in the AALS Equal Justice Colloquium held at Pace Law School on October
26, 2000, and the ABA Deans Workshop held in January 2002 and February 2003.
I first presented the outline of this article at the SALT Teaching Conference:
Teaching, Testing and the Politics of Legal Education in the 21st Century, October
21, 2000, when I spoke on a panel entitled: "High Stakes Testing in Law Schools
and the Legal Profession." I want to express my appreciation for all the ideas
which have come from these conversations and which I have incorporated in my
own thoughts about the issue.
30. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, The Profession and the Public Interest, 54
STAN. L. REV. 1501, 1502-08 [hereinafter Profession and Public Interest] (discuss-
ing criticisms of, and problems in, the profession).
31. See, e.g., Kenneth M. Casebeer, 2001: A Global Odyssey Prompted by the
Merritt-Cihon Upper Level Curriculum Report of the AALS, 30 U. MIAMI INTER-AM.
L. REV. 415 (1998); Wallace Loh, Introduction: The MacCrate Report-Heuristic or
Prescriptive?, 69 WASH. L. REV. 505 (1994); Richard A. Matasar, The MacCrate
Report from the Dean's Perspective, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 457 (1994); Andrew J. Roth-
11
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creasing scrutiny of, and concern about, the influence of high
stakes testing32 has created a space, and perhaps a demand, to
ask basic questions about how the bar exam itself performs.
The shifting terrain on which the profession and legal education
now stands 33 provides the opportunity to imagine and advocate
alternatives. This essay is intended to stimulate thought, en-
courage research 34 and challenge my colleagues in both legal ed-
ucation and the legal profession generally. For while this
man, Preparing Law School Graduates for Practice: A Blueprint for Professional
Education Following the Medical Profession Example, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 875
(1999); Sexton, supra note 25; Amy Travison Jasiewicz, Experts Contemplate Fu-
ture of the Legal Profession, and How Attorneys Can Prepare, N.Y. STATE B. NEWS,
July-Aug. 2001, at 18.
32. See, e.g., Mary C. Waters & Carolyn Boyes-Watson, The Promise of Diver-
sity, in WHO'S QUALIFIED? 55, 56 (Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier eds., 2001) ("The
argument that much standardized testing is of questionable value in predicting
future success, and largely reflects the past cultural and economic advantages of
the test taker is hardly new. But with the testing mania currently sweeping the
nation, it is certainly worthy of broad dissemination."); Jennifer Mueller, Facing
the Unhappy Day: Three Aspects of the High Stakes Testing Movement, 11 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 201 (2002) (describing the history of, and arguments in, the de-
bate); Peter Sacks, How Admissions Tests Hinder Access to Graduate and Profes-
sional Schools, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., June 8, 2001, at Bl; Philip Shelton,
Admissions Tests: Not Perfect, Just the Best Measures We Have, CHRON. OF HIGHER
EDUC., July 6, 2001, at B15. The importance of standardized tests for college ad-
missions has been seriously challenged by the University of California's decision to
abandon the general SAT as a requirement for admission. See UC Panel Recom-
mends Replacing SAT, But No Earlier Than 2006, at http://www.ucop.edu/path-
ways/ucnotes/mar02/sat.html (Mar. 2002); Regents Receptive to Proposed Test
Changes, available at http://www.ucop.edu/pathways/ucnotes/may02/regents.htm
(May-June 2002). Responding to UC's decision, and other criticism, the College
Board has recently announced its intention to revise the test. See, e.g., Tamar
Lewin, College Board to Revise SAT After Criticism by University, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 23, 2002, at A10; James Traub, The Test Mess, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2002, § 6
(Magazine), at 46.
33. For example, consider the debate about multidisciplinary practice which
goes to the very heart of what it means to be a professional. See, e.g., Neil W.
Hamilton, MDPS: View the Bigger Picture, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 24, 2000, at A23; MDP
in NY: OCA Adopts Rules Proposed by NYSBA, N.Y. STATE B. NEWS, July-Aug.
2001, at 1; Joseph P. Sullivan, MDP Demands Critical Review, N.Y. L.J., May 1,
2000, at S1. See also NYSBA Special Committee on the Law Governing Firm
Structure and Operation, Preserving the Core Values of the American Legal Profes-
sion, available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/mdp/mdpl.htm.
34. As will be readily apparent to the reader, many complex areas of research
and intellectual inquiry bear upon this proposal. More extensive explication
awaits another day-and another author-as the purpose here is to suggest and
provoke. This choice, and the justifiable criticisms of particular sections of this
essay which it may engender, should not detract from the larger issues raised and
the proposed movement to experiment and change.
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proposal for a PSABE is primarily about testing, inclusion, and
the responsibilities of legal education, it should also engage our
highest aspirations for excellence in the profession, and our
deepest commitments to diversity and democracy.
III. Some Perverse Effects of the Bar Exam
Many reasons for reforming the evaluation process for li-
censing legal professionals are embedded in the most cherished
and oft-repeated beliefs of legal education and the profession.
Given many of our values, like faculty control over curriculum,
informed consumers, diversity, and competence, the bar exam
is, to use the old gender-based equal protection language, "actu-
ally perverse." 35 What follows is a preliminary list, with no in-
tent to rank the issues by the order in which they are presented.
a) Relieving Law Schools of Responsibility
Under ABA standards, law schools have an obligation to
"prepare [their] graduates for admission to the bar and to par-
ticipate effectively and responsibly in the legal profession," 36
but, in many ways, the existence of the bar exam lets law
schools off the hook. Over the years, I have heard many faculty
conversations that include confessions about passing questiona-
ble students (or, at least, students whose work did not suggest
total or adequate comprehension of the subject matter) for hu-
mane reasons. 37 I suspect that many more such conversations
are held silently in the hearts of colleagues. These law teachers
were, I imagine, comforted by the conscience-assuaging belief
that their version of "social promotion" would not loose incom-
35. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 213 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
36. ABA STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 301(a) (2002) [hereinaf-
ter ABA STANDARDS]. In 1976, Professor Roy Stuckey expressed hope that the
combination of new ABA Accreditation Standards, of which 301(a) was one, and
the MacCrate Report, supra note 1, would, together with "unprecedented calls for
reform [of legal education] from students, the public, and the legal profession"
cause "law schools to improve the preparation of lawyers for practice." Stuckey,
supra note 10, at 659. Unfortunately, his expectations have remained largely
unrealized.
37. See Katherine L. Vaughns, Towards Parity in Bar Passage Rates and Law
School Performance: Exploring the Sources of Disparities Between Racial and Eth-
nic Groups, 16 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 425, 464 (1991) ("at least one commentator
has observed that law professors are loathe to fail anyone .... ") (citation omitted).
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petent graduates upon the public; the bar exam could be ex-
pected to protect against that undesirable result. For many
tuition-driven law schools, there are financial imperatives to
admit as many students as possible (these schools tend to be
those not so deeply concerned by U.S. News and World Report).
They can do so, and pass those students through, collecting tui-
tion along the way; (and also salving the consciences of their
faculties in the ways described above) secure, although perhaps
falsely, in the belief that the bar exam will separate the wheat
from the chaff and fulfill the profession's responsibility of ad-
mitting only those who are competent to practice law. 38 Rather
than relying on the bar exam, we should insist that law schools
meet their obligations to their students and to the profession.
b) Impact on Admissions Decisions
There is another way in which the bar exam lets law
schools off the hook. Because the goal of passing the bar, or
rather of having a high bar pass rate, is one which is not invisi-
ble to admissions offices and directors, 39 they tend to admit only
those students who show a high degree of likelihood that they
38. One of the original justifications for the bar exam was to protect the public
from the potentially ill-prepared graduates of a burgeoning number of law schools
which lacked the high standards of earlier, more elite, institutions. See, e.g., Han-
sen, supra note 11, at 1205-06; Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Think Like a Lawyer, Work
Like a Machine: The Dissonance Between Law School and Law Practice, 64 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1231, 1245-46 (1991).
39. One of the frequently repeated justifications for the bar exam is that it
forces law schools to keep "standards high," thus ensuring that if a school's stu-
dents do not pass the examination, the school will be forced to improve its pro-
gram. See, e.g., Erwin N. Griswold, In Praise of Bar Examinations, 60 A.B.A. J. 81
(1974); Michael Bard & Barbara E. Bamford, The Bar: Professional Association or
Medieval Guild?, 19 CATH. U. L. REV. 393, 408 (1970). A more likely result-and a
quicker "fix"-is that law schools will stop admitting students they believe have a
lesser chance of passing the bar. See, e.g., Wegner, supra note 15; Vaughns, supra
note 37. The recent spate of law schools which have substantially downsized their
entering classes suggests the validity of this supposition. See Patricia G. Barnes,
Cutting Classes: Many Law Schools Are Shrinking Along with the Job Market,
A.B.A. J., Dec., 1995, at 26, 26; Phillip J. Closius, The Incredible Shrinking Law
School, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 581 (2000); Phillip S. Figa, Colorado Bar Association
President's Message to Members: The First Thing We Do, Let's Kill All the Law
Schools (With Apologies to Dick the Butcher), COLO. LAW., May 1996, at 13-14; Alan
B. Rabkin, A Law School in Nevada? Why Should I Care?: Thoughts on Crossing
the Bridge, NEVADA LAW., Jan. 1996, at 10, 11.
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will pass the bar on the first try.40 LSAT scores, which have
some predictive value, thus take on excessive importance in the
admissions process.41 This pressure adds another incentive to
give excessive weight to LSAT scores, provided by the much
bemoaned, but hugely influential US News and World Report
annual ranking of law schools.42
There is another more subtle consequence to this excessive
reliance on scores. As a near-definitive Law School Admission
Council (LSAC) study43 tells us is the case with the LSAT, if you
take students who know how to take a test almost exactly like
the bar exam, and know how to take it successfully, you don't
have to do much with those students in law school in order to
assure their success on the bar exam.44 They are pre-program-
med to succeed on the examination, which ensures admission to
the profession,45 so the law school and its faculty are free to do
40. See, e.g., Howarth, supra note 11, at 928 ("[Tlhe bar exam is a key factor in
determining who gets into law school .... All but the most elite law schools face
constant pressure regarding bar pass[ I rates."). Conversely, tuition-dependent,
lower-tier law schools may engage in the equally unfortunate practice of admitting
many questionably qualified applicants and then "impos[ing] [excessively] strin-
gent retention requirements in order to enhance pass [] rates for graduates who
take the bar." Wegner, supra note 15.
41. Howarth, supra note 11, at 928 ("Given the correlation between [the LSAT
and the bar exam] over-reliance on the LSAT is largely driven at less elite law
schools by bar passage pressure.").
42. For the importance of U.S. News and World Report's rankings to law
schools, for example, Nancy B. Rapoport, Ratings, Not Rankings: Why U.S. News
and World Report Shouldn't Want to be Compared to Time and Newsweek-or The
New Yorker, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1097, 1098 (1999), in which she argues for the use of
broad measures of quality for ratings, rather than ranking law schools.
43. Linda F. Wightman, LSAC National Longitudinal Bar Passage Study
(LSAC Research Rep. Series 1998) [hereinafter LSAC Study]; see discussion infra
notes 164-84 and accompanying text.
44. An early American Bar Foundation study demonstrated that the bar exam
merely verifies law school grades, which, at least in the first year, are correlated to
LSAT scores. ALFRED B. CARLSON & CHARLES E. WERTS, LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS
COUNCIL, Relationships Among Law School Predictors, Law School Performance,
and Bar Examination Results, in 3 REPORTS OF LSAC SPONSERED RESEARCH 211,
253 (1977). The more recent LSAC Bar Study reaches the same conclusion. See
LSAC Study, supra note 43. This raises an additional question: If the bar exam
basically verifies successful law school performance, is it not redundant, and why
bother with the bar exam at all? See Hansen, supra note 11, at 1206.
45. Wegner demonstrates how students who have developed particular ana-
lytical skills prior to law school will not only score higher on the LSAT, but will
carry that advantage into first-year grades. Once the advantage is "built in," it is
difficult, if not impossible, for others who develop the skill later to catch up, since
15
358 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:343
as much or as little with those students during their three years
as they desire. 46 In many instances, perhaps, particularly in
the elite schools, 47 this results more in intellectually interesting
theoretical conversations disconnected from the practice of law
than in learning the skills and substance required for effective
practice. 48 I do not mean to devalue theory, interdisciplinary or
other intellectual work conducted at a high level, all of which
the bar exam not only correlates with law school grades, but is actually, to some
degree, scaled to them, at least to the extent that the same skills tested on the bar
exam are emphasized in most law school courses. See, e.g., Howarth, supra note
11. A self-fulfilling prophecy emerges: if a law school can capture those students
who have the relevant skills in its admissions process, it can be reasonably confi-
dent of their ultimate success, whatever it does with them over the ensuing three
years. See Wegner, supra note 15. While Wegner does not explicitly make this
argument, it can be fairly inferred.
46. Vaughns, supra note 37, at 471, citing Derrich A. Bell, Black Students in
White Law Schools: The Ordeal and the Opportunity, 1970 U. TOL. L. REV. 539, 555
("[Alt some of the most highly regarded law schools the number of applicants ex-
ceed the number of admissions by so substantial a margin that the quality of stu-
dent accepted is so high many of them could learn the law if the school merely
provided them with the books."). See also Moran, supra note 8, at 651.
47. These elite institutions, which generally serve as gateways for the large
firms, have also been able, at least in the past, to rely on the firms to supply train-
ing in lawyering skills, and even in some of the substantive law which the gradu-
ates will practice.
Legal educators at elite schools produce what they must perceive to be a
finished product, one capable of entering the practice of law upon gradua-
tion. Law firms, however, view that finished product as, at best, a diamond
in the rough. They still must educate new associates about the intricacies of
the practice of law. From the perspective of these firms, law schools do not
produce lawyers. Some megafirms have adapted so well to this state of af-
fairs that they actually prefer to train their attorneys within their own
systems.
Johnson, supra note 38, 1245-46. Unfortunately, with the ever-increasing demand
for billable hours, the opportunities for such in-house training are declining or dis-
appearing. See Fulton Haight, Law Schools Are Still Training People to Be Associ-
ates in Major Law Firms, B. EXAMINER, Feb. 1990, at 24-25; Douglas D. Roche,
Practice Skills Teaching and Testing as Part of the Bar Admissions Process, B.
EXAMINER, Feb. 1995, at 27; Deborah L. Rhode, The Profession and Its Discontents,
61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1335, 1339 (2000); Colloquium, The Lives and Times of Law
School Deans: Local Leaders of Legal Academy Sound Off, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 7,
1998, at S32; Legal Bill, THE AMERICAN LAWYER, May 1997, at 7.
48. ABA accreditation standards have evolved to encompass the movement
from a purely doctrinal and analytical mode of law school teaching tested on the
bar to a requirement that law schools actually prepare graduates for law practice.
See Robert MacCrate, Preparing Lawyers to Participate Effectively in the Legal
Profession, B. EXAMINER, Feb. 1995, at 36, 37-38 (chronicling the amendment of
Standard 301a to incorporate, in part, concerns expressed by the MacCrate
Report).
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are also important at schools like CUNY, but rather to suggest
that commitment to an excessively theoretical pedagogy, to the
exclusion of lawyering skills and practice-oriented instruction,
fails to adequately serve the profession and the public.
c) Control over Curriculum
The next "perverse effect" of the bar exam relates to the
curriculum. One of the major arguments made against the di-
ploma privilege in Wisconsin and in the past, other states, is
that the tradeoff for automatic admission to the bar is substan-
tially greater state control over the curriculum of law schools in
those states.49 This flies in the face of the widely-accepted belief
that a law school's faculty should control the law school's curric-
ulum. 50 In fact, however, although the faculty may design and
determine the curriculum, the decision by bar examiners as to
which subjects to test5 1 has a huge impact upon the choices
49. The history of the diploma privilege is fully set forth in Moran, supra note
8. Wisconsin's diploma privilege has been characterized as "the most restrictive
... ever written." Thomas W. Goldman, Use of the Diploma Privilege in The United
States, 10 TULSA L.J. 36, 42 (1972). It requires that students take ten specific
courses (or thirty credits) and achieve a grade point average of seventy-seven, and,
further, that students take at least sixty of their law school credits in thirty subject
areas also receiving at least a seventy-seven average. Moran, supra note 8, at 648.
50. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Curriculum Structure and Faculty
Structure, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 326, 329 (1985). For a more recent review, incorpo-
rating increased knowledge of and concerns about experiential learning and skills
training, see Stuckey, supra note 10, at 663-65. Where state rules on Bar admis-
sion required that substantial curricular requirements be satisfied by applicants,
the American Bar Association criticized them (in the case of Indiana and South
Carolina) on the grounds that they "interfere[d] with the duty and responsibility of
each individual law school faculty to determine and periodically to revise the law
school curriculum .... " James P. White, Legal Education in the Era of Change:
Law School Autonomy, 1987 DuKE L.J. 292, 297.
51. See George N. Stevens, Diploma Privilege, Bar Examination or Open Ad-
_._ _ _ _ ,- J - I I 1 s .. O. -CII n . t t fll nu, u -auc V.,
the bar exam, including the need for the State Bar to "retain a voice in the qualifi-
cation process, either through a bar examination or by insisting upon a direct voice
in compulsory curriculum planning .. "). In fact, the bar exam gives the state-
through its bar examiners, if not the state bar itself-a substantial, if not compul-
sory, say in the law school curriculum. See also W. Sherman Rogers, Title VII
Preemption of State Bar Examinations: Applicability of Title VII to State Occupa-
tional Licensing Tests, 32 How. L.J. 563, 566 n.14 (1989) (citing Charles D. Kelso,
In the Shadow of the Bar Examiner, Can True Lawyering be Taught?, in LEARNING
AND THE LAw 39, 45 (Charles D. Kelso ed., 1976) ("Bar examinations have a ten-
dency to turn law schools into high powered cram courses by forcing students to
make curricular choices based on subjects tested by the bar.").
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made by students in their course selection.52 The law school
curriculum is controlled de facto, as opposed to de jure, by the
bar examiners.5 3 Thus, whatever electives may be offered in
any given institution, students almost invariably flock to those
courses which are tested on the bar examination. 54 Whether or
not this is a good thing for students and/or legal education, 55 the
faculty's control of the curriculum is more illusory than real.
On the other hand, there is an additional "perverse effect,"
whereby the bar exam, as shaped by the bar examiners' choice
of subjects to be covered, affects law school curricula. For exam-
ple, several years ago in New York when the bar examiners de-
creased the number of subjects tested on the bar, they included
administrative law5 6 among the newly-purged subjects. Most
observers of law practice as well as most practicing lawyers
would confirm that administrative or agency law, after con-
tracts, is perhaps the single subject most commonly encoun-
tered by lawyers in our state.57  However, because
administrative law is no longer tested, few schools now require
52. See, e.g., Howarth, supra note 11, at 928; ABCNY Bar Report, supra note
9, at 479.
53. This was one of the arguments for the bar exam propounded by one of its
great defenders, Erwin Griswold. J.R. Jubin, Perceptions and Plans for Testing,
Research & Development, B. EXAMINER, May 1986, at 11, 12, 14 (remarks of Dean
Griswold). See Carolyn E. Jones, The Bar Exam: To Be or Not to Be; That is the
Question, B. EXAMINER, May 1994, at 15, 16.
54. See Hansen, supra note 11, at 1221 ("Even if a school has broad offerings,
the students may select their courses with an eye toward the bar exam, taking only
courses which they perceive will help them on the bar exam instead of courses they
perceive will help them in their careers.").
55. The Working Group on Diversity of the ABA Out-of-the-Box Committee
suggests that because "the topics covered on the exam make up a large part of
most law students' actual curriculum . . . [the bar exam] constrains curricular of-
ferings, especially in smaller law schools." Working Group on Diversity, Position
Paper 19, Sept. 23, 2002, in Memorandum from Dean John Attanasio & Diane C.
Yu, Esq., Co-Chairs, Out-of-the-Box Committee, ABA Section of Legal Education,
to the Deans of ABA-Approved Law Schools [hereinafter Position Paper] (on file
with author).
56. ABCNY Bar Report, supra note 9, at 476; N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS.
tit. 22, § 6000.6(b) (2000).
57. Significantly, familiarity with the administrative law process is among
the skills in MacCrate Skills, Litigation and Alternative Dispute Resolution Proce-
dures, 8.3(a) "Knowledge of the Fundamentals of Advocacy in Administrative and
Executive Forums .. " MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 195.
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it, few students choose it,58 and a generation of law graduates
may now enter practice with little or no understanding of this
important area.
d) Creating False Consumer Confidence
The fourth "perverse effect" of the bar exam is that it cre-
ates an all-together false sense of security for consumers. 59
Most people believe that the bar exam is a rigorous test which
weeds out those who are capable of practicing law from those
who are not.60 The belief that the bar examination in fact pro-
tects consumers of legal services is widespread. 61 And yet, this
belief is, based on my experience and on the anecdotal experi-
ence of my judicial colleagues, as well as the recorded numbers
of disciplinary complaints and malpractice actions, demonstra-
bly untrue.62 If we were to seriously hold law schools to a stan-
58. Recognizing the importance of administrative law to the actual practice of
the law, CUNY has retained it as a required course. Only two of the other fourteen
New York law schools require their students take a course containing a basic ad-
ministrative law component. Columbia requires "Foundations of the Regulatory
State," while Hofstra includes some Administrative Law in "Legislating Institu-
tions," where instructional focus is shared with courts and legislatures. Cardozo
encourages, but does not require, students to take Administrative Law. Review of
all NY State law school catalogs and websites, June 2002.
59. This is probably more true for individuals than for high-end users of legal
services like corporations. Given the proliferation of lawyer advertising, individu-
als are more likely to choose lawyers with whom they-or their friends or associ-
ates-have had no prior contact, so that the presumption of competence is
especially (if not always in fact) important.
60. Bar examiners rely on this widely held belief. Report and Recommenda-
tion, supra note 18, at 21 ("The public is entitled to the assurance that the licensed
lawyer has the requisite legal knowledge and skills to deliver competent represen-
tation."). For a full discussion of whether the bar exam tests minimal competency
to practice law (which I argue it does not) and what constitutes competency, see
Curcio, supra note 14, at 366 ("It is wrong to represent to the public that bar li-
censing rpn irpmpnft -nure mininal competence when, in fact, these require-
ments screen for only a narrow range of skills that competent lawyers should
possess."); Jeffrey M. Duban, The Bar Exam as a Test of Competence: The Idea
Whose Time Never Came, N.Y. ST. B. J., July-Aug. 1991, at 34, 35-36.
61. This is not inconsistent with the growing disregard in which lawyers are
held. The public can-and I think does-believe that the bar exam weeds out
graduates who are not competent, but that many of those once competent gradu-
ates who pass later become unacceptably careless, unethical, or more concerned
with making money than with doing justice.
62. See, e.g., Gary Spencer, Steady Increase in Complaints Against Lawyers is
Reported, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 8, 1999, at 1; John Caher, Hundreds of Lawyers Disci-
plined, ALB. TIMES-UNION, Sept. 4, 1999, at B2; Denise Callahan, Few Lawyers on
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dard of competence for graduating their students,63 the bar
examination would not be so significant a gatekeeper against
inadequately prepared or incompetent practitioners. Instead,
the law schools are let off the hook, and the bar exam becomes
the only barrier. 64 Unfortunately, it is all too porous for those
who are poorly or inadequately prepared, at the same time that
it is far too solid a barrier for many of those whom anecdotal
experience demonstrates would and will be excellent lawyers. 65
e) Reinforcing the Myth of a "Unitary Profession" and
"Unitary Legal Education"
Fifth, the bar exam perpetuates what I believe to be an un-
healthy myth concerning the unitary nature of the profession
and of legal education. Whatever the original reason for this
mystification in seizing the power of self-governance of the pro-
fession, 66 the reality of today's practice makes a lie of the origi-
Wrong End of Law: Stats Show Number of Sanctioned Solicitors is Rising, IND.
LAW. Mar. 14, 2001, at 11. Though disciplinary complaints and sanctions have
seemed to stabilize in some jurisdictions, see Tom Kertscher, Fewer Lawyers Disci-
plined Last Year, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, Nov. 11, 2000, at 3B (graduates
of law schools in Wisconsin, remember, enjoy the diploma privilege), such actions
are generally on the rise. In some cases, this may be due to increased vigilance.
See Joe Gyan, Jr., La. High Court Says Caseload, Lawyer Disciplinary Actions Up,
THE ADvOCATE, June 1, 2000 at B10; Bruce Schultz, Louisiana's Lawyer Discipline
System Gets Tougher, THE ADVOCATE, Nov. 19, 2000, at Al.
63. This is, presumably, the intent of the 1993 amendment to ABA accredita-
tion Standard 301(a) discussed by MacCrate, supra note 48. See also Stuckey,
supra note 10, at 668 ("The core purpose of legal education is to teach students ...
[to be] minimally competent for their first professional jobs, supervised or
unsupervised.").
64. The ABA and the National Conference of Bar Examiners (NCBE) have
consistently taken the position that "law schools should not be entrusted to certify
competency," Rogers, supra note 51, at 576.
The background of this position may be found in the "Minimum Standards
of the American Bar Association for Legal Education" adopted in 1921 [and
reaffirmed in 1971] which provided that: "[G]raduation from a Law School
should not confer the right of admission to the bar, and that every candidate
should be subject to an examination by public authority to determine his
fitness."
Id. at 575 n.67 (citation omitted).
65. See infra Part XIII(j)(1).
66. See, e.g., David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 799 (1992). For an interesting discussion of the history of (if not the rationale
for) the development of the bar's self-governance, see Special Committee on the
Law Governing Firm Structure and Operation, N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Preserving
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nal notion of unitary practice. I want, however, to be clear here
that I am talking about the practice of the profession, not the
underlying values which, in theory and aspiration, continue to
unite its members. 67 Lawyers can and should reaffirm those
core values regardless of the setting in which they practice.
In practice, however, there are probably few professions as
segmented as the law. 68 At one end of the spectrum, there are
small firm or solo practitioners who practice family or landlord-
tenant law in the lower state courts, or who have practices in-
volving counseling on matters of small economic value. At the
other end, huge firms do incredibly sophisticated mergers and
acquisitions work involving international commercial law and
global capitalism at its most advanced. 69 Lawyers working at
the two ends of the spectrum seldom utilize similar skills or
similar knowledge bases.70 The idea that a single law school
the Core Values of the American Legal Profession, available at http:fl
www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/mdpl.htm. (last visited Feb. 10. 2003).
67. These values are well-described and persuasively presented in the Mac-
Crate Report. MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 87-103. The idea that there is a
common set of ethical norms is a basic premise of the profession. See MODEL CODE
OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Preamble (1983). But see CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MOD-
ERN LEGAL ETHICS § 2.6.2, at 54-55 (1986) (identifying and criticizing this idea).
68. See Paper of the Working Group on the Structure of Legal Education and
the Legal Profession, Multidisciplinary Practice, Competition and Globalization, in
Memorandum from Dean John Attanasio and Diane C. Yu, Esq., Co-Chairs, Out-
of-the-Box Committee, ABA Section of Legal Education, to the Deans of ABA-Ap-
proved Law Schools [hereinafter Structure of Legal Education) (describing the in-
creasing stratification of the legal profession and of legal education). This
stratification is increasing. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, "Old and In the Way": The
Coming Demographic Transformation of the Legal Profession and its Implications
for the Provision of Legal Services, 1999 Wis. L. REV. 1081, 1088 (1999) (demon-
strating a shift from 1967, where businesses bought 39% of legal services, and indi-
viduals bought 55%, to 1992, when businesses' share increased to 51%, and
individuals' decreased to 40%); Profession and Public Interest, supra note 30, at
1508-09.
69. A landmark study of the dichotomy of lawyers' work, focusing on the dis-
tinction between those who serve business or corporate clients, and those who
serve personal clients, was conducted in Chicago in 1975, and again, showing an
even more dramatic spread, in 1995. JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHI-
CAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (1982); John P. Heinz et al.,
The Changing Character of Lawyers' Work: Chicago in 1975 and 1995, 32 LAW &
Soc'y REV. 751 (1998) [hereinafter Changing Character of Lawyers' Work]. This
work coined the phrase, "two hemispheres," for describing the departure from a
perceived "unitary profession." Id. at 752.
70. See Profession and Public Interest, supra note 30, at 1509 ("Legal work-
places vary considerably, and the professional lives of security specialists in a
21
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education equips any lawyer to do every kind of legal work is as
preposterous as the notion that a medical degree insures the
competence of every medical school graduate to do sophisticated
psychopharmacology, patient counseling, preventive medicine,
or brain surgery. Yet the bar exam, which purports to test the
qualifications of law school graduates to practice all varieties
and levels of law, perpetuates the myth of a unitary profession,
redounding to the detriment of consumers in potentially dan-
gerous ways. 71
On a more practical level, perpetuating the myth of the uni-
tary practice of law and the unitary nature of legal education
means that the students in individual institutions with differ-
ing client bases (by which I mean the clients to be served by the
graduates of those institutions) may be seriously ill-served. 72 It
is foolish, or even irresponsible, for law schools to pretend that
all their graduates are going to large firms, and train them ac-
cordingly, when the reality is that more than half will be in solo
large Wall Street firm bear little resemblance to those of small town divorce law-
yers practicing on their own."). I do not mean to suggest that ordinary legal
problems are necessarily less complex, but rather that specialized problems draw
on specialized knowledge bases which are not part of a general legal education.
Intellectual rigor and analytical skills can-and should-be deployed across the
entire spectrum.
71. Gillian Hadfield offers an interesting and provocative critique of the way
in which the myth of the unified profession injures consumers of legal services,
especially personal legal services, by pricing them beyond most consumers ability
to pay, noting also the corresponding threat to lawyers' role in protection of indi-
vidual rights.
[Bly keeping under one roof the multiple roles for a modern legal system-
management of the economy, individual justice, social control, and so on-
the role that complexity and monopoly accord to wealth, rather than cost, in
the market allocation of lawyers perpetuates a system that is heavily, and it
seems increasingly, skewed toward managing the economy rather than safe-
guarding just relationships and democratic institutions.
Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the
Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953, 1004 (2000).
72. Phoebe Haddon is one of the few legal educators who has noted the impor-
tance of determining who will be served by a law school's graduates. Phoebe A.
Haddon, Redefining Our Roles in the Battle for Inclusion of People of Color in Legal
Education, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 709, 721 (1997) ("Few schools examine their own
teaching and curriculum holistically-with an eye toward the clients that lawyers
will be serving....") See also Note: The Relationship Between Equality and Access
in Law School Admissions, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1449, 1457 (2000) (proposing that
law schools evaluate their selection criteria in light of their missions) [hereinafter
Equality and Law School Admission].
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or small practice, 73 confronting entirely different legal issues
and practice concerns. Such myopic training, aided, abetted
and enforced by a unitary bar examination, fails to serve the
actual client population. 74
f) Failure to Test the Law
Sixth, the bar exam, or at least a major and especially im-
portant part of it, the Multi-State Bar Examination (or the
MBE) does not, in fact, test the law which practitioners will ac-
tually encounter and apply when they enter the profession. 75
The MBE is a major component of almost all bar exams, gener-
ally taking up one full day of a standard two-day bar examina-
tion. 76 The MBE consists of 200 multiple-choice questions
covering six subject areas 77 which do not test the law of the state
in which the exam is being administered, but rather concern
73. According to studies done by the ABA and American Bar Foundation in
1994, 19% of lawyers in private practice work in large firms of twenty or more, with
another 10% working as corporate counsel or similar positions in private industry.
American Bar Association, Statsmania, available at http://www.abanet.org/solo/
stats/html (last visited Feb. 1, 2003). In 1995, 47% of all lawyers practicing in
firms were solo practitioners. CLARA N. CARSON, THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT:
THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN 1995, 7 (1999). For a discussion of the surprising
increase in solo practitioners in the 1990's, see Dream Deferred, supra note 21, at
18.
74. See Mary Kay Kane, What's Out The-Trends and Ideas Affecting Bar Ex-
aminers: A View from the Law School, B. EXAMINER, Aug. 2000, at 20, 26 (arguing
that there is a "widening gap between students pursuing small firm or government
practice and those headed for large firm practice ... ).
75. Interestingly, this was the reason that New York rejected the MBE until
1979. Fisher, supra note 3, at 6 (quoting Holt-Harris) ("The New York Examina-
tion tested the proficiency of the candidate in New York Law; not in the general
rule or the weight of authority. I felt that the 'best answer' was a red herring...
."). Holt-Harris, former Chair of the New York State Board of Law Examiners,
"changed [his] mind" after he "came to realize the value of 'national norming' and
scaling to the national norm . . . ." Id.
76. The MBE contributes a substantial portion of the total examination score
in most states, generally counting between one third and one half of the total score.
More importantly, almost all states scale the scoring of the remaining portion of
the exam (usually essays, and in New York, also including fifty short answer ques-
tions) to the applicant's score on the MBE. See, e.g., Merritt et al., supra note 20,
at 932, 933 n.15, 934 n.16. For a discussion of the theoretical bases for various
ways of combining or scaling MBE and essay scores, see Stephen Klein, Options for
Combining MBE and Essay Scores, B. EXAMINER, Nov. 1995, at 38.
77. The six subjects areas are Constitutional Law, Contracts, Criminal Law,
Evidence, Legal Property, and Torts. Marcia Kuechenmeister, Admission to the
Bar: We've Come a Long Way, B. EXAMINER, Feb. 1999, at 25, 28.
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multi-state law, allegedly the 'majority view'78 of the application
of legal principles. This majority view is sometimes directly op-
posite to the rule applied in the state of administration.79 In the
1.8 minutes per question allowed for testing "in minute detail,
under extraordinary pressure,"80 the MBE requires the appli-
cant to "ignore refinements and pick the proper response by
drawing upon that assemblage of 'majority' rules, 'traditional'
rules and 'trends' which [she] presumably carries in [her]
head."81 Not surprisingly, there is sometimes no right answer,
just one which is least wrong.8 2 This inappropriate emphasis on
general or majority law, unrelated to the law of the state of ad-
ministration, is compounded in states that, partly as a matter of
economy,8 3 also purchase essays created by the National Con-
ference of Bar Examiners (NCBE), the Multi-State Essay Ex-
amination (MEE).8 4
78. See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS, Description of the MBE, avail-
able at http://www.ncbex.org/tests.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2003) (stating that the
MBE calls for application of "fundamental legal principles rather than local case
or statutory law").
79. See, e.g., J. Kirkland Grant, The Bar Examination: Anachronism or Gate-
keeper to the Profession?, N.Y. ST. B. J., May-June, 1998, at 12, 14 ("An MBE an-
swer may be even contradictory to New York law as it concentrates on the majority
rule rather than applicable New York law where New York adopts the minority
position.").
80. ABCNY Bar Report, supra note 9, at 483 (quoting Jeffrey F. Duban, Re-
thinking the Exam: The Case of Fundamental Change, MANHATTAN LAWYER, June
1990, at 16).
81. Id. (quoting Max A. Pock, The Case Against the Objective MultiState Bar
Examination, 25 J. LEGAL EDUC. 66, 67 (1973)).
82. Id.
83. Using the MEE results in substantial savings to states which choose to
employ it rather than tailor their own essays. See Marygold Shire Melli, The Multi-
state Essay Examination, B. EXAMINER, Nov. 1988, at 5, 6.
84. The MEE consists of seven questions that are each intended to be an-
swered in thirty minutes. It tests subjects not covered by the MBE: Agency &
Partnership; Commercial Paper; Conflict of Laws (an area where states differ
widely in the approach they have adopted); Corporations; Decedents' Estates;
Family Law (again, an area with wide differences among the states); Federal Civil
Procedure; Sales; Secured Transactions; and Trusts & Future Interests. See http:ll
www.legaled.com/meeinfo.htm (last visited May 12, 2003). Fourteen jurisdictions
currently use the MEE with Alabama joining in July 2003. COMPREHENSIVE
GUIDE, supra note 13, at 21, Chart VI. Unlike the MBE, "[a] number of states
instruct their applicants to answer the questions according to state law, but the
majority of jurisdictions have their candidates answer according to generally ac-
cepted principles of law." Jane Smith, Testing, Testing, B. EXAMINER, Nov. 1998,
at 24, 25. NCBE attempts to alleviate the tension between the majority view and
366
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If a successful bar taker does not carefully separate (and
discard) that which she has memorized for the MBE from that
which she memorized for the state essays testing local law85
(and, where given, state multiple-choice questions), she may
well make serious errors in practice when she first encounters
the tested subjects in the real world.8 6 This is precisely the op-
posite result one would expect from an examination which pur-
ports to test-and, in some ways, ensure-competence in the
basic substantive law of the state administering the exam. The
MBE's testing methodology is equally disconnected from reality:
think for a moment of the last time a judge gave a lawyer sev-
eral choices when asking a pointed legal question, or when, in
doing legal research, or making an evidentiary objection, there
were only four distinct possibilities? 8 7
idiosyncratic state law through its Checklist for Preparation of Essay Questions, B.
EXAMINER, Nov. 1995, at 36.
85. For example, the MBE tests the federal law of evidence which is quite
different from New York evidentiary law. See ABCNY Bar Report, supra note 9, at
482-83.
86. Florida provides a good example. See In re Pet. of Fla. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs
to Amend Rules of the Sup. Ct. Relating to Admissions to the Bar, No. 98, 689 (Fla.
filed Apr. 6, 2000) (on file with author).
Competent lawyers do not rely on what they remember from their bar re-
view course when asked to advise a client. This is particularly true because
half of the Florida Bar Exam, that is the Multi-State portion of the exam,
tests common law rules that are no longer, and in some instances never
were, applicable in Florida.
87. See Steven C. Bahls, Standard Setting: The Impact of Higher Standards
on the Quality of Legal Education, B. EXAMINER, Nov. 2001, at 15, 16 (decrying
multiple-choice questions and noting that "judges and clients don't ask questions
and then give the lawyer four or five answers to choose from"). For a more radical
critique, see Howarth, supra note 11, at 929.
Even more insidious than the bar's influence on what areas of the law
are deemed important, is the bar's influence on how the law is understood
The bar reinforces teaching that the law is fixed, neutral, and natural,
rather than contingent, mutable, and often deeply flawed. But, to under-
stand what legal doctrine one should use on behalf of a client, we need to
understand a doctrine's limitations and inequities .... The bar's memoriza-
tion and analysis program undermines and defeats such knowledge,.... as-
sum[ing] that the rule's existence is justification enough-the end of legal
analysis, rather than the beginning.
25
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g) Testing the Skills of Test-Taking, Not Knowledge of the
Law
The amount of time allocated to each MBE question (and to
the multiple-choice questions on the state sections of bar ex-
ams) underscores the oft observed criticism that, in large part,
the bar exam tests test-taking skills,88 rather than the law or
lawyering skills.89 And, of course, as most applicants believe-
else why would they invest in bar review courses 9 -it tests
what you learn in those courses, 91 not the higher skills of syn-
thesis actually required to practice law.92
In an extraordinarily thoughtful new examination of the
nature of teaching and learning in legal education,93 Judith
88. ABCNY Bar Report, supra note 9, at 482. See also Hansen, supra note 11,
at 1220 ("The bar exam places a premium on cramming and rote memorization
...."). "In addition, success on the bar exam depends on understanding the partic-
ular format, grading standards, and difficulty of the bar exam in the applicant's
jurisdiction." Hansen, supra note 11, at 1220 n.146 (citation omitted).
89. The ABCNY report opines:
While the Committee is cognizant of the concern that the examination test
knowledge across a range of subject areas (that theoretically might be re-
quired for the unsupervised practice of law by some hypothetical generalist)
the Committee is more concerned that the examination makes no attempt to
test for the contextual use of legal knowledge that is employed by lawyers in
the real world.
ABCNY Bar Report, supra note 9, at 481.
90. With the stakes today higher than ever, thanks to the many thousands
of dollars it takes to finance the average J.D., graduating law students
aren't shy about seeking help to tackle the bar exam. Most of them know
they've forgotten what they learned in their first-year property class,
anyway.
That's why so many students and graduates are willing to plunk down large
sums, often over $1,000 and even up to $5,000, for an intensive review
course.
Rebecca Luczycki, The Bar Review Choice, NAT'L JURIST, Jan.-Feb. 2001, at 18-19.
91. This view gains support from Standard 302(f) of the ABA's accreditation
standards, ABA STANDARDS, supra note 36, Standard 302(f), which prohibits law
schools from offering credit for a "bar examination preparation course." At least
one clear implication of this rule is that "bar examination preparation courses sim-
ply teach test-taking skills, which have no place in preparing students to practice
law." Maureen Straub Kordesh, Reinterpreting ABA Standard 302() in Light of
the Multistate Performance Test, 30 U. MEM. L. REV. 299, 302 (2000).
92. See Hansen, supra note 11, at 210. This "fact," whether verifiably true, or
deeply believed, also has serious consequences for those who cannot afford the ex-
ams, or who pay for them only by extra outside work which comes at the cost of bar
review study time.
93. Wegner, supra note 15.
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Wegner uncovers and explicates the serious dissonance between
what is taught and what is tested in legal education, 94 and the
unintended but disparate impact which that dissonance has on
differing groups of students. 95
Vastly simplified here, Wegner's thesis is that there is a
disconnect between relevant (to lawyering skills) learning and
assessment. Her "guiding principles" are "the importance of
recognizing the multifaceted, progressive nature of legal learn-
ing; the wisdom of considering precise purposes for assessment;
and the potential for enhancing learning through attention to
the relationship of assessment systems used in legal education
and the bar exam."96 Law school grades, she asserts, often are
part of what she refers to as the "hidden curriculum." Wegner
draws on a well-known study done at MIT. That study de-
scribed the official curriculum, emphasizing "high level educa-
tional goals such as those central to law school classrooms
(development of independent thinking, analysis, and problem
solving capabilities), [as] undercut by assessment and teaching
practices that suggested, in the eyes of students, that it was
most important to memorize facts and theories to achieve suc-
cess."97 The construct of the "hidden curriculum" may also be
used to describe the difference between what bar examiners say
they are testing and what, to the contrary, applicants, like the
94. In her study of legal education, Wegner found, for example, that "class-
room teaching in first-year courses tends to focus primarily on certain intellectual
tasks, including comprehension, analysis, application of legal principles to simple
fact patterns, synthesis of related cases, and limited forms of 'internal' evaluation
concerning logic and doctrinal consistency." Id. Looking, however, at the single,
end-of-course exams that typically constitute a student's grade, she found that
"strong performance on essay examinations requires demonstrated skill in just
those skills that are not directly taught." Id.
95. There are distinct advantages for some students- "the existing mismatch
between what is taught and what is tested appears significantly to advantage stu-
dents who enter law school with 'expert-like' characteristics or who have a well-
developed expertise in how to learn in the face of significant unknowns-over
others-"those who lack such characteristics and who have not had the opportu-
nity to develop expertise in learning in unknown complex fields while operating
very much on their own can be expected to perform much more poorly...." Id. In
addition, Wegner found that there are "[a] different set of disadvantages-implicit
in the existing regime-one involving visible student characteristics [stereotype
threat, see discussion infra Part VII(b)] and the other invisible ones [cognitive
styles, see discussion infra Part VII(b)]." Wegner, supra note 15.
96. Id.
97. Id.
369
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MIT students in Sambell and McDowell's study, actually expe-
rience. This assumes that the bar exam's main purpose is to
ascertain minimum competence to practice law, and thus pro-
tect the consumer from incompetence. This has been the
NCBE's position, articulated at its 1987 conference by Joseph R.
Julin, at that time NCBE's Director of Testing, Research &
Development. 98
Wegner's study has major implications for the bar examina-
tion because of the relationship between the MBE (and, thus,
bar examination scores) 99 and law school grades.100 That is, to
the extent there are distortions in law school grading,10 those
distortions, unrelated to the purpose of the bar exam, 0 2 carry
over into and influence, in an entirely problematic fashion, the
bar exam itself. 0 3 Similarly, Wegner's criticism of the assess-
ment systems used in legal education strongly resonates with
criticisms of the bar exam, including particularly its disparate
impact on non-majority students. 10 4
98. Duban, supra note 60, at 38.
99. See Moran, supra note 8, at 651.
100. Wegner, supra note 15 ("Multi-state bar examination questions are - val-
idated with an eye to - performance in law school."). See CARLSON & WERTS, supra
note 44, at 211. See also Merritt et al., supra note 20, at 211 n.14 (California MBE
scores track LSAT scores closely); Hansen, supra note 11, at 1206.
101. For an excellent analysis and critique of law school grading, see E.
Joshua Rosenkranz, Law Review's Empire, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 859, 892-94 (1988).
Rosenkranz argues that the law school grading system is "inaccurate and impre-
cise, at best, and arbitrary, at worst." Id. at 893.
102. See Fisher, supra note 3.
103. Wegner conceptualizes law school grading as occurring "in the context of
a multi-part legal assessment system, which includes admissions testing and post-
graduate bar examination regimes." Wegner, supra note 15.
104. She writes:
The current system of law school examinations thus has the potential for
disadvantaging some students while it also advantages others. The exam
performance of students vulnerable to "stereotype threat" may be depressed
in situations where high-stakes examinations are seen to reflect ability and
are perceived as reflecting stereotypical patterns of performance, as is often
the case. Current exam formats that require students to process a great
deal of information under significant time pressure may compound
problems of stereotype threat that make it difficult for those affected to
work quickly and to maintain focus, while also imposing special burdens on
students whose physiological characteristics and cognitive styles causes
them to process information more slowly or analyze problems presented in
more wholistic terms.
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Finally, her nuanced discussion of the difference in law
school grading and assessment between "sorting" and "weeding"
functions is important to another concern about the bar exam.
Testing may be used to "sort" examinees, so as to create rank-
ings which allow those who are relying on test scores to make
educated choices among those who have demonstrated basic
competence. Law school grades, for example, are utilized by
employers to identify the "best" students, not those who are
"merely" competent. Similarly, SAT scores permit colleges to
admit the "best" high school graduates willing to come to their
schools. Sorting is, ultimately, about creating and maintaining
hierarchy. "Weeding," on the other hand, seeks to determine-
and fail-those who lack minimum competence in the skills
that the evaluative device is testing. Weeding is a blunt tool
which gives no information about those who passed other than
that they possess (if the device is valid) minimum competence.
Unlike sorting, which depends on gradations (A+ to D-, 100-65),
weeding can utilize a pass/fail standard. The stated purpose of
the bar exam, unlike that of law school grades, is weeding, but
"sorting" criteria and methodologies have been employed, partly
because of a (in my view) misplaced belief that they permit vali-
dation of the examination.10 5
The bar exam's utilization of sorting rather than weeding
explicates another counterintuitive 10 6 feature of the bar exam-
that a single point difference in an applicant's score marks the
difference between passing and failing, or the bar examiner's
assessment that the applicant is or is not competent to practice
law.107 Even more counter-intuitively, a single point difference
Wegner, supra note 15. For a discussion of "stereotype threat," see infra Part VII
b).
105. See discussion infra note 574.
106. If counterintuitive is also counterfactual, then it is also "actually per-
verse," in several respects. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 213 (1976) (Stevens, J.,
concurring). The notion of the precise calibration used in determining the passing
score for any bar administration creates entirely unwarranted consumer confi-
dence in a process ("sorting") which is, itself, only marginally related to the assess-
ment of minimum confidence ("weeding"). Weeding, apparently the goal of the bar
examination, requires minimal gradations such as pass/fail. Use of a sorting sys-
tem would thus appear antithetical to the bar exam's basic purpose. That the ulti-
mate result of a bar exam is that one passes or fails, by as little as a single point,
does not relieve the bar exam of its sorting function.
107. The ability of bar examiners to decide, arbitrarily as many would argue,
see supra notes 16-26, and Merrit et al., supra note 20, that a given score is a pass
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might have an entirely opposite result in a different
jurisdiction.108
h) Impact of the Bar Exam on Law School Assessment
In the same way that the bar exam affects law school cur-
ricula, the bar exam also affects the way in which legal educa-
tion assesses student performance. The tests which law
professors administer, usually only at the conclusion of their
courses, look remarkably like the bar exam. Most law school
exams are three hours long and consist of a number of essays
(averaging an hour or so in length) that, like the state essays
and MEE, focus on issue-spotting, and/or multiple-choice ques-
tions (MCQ's). 10 9 There is an unsurprising connection between
the form of assessment used by bar examiners and by law
professors: for example, the use of MCQ's increased following
adoption of the MBE. 110
This might be an interesting observation, rather than a
matter of concern, but for a basic premise of education, "assess-
ment drives student learning.""' As the Director of Testing for
the NCBE has noted, it is critical to develop assessments in
one year, and a fail the next demonstrates that something more complex than the
question, "is this applicant minimally competent to practice law unsupervised?," is
embedded in the examination and its calibrated scoring system. For the way in
which states use and choose different "passing" scores, see Merritt et al., supra
note 20. Also see my anecdotal example infra notes 546-54 and accompanying
text.
108. For the way in which states use and choose different passing scores, see
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 13, at 22 Chart VII; Merritt et al., supra note
20, at 941.
109. Issues of law school exam construction were extensively discussed in a
panel at the most recent AALS Annual Conference, How to Construct a Law School
Exam, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 3, 2003) [hereinafter Exam Panel]. Three of the five
speakers were from the NCBE: Susan Case, Director of Testing, Michael Kane,
Director of Research, and Erica Moeser, President. Two law professors, Charles
Daye and Sheldon Kurtz, rounded out the panel on the issue of using a single
device to assess competence or knowledge (whether a year-end law school exam or
the bar exam). See Mueller, supra note 32, at 203 ("[Within the psychometric
community-a field well-known for taking polar stances on everything from school
tracking to affirmative action-using a single assessment device for a high-stakes
purpose does have an easy answer: don't do it.").
110. Steve Sheppard, An Informal History of How Law Schools Evaluate Stu-
dents, With a Predictable Emphasis on Law School Final Exams, 65 UMKC L.
REV. 657, 684 (1997).
111. Oral presentation by Susan Case, Exam Panel, supra note 109.
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which teaching to the test is a valid use of instructional time,
and studying for the test is an important use of a student's
study time. 112 In the same way the bar exam encourages the
study and use of lower order skills,1 3 legal education's adoption
of similar assessment devices" 4 results in an emphasis on facil-
ity and, often, memorization rather than the complex set of
skills used by lawyers in legal analysis. 115 By limiting what and
how we test, we correspondingly limit what students study and
what they are taught.
i) Decreasing Access to Justice
While the profession consistently expresses concern about
the large proportion of the American public that lacks access to
legal services and thus access to justice, 116 the bar exam re-
stricts and/or postpones entry into the profession of successful
law graduates who could increase access. This is perhaps a
kinder way of stating the oft-made criticism that the bar exam
is profoundly anti-competitive, a "guild" restriction rather than
a genuine test and guarantee of competence. 1 7 In a recent arti-
cle, William Kidder tracks the decision to increase passing bar
scores as it corresponds with the availability of legal jobs." 8
Not surprisingly, for those who believe the guild argument, as
available jobs decrease, passing scores increase, thus decreas-
112. Id.; Wegner, supra note 15.
113. See, e.g., Curcio, supra note 14, at 664-65; Mueller, supra note 32, at 204-
05.
114. This is entirely reasonable since law schools are judged, in large part, by
their graduates' ability to pass the bar. At CUNY, over time, we have become
persuaded that it is necessary to use such evaluative devices in order to give stu-
dents proficiency, familiarity and some level of comfort with them. However, be-
cause CUNY requires that every course include at least two evaluative devices, we
maintain the ability also to test students' learning differently and more exten-
sively and, we hope, to direct their learning to higher level skills.
115. See discussion infra note 130, concerning the MacCrate skill of legal
analysis.
116. Legal education has also expressed concern that "[tihe academy has
failed to train lawyers who provide legal services to the middle and working-clas-
ses, which, of course, comprise the overwhelming majority of American society."
John B. Attanasio, Foreword: The Out-of-the-Box Dialogues 5, in Memorandum
from Dean John Attanasio & Diane C. Yu, Esq., Co-Chairs, Out-of-the-Box Com-
mittee, ABA Section of Legal Education, to the Deans of ABA-Approved Law
Schools [hereinafter Attanasio] (on file with author).
117. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 49.
118. Dream Deferred, supra note 21, at 13-19.
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ing the number of lawyers in competition for those jobs. 119 And,
of course, decreasing the number of lawyers also tends to in-
crease the price of legal services, 120 thus making representation
less accessible to persons of moderate means.
Since the vast majority of applicants eventually pass the
bar,121 the bar exam works perversely in limiting rather than
increasing access to justice, unless it can be shown that the de-
lay in passing results in more competent lawyers. To my knowl-
edge no one has attempted to make this showing which is, at
the very least, counterintuitive 122 assuming that law graduates
engage in real learning while in law school. 123
IV. Lawyer Competence
Thus far, I have noted a number of ways in which the bar
exam works contrary to its intended goals, or to goals widely
held by legal education and the profession. These goals, sub-
verted by the "perverse effects" of the bar exam, include foster-
ing legal education's responsibility for the competence of its
graduates, protecting faculty control of curriculum, ensuring
consumer confidence, acknowledging and preparing graduates
for the multitude of roles they may assume within the profes-
sion, promoting knowledge of the law of the jurisdiction to
which an applicant seeks admission, and increasing access to
justice. While there are many other valuable criticisms of the
bar examination, 24 the two most serious ways in which the bar
119. Id. at 52. Ironically, this may also subject the profession to increased
criticism and scrutiny. Kidder cites sociologist Magali Larson for the proposition
that when a profession responds to the perception of overproduction of its members
by enacting more stringent licensing requirements, this will tend to increase that
profession's susceptibility to challenge because "it is at this level that the monopo-
listic goal of the professional project enters into visible contradiction with the de-
mocratizing and rationalizing dimensions potentially defined by the market
orientation." MAGALI SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALIsM: A SociO-
LOGICAL ANALYsIs 52 (1977).
120. See, e.g., Hadfield, supra note 71.
121. See, e.g., LSAC Study, supra note 43, at 27.
122. That is, the further one is from legal education, the less of what she has
learned will be retained.
123. If this is not the case, then there is no reason for law school to be a pre-
requisite to entry into the profession.
124. A particularly intriguing one, the development of which is beyond the
scope of this essay, is the way in which the bar exam may, like the LSAT's and
other allegedly neutral criteria, contribute to a "lock-in model" of racial discrimina-
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exam thwarts the profession's stated goals relate to the most
pressing challenges faced by the profession: lawyer competence
and diversity.125
a) Failure to Test the Skills Necessary for Lawyer
Competence
As this volume of the Pace Law Review details, the 1992
MacCrate Report provided legal education and the profession
with a comprehensive analysis and description of the skills ac-
tually employed by attorneys in the practice of law. The Report
lists ten skills deemed necessary to competent practice: problem
solving; legal analysis and reasoning; legal research; factual in-
vestigation; communication; counseling; negotiation; litigation
and alternative dispute resolution procedures; organization and
management of legal work; and recognizing and resolving ethi-
cal dilemmas. 126 Each skill is meticulously dissected into nu-
merous sub-skills. The Report is almost universally
acknowledged as authoritative;127 for me, as a practicing lawyer
tion in legal education and the profession which can be conceptualized in anti-trust
terms as legally prohibited anti-competitive conduct foreclosing competition and
creating impermissible barriers to entry. See the extremely thoughtful and pro-
vocative article by Daria Rothmayr, Barriers to Entry: A Market Lock-In Model of
Discrimination, 86 VA. L. REV. 727 (2000).
125. Concern about lawyer competence is, of course, long-standing. "Former
Chief Justice Warren Burger has been quoted as saying that 75-90 percent of
American trial lawyers are dishonest, incompetent or both. Meanwhile, about
40,000 new lawyers enter the legal profession each year, and without any practical
experience whatsoever, they can begin practicing . . . ." PR NEWSWIRE, June 23,
1986. While this blurb for a 1986 book misquotes the former Chief Justice (Burger
actually opined that somewhere "between one-third and one-half of lawyers ap-
pearing in serious cases were 'not really qualified to render fully adequate repre-
sentation"') it does reflect a widespread belief in American culture. Deborah L.
Rhode, The Rhetoric of Professional Reform, 45 MD. L. REV. 274, 289 (1986) (quot-
ing Chief Justice Burger Proposes First Steps Toward Certification of Trial Advo-
cacy Specialists, 60 A.B.A. J. 171, 173-74 (1974)). See, e.g., Bryant G. Garth,
Rethinking the Legal Profession's Approach to Collective Self-Improvement: Compe-
tence and the Consumer Perspective, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 639, 644 (describing the
attorney competence problem as serious).
126. MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 138-40.
127. See, e.g., Patrick R. Hugg, Comparative Models for Legal Education in
the United States: Improved Admissions Standards and Professional Training
Centers, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 51, 55-59 (1995) (noting also that there have been some
"poignant and at times indigent" responses); see also Gary A. Munneke, Legal
Skills for a Transforming Profession, 22 PACE L. REV. 105, 136 (2001) (noting that,
after ten years, "[tihe original list of ten lawyering skills described in the Mac-
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and judge for 30 years, reading the Statement of Skills is a true
"ah ha!" experience, brilliantly capturing the essence of a law-
yer's work. If the purpose of the bar exam is to test minimum
competence to practice law unsupervised, one would expect it to
test all or most of the skills identified by the Report. 128 Per-
versely, the existing bar exam does not.129
The bar examiners claim that the exam tests legal analysis
and, to some extent, 130 this is true. They also claim that it tests
communication skills and problem solving; these assertions
Crate Report have [sic] been remarkably resilient"). But see, e.g., Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Symposium on the 21st Century Lawyer: Narrowing the Gap by Narrow-
ing the Field: What's Missing from the MacCrate Report- of Skills, Legal Science
and Being a Human Being, 69 WASH. L. REV. 593, 593-96 (1994) (arguing that the
MacCrate skills omit other qualities necessary for competent law practice).
128. I recognize the Report's observation that many of the skills are developed
in the course of practice, and hence not possessed fully by law school graduation
and its caution that, for this reason, the Report should not be utilized as the basis
for a bar exam. MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 131-33. To say that, at least
aspirationally, one becomes a better client counselor, negotiator, or developer of
facts over time, does not negate the need for even neophyte lawyers to have some
knowledge of, and minimum competence in, these skills as in other MacCrate
skills. However, since the purpose of the bar exam is to test minimum competence
to practice law unsupervised, that is, taking sole responsibility for a client, the
Report's caution misses the mark.
129. See, e.g., Structure of Legal Education, supra note 68, at 5 ("There cur-
rently exists a gap.., between the knowledge and skills that the bar examiners
test for and the knowledge and skills that the employers of law graduates are
demanding.").
130. In the Commentary to Skill 2, Legal Analysis and Reasoning, that the
Statement "reflects the prevailing conception of legal analysis as a means of rea-
soning from existing law and applying rules and principles established in prior
judicial decisions (as well as other sources of law) to a new factual situation." Mac-
Crate Report, supra note 1, at 156. Clearly, the bar exam tests this formulation.
However, the Commentary goes on to note that it "diverges from the tradition case-
method approach to teaching legal analysis" by taking into account two ways in
which legal analysis differs in real-life practice. Id. at 156. Since the bar is testing
for minimum competence in practice, not in the classroom (where the first formula-
tion of legal analysis has been taught and tested, over and over) this "divergence"
is critical. The first of the two ways is the unbounded (as opposed to closed) uni-
verse of facts which confront the practitioner. The second involves the reality of
imperfect or incomplete knowledge of law-precisely the opposite of what the bar
exam posits and requires. The Commentary notes: "in the case method, students
develop legal analyses in situations in which they are familiar with the law to be
applied .... [I]n practice, lawyers are often called upon to develop legal analyses
in situations in which the lawyer is not familiar with the applicable law[,]" thus
taking into account the need for additional research. Id. at 156. Surely new law-
yers need such self-awareness and humility, rather than the stock answers for
which the bar exam necessarily calls.
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seem more questionable, or at least more limited. The Mac-
Crate skill of communication includes both oral and written
communication; clearly none of the intricacies of the former can
be assessed by a written instrument. Written communication,
however, subsumes an equally complex set of skills including,
inter alia, the effective use of factual material, 131 effective elabo-
ration of legal reasoning, 132 "Islubstantive and technical re-
quirements for specialized kinds of legal writing .. . "133 and
methods for effectively recording or memorializing oral commu-
nications. 34 Problem solving, the first MacCrate skill, requires
"identifying and diagnosing a problem, 35 generating alterna-
tive solutions and strategies, 36 developing a plan of action, im-
plementing the plan, and keeping the planning process open to
new information and ideas."137
Implementing the plan requires far more than writing an
answer based on a closed file; it incorporates reflection and self-
assessment 138 that clearly have no place on the bar exam.
These are only a few examples of the complexity and necessary
131. Id. at 174, Skill 5.2(b)(i). This in turn includes more subtle choices, com-
pletely inappropriate for a bar exam, such as "[dietermining whether facts should
be presented in an abstract or concrete fashion." Id. at 174, Skill 5.2(b)(i)(C).
132. MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 174, Skill 5.2(b)(ii). Again, the bar
exam format does not permit testing of these requirements, including, for example,
"[m]aking appropriate determinations of whether to anticipate and answer objec-
tions, to dismiss them summarily, or not to address them at all[,]" although this is
a critical skill for practicing lawyers. Id. at 174, Skill 5.2(b)(ii)(D).
133. Id. at 174-75, Skill 5.2(b)(iii). These include the "[dirafting of executory
documents (for example, contracts, wills, trust instruments, covenants, consent de-
crees and corporate charters); and [1legislative drafting (for example, drafting of
statutes, administrative regulations, and ordinances)." Id. at 174-75, Skill
5.2(b)(iii)(A) and 5.2 (b)(iii)(C).
134. Id. at 175, Skill 5.2(e).
135. While at first glance the MPT might seem to provide an opportunity to
exercise this skill, it actually calls more for issue spotting than a complex process
which includes a focus on the client, her perception, or misperception of the prob-
lem, economic constraints, her goals, and possible courses of action, ranked in or-
der of her preferences, needs and interests. See MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at
142, Skills 1.1(a), (c), (d) and (e).
136. Id. at 143, Skill 1.2; this is the antithesis of a successful bar exam
answer.
137. Id. at 142.
138. This includes determining, for example, whether the lawyer has suffi-
cient skill, expertise and knowledge to implement the plan, or whether the require-
ment of competent representation suggests the matter should be referred to
another lawyer, and assessing whether parts of the plan require expertise in fields
other than the law. Id. at 145-46, Skill 1.4(a)(i)-(iv).
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contextualization of the MacCrate skills, that simply cannot be
meaningfully evaluated in one or two 90-minute MPT questions
(or anywhere else on the bar exam). Talismanic repetition of
the "skills" the bar exam allegedly tests should not obscure that,
with all the effort and goodwill brought to it by the bar examin-
ers, the bar exam is an extremely limited-and poor-proxy for
the skills lawyers need to provide minimally competent un-
supervised representation.
More to the point, the existing bar exam does not even pur-
port to test the majority of MacCrate skills, some of which, like
counseling, negotiation, and alternative dispute resolution pro-
cedures, simply are not amenable to written tests. Others, like
factual investigation and organization and management of legal
work, could not possibly be evaluated within the closed universe
and time constraints of the existing bar. Although Title VII law
does not require a valid employment test to evaluate all the
skills necessary for a job139 where licensure is required to pro-
tect the public, 140 more than a few of those skills acknowledged
as critical should be tested, and tested in an appropriately
nuanced manner.' 4'
b) Disincentives to Teach Lawyering Skills
Directly connected to the first point, the bar exam not only
fails to test the MacCrate skills, but, by its single-minded focus
on particular areas of substantive law, and an even more single
minded focus on the way in which these areas are tested, the
bar examination actually discourages law schools from offering
139. See discussion infra notes 271-76. See, e.g., Guardians Ass'n of N.Y. City
Police Dep't v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 630 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that a valid
test need not test for all the skills required for by a particular job).
140. In Title VII law, licensure tests are treated differently than other kinds
of employment tests, partially because they represent an exercise of the state's
police power to protect the public. See, e.g., Ass'n of Mexican Am. Educators v.
California, 231 F.3d 572, 582-83 (9th Cir. 2000).
141. Consider, for example, whether the public would be adequately protected
by a medical licensure regime which tested diagnosis, but not treatment skills.
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courses142 or preparing its students in the actual skills required
for the practice of law. 143 As the MacCrate Report found:
[the traditional bar examination does nothing to encourage law
schools to teach and law students to acquire many of the funda-
mental lawyering skills identified in the Statement of Skills and
Values. If anything, the bar examination discourages the teach-
ing and acquisition of many of those skills, such as problem solv-
ing, factual investigation, counseling and negotiation, which the
traditional examination questions do not attempt to measure.
For example, the examination influences law schools, in develop-
ing their curricula, to overemphasize courses in the substantive
areas covered by the examination at the expense of courses in the
area of lawyering skills. The examination also influences law stu-
dents, in electing from among those courses offered, to choose sub-
stantive law courses that are the subject of bar examination
questions instead of courses designed to develop lawyering skills.
Finally, the examination discourages law professors from inte-
grating skills training into their substantive law courses. 144
The skills extolled by the MacCrate Report are most frequently
taught and explored in law school clinical courses, but there are
many financial disincentives, 145 as well as resistance within law
school faculties themselves 146 to clinical education and to skills
142. As Moran argues, the bar exam forces students into classes which cover
subjects taught on the exam, rather than into skills-oriented courses, whose sub-
ject matter is not tested. Moran, supra note 8, at 652. Without sufficient student
demand, law schools will have little reason to offer more expensive and labor in-
tensive skills training courses.
143. This has been a consistent criticism of legal education over the last 75
years. See Hugg, supra note 127, at 55 n.22 (collecting "ABA reports, judicial com-
mittees and legal [education] commentators ... callfing] for improvements in legal
education").
144. MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 278.
145. The issue of the high costs of clinical legal education was raised at the
inception of the clinical movement in the early 1970's. See, e.g., HERBERT L.
PACKER & THOMAS EHRLICH, NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL EDUCATION 46 (1972). For
a thorough discussion of this argument against clinical education, and at least a
partial refutation, see Margaret Martin Barry et al., Clinical Education for This
Millennium: The Third Wave, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 21-30 & nn.91-93 (2000).
146. See Hugg, supra note 127, at 56 ("Many traditional scholars resist sacri-
ficing any theoretical instruction to practical training . . . ."); Stuckey, supra note
10, at 650 (noting "resistance from law teachers" as one of "the two main impedi-
ments to reform"). Law teachers are primarily lawyers, not educators. They un-
derstand the law, which they attempt to convey to their students, but generally
speaking, they have little or no training in the educational process. Consequently,
much of law teaching is an attempt to convey substantive knowledge without the
379
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instruction generally. Success on the bar is a major incentive
for most prospective students, so law schools would be foolish
not to ensure that their curriculum prepares their graduates for
such success. Because no skills other than memorization 147 and
a modest ability of legal analysis are required, law schools can
teach "on the cheap" and be considered successful among their
competitors if they manage, by such techniques, to guarantee
high bar pass rates (although not the ability to successfully and
appropriately practice law) to their graduates. 148 As so many
critics have noted for so long, the bar exam is almost entirely
unrelated to the successful practice of law. 149 Finding the bar
expertise or sophistication necessary to engage and train students in skills such as
counseling, alternative dispute resolution, time management, and the like. Over
the past twenty years, clinical teachers have developed a pedagogy for transmit-
ting these skills which is quite different from that of most classroom teaching. See
Barry et al., supra note 145, at 16-18 & 36-50 (describing the integration of clinical
teaching and methodological insights into the law school curriculum), including
serious attention to issues concerning feedback. See, e.g., Victor M. Goode, There Is
a Method(ology) to this Madness: A Review and Analysis of Feedback in the
Clinical Process, 53 OKLA. L. REV. 223 (2000).
147. The bar exam's excessive reliance on memorization and test-taking skills
has been widely criticized. See, e.g., ABCNY Bar Report, supra note 9, at 480-81;
Yuli Zhao, For Exam, Recollection is Nine-Tenths of the Law, N.Y. TIMES, June 27,
2001, at Bl.
The bar exam is all about memorization, about the nuts and bolts of New
York State laws, about knowing facts, not necessarily understanding them,
according to many veteran lawyers in New York City.
Because it requires preparation centered on mechanical memorization,
the bar exam is facing increasing criticism. Many lawyers say that it has
little to do with how law is practiced.
Id.
148. See Hansen, supra note 11, at 1220-21 ("[Llaw schools . . . have little
incentive to introduce additional intensive theory courses that demand students to
work harder analyzing and evaluating legal arguments. Instead, the schools have
the incentive to 'teach the bar exam.'").
149. In 1939, Dean Leon Green of Northwestern Law School famously re-
marked why the bar examination should be eliminated:
[Tihere is not a single similarity between the bar examination process and
what a lawyer is called upon to do in his practice, unless it be to give a
curbstone opinion. Moreover, I have never heard anyone assert that his ex-
perience in the bar examination process was of any value to him as a lawyer.
Leon Green, Why Bar Examinations?, 33 Nw. U.L. REV. 908, 911 (1939). See, e.g.,
Bell, supra note 46, at 589-90. See also Zhao, supra note 147, at Bll.
I don't think it's a useful exercise at all because it doesn't test most of the
core competence that a lawyer needs," said one partner at a Manhattan law
firm. "Passing the bar exam does not equate to the competence to provide
380
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exam responsible for lacunae in the law school curriculum,
prominent clinicians have noted that "development of more
competent professional education will be hampered until the
apparent trend towards more professionally relevant testing 50
is refined." 151
V. Disparate Effect on Non-Majority Law Graduates
Of equal importance, the bar examination works in a per-
verse way, given our apparent and alleged commitment to
diversifying the profession. 152 Innumerable studies and en-
treaties by the ABA, state bar associations, the AALS, a former
President of the United States, the Justice Department, and
others have called for greater diversity in the bar,153 which, in
turn, requires diversity in legal education. 54 These calls envi-
legal service." The lawyer, an advocate of changing the bar exam, spoke on
the condition of anonymity because of his close ties to the State Bar
Association.
Id.
150. The reference here is to the MPT discussed infra which is described as
"not all that distinguishable from other bar questions." Barry et al., supra note
145, at 38 n.150.
151. Id. at 38. The flip side of this is the observation that "bar exams [can] not
be revised to recognize broad components of lawyer competence until those ele-
ments [are] reflected in the law school curriculum." Vaughns, supra note 37, at 442
n.74, citing CARLSON & WERTS, supra note 44, at 214. Since Carlson and Werts'
research, law schools have adopted many more professional skills classes, so the
impediment they observe may no longer be valid, or is at least less valid.
152. See Glen, supra note 4, at 1700 n.8 (collecting statistics that demonstrate
serious under representation of African-Americans in the bar). A comprehensive
discussion of this issue can be found in Cecil J. Hunt, II, Guests in Another's House:
An Analysis of Racially Disparate Bar Performance, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 721
(1996).
153. See William Jefferson Clinton, Call to Action, 35 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 1505, 1507 (July 27, 1999) (on file with author); ELIZABETH CHAMBLISS, ABA
COMM'N ON RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN THE PROFESSION; MIl,. To Go 9.000:
PROGRESS OF MINORITIES IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2000); Michael A. Cooper,
Our Commitment to Diversity, 44TH STREET NOTES (The Ass'n of the Bar of the
City of New York, New York, N.Y.), June 2000, at 16; RICHARD A. WHITE, AMERI-
CAN ASSOCIATION OF LAW SCHOOLS, PRELIMINARY REPORT: LAW SCHOOL FACULTY
VIEWS ON DIVERSITY IN THE CLASSROOM AND THE LAW SCHOOL COMMUNITY (May
2000); AALS Memorandum 00-19 from Carl C. Monk, Executive Director, Associa-
tion of American Law Schools, to Deans of Member and Fee-Paid Schools, availa-
ble at http://aals.org/00-19.html (June 29, 2000) (last visited Oct. 7, 2003); Bar
Association Finds Little Diversity, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2000, § 1, at 22.
154. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Duban, Banishing Bias: The Second Circuit's Draft
Report on Gender, Racial and Ethnic Fairness in the Courts, N.Y. ST. B.J., Dec.
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sion a bar whose membership is as diverse as our citizenry and
access to justice for all segments of the population. 15 5 The bar
exam thwarts this goal through its persistent disparate effect
on non-majority students, 156 unrelated to their ability to prac-
tice law. As psychometrician Stephen Klein notes,
All the studies that we know about report large disparities in
passing rates among groups .... On average, the passing rate for
White first-timers is about 30 percentage points higher than the
rates for Blacks. The rates for Asians and Hispanics generally
fall in between those for Whites and Blacks. A study . . . of all
takers (first-timers plus repeaters) on the July 1992 New York
exam found that the [pass] rate for Whites was more than double
the rate for Blacks. 157
One particularly distressing set of statistics was developed
by the New York State Judicial Commission on Minorities for
those who took the exam in July and who were graduates of in-
state law schools between 1985-88.158 The overall pass rates
were as follows:
1997, at 53; Jon C. Dubin, Faculty Diversity as a Clinical Legal Education Impera-
tive, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 445 (2000); Haddon, supra note 72 (discussing the problems
of racial and ethnic diversity); Linda F. Wightman, The Threat to Diversity in Le-
gal Education: An Empirical Analysis of the Consequences of Abandoning Race as
a Factor in Law School Admission Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1997). The di-
versity programs of William Paul, ABA Pres. 1998-99 and Gregory Williams,
AALS President 1999-2000 are discussed in Joan A. Lukey, The Face of America,
B. B.J., Jan.-Feb. 2001, at 2.
155. See Position Paper, supra note 55. There is good circumstantial evidence
that increasing the diversity of the bar increases access to justice for underserved
communities. See, e.g., Richard 0. Lempert et al., Michigan's Minority Graduates
in Practice: The River Runs Through Law School, 25 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 395, 499-
500 (2000); see also Charles R. Lawrence, III, Each Other's Harvest: Diversity's
Deeper Meaning, 31 U.S.F.L. REV. 757, 775-77 (1997).
156. See, e.g., Maurice Emsellem, Racial and Ethnic Barriers to the Legal Pro-
fession: The Case Against the Bar Examination, N.Y. ST. B.J., Apr. 1989, at 42, 44;
Hansen, supra note 11, at 1219-20; Hunt, supra note 152.
157. Stephen P. Klein, Ph.D. & Roger Bolus, Ph.D., The Size and Source of
Differences in Bar Exam Passing Rates Among Racial and Ethnic Groups, B. Ex-
AMINER, Nov. 1997, at 8.
158. 4 Report of the New York State Judicial Commission on Minorities 76,
(1991) [hereinafter JCM Report]. These figures were obtained through the Com-
mission's survey of the law schools in New York State, all of which maintain infor-
mation on both race and bar passage for individual students. As such, they are
based on 59% of all takers, since the remainder attended out-of-state law schools
and their pass rates and race could not be determined. This disadvantage occurs
when the statistics are not gathered and maintained by the Bar Examiners. Data
from a one-time study of all takers on the July 1992 bar exam done by the evalua-
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Blacks 31.0%
Native Americans 33.3%
Hispanics 40.9%
Asian Americans 62.9%
Whites 73.1%
This disparity could, on its face, have any one of a number of
explanations. It might mean, as Klein claims, that "[o]n the av-
erage, members of racial/ethnic minority groups do less well on
the bar exam than their [white] classmates. '" 159 It might mean
that for reasons not fully understood, blacks and other non-ma-
jority students of equal ability achieve significantly lower scores
on timed, standardized paper and pencil tests160 than whites of
equal ability. What it most certainly does not demonstrate,
however, is that non-majority law graduates are, as a group,
any less likely to be able to possess the "minimum competence
to practice law unsupervised" which the bar exam purports to
test.16'
tion team commissioned by the Court of Appeals mirror the findings of the JCM.
Millman study, supra note 7, at 10-14.
159. Klein & Bolus, supra note 157, at 15. By stating this argument, I do not
mean to endorse it. The argument has been made more benign, and more proac-
tive, by Katherine Vaughns. See Vaughns, supra note 37. An alternative, and
more critical way of looking at the preparation of non-majority students is that it is
different, not "better." Rothmayr, supra note 124, at 740. Drawing on the work of
Barbara Shade, CULTURE, STYLE AND THE EDUCATIVE PROCESS, (Barbara Shade ed.,
2d ed. 1989), Rothmayr notes, "compared to whites, students of color are more ori-
ented towards team problem-solving as opposed to individual learning, and active,
hands-on, application-based learning with concrete examples as opposed to pas-
sive, lecture-based learning that emphasizes abstract principles." Rothmayr,
supra note 124, at 740 (citation omitted). If true, this difference in learning styles
could account for lower scores on "abstract" tests, while suggesting that the prob-
lem-solving approaches students have learned and internalized will make them
good, if not "better," lawyers.
160. See William C. Kidder, Comment, Does the LSAT Mirror or Mngnify Ra-
cial and Ethnic Differences in Educational Attainment?: A Study of Equally
Achieving "Elite" College Students, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1055, 1074 (2001) [hereinafter
Kidder] (demonstrating that, when matched by undergraduate institutions, majors
and undergraduate grade point averages (UGPA's), African-Americans scored 9.2
points, or a full standard deviation, lower than their white counterparts). One
possible explanation for this disparity comes from the work of Claude Steele. See
discussion infra notes 195-201. Or, as Kidder argues, and "set[s] out to demon-
strate .. .that the bar exam, like other high-stakes tests, also imposes extra bur-
dens" on non-majority takers. Dream Deferred, supra note 21, at 30.
161. Our experience at CUNY is that our non-majority graduates possess the
same capacity and skills for successful law practice as their majority classmates.
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The appalling statistics reported by Klein and others have,
not surprisingly, resulted in a variety of efforts to attack and/or
overcome the bar exam's disparate impact on non-majority law
graduates. Besides a great deal of criticism, 162 they have
prompted a major statistical study by the Law School Admis-
sions Council (LSAC), litigation based on the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection and on Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, and a noble experiment by California Bar
Examiners in 1980.163 I consider each of these seriatim, noting
the ways in which each supports, inspires and gives direction to
the proposal for a PSABE.
VI. The LSAC Study
In 1991, responding to concerns about non-majority bar
passage, 64 the Law School Admission Council (LSAC) commis-
We also take pride in the fact that, with far more attention to the bar exam than
we would otherwise believe educationally valuable, we have increased non-major-
ity pass rates to approximately those accomplished by our majority students. Al-
though this success is important for our students, dispelling the myth of
inferiority, it should not preclude criticism or debate about the current bar exam,
nor impede efforts to experiment and change.
162. See, e.g., ABCNY Bar Report, supra note 9; Hunt, supra note 152. Im-
plicit critiques of the bar exam's race bias has been raised by Howarth, supra note
11, Rhode, supra note 30, and LSAC Study, supra note 43. See also James R. P.
Ogloff et al., More Than "Learning to Think Like a Lawyer:" The Empirical Re-
search on Legal Education, 34 CREIGHTON L. REV. 73 (2000); Victor C. Romero,
Broadening Our World: Citizens and Immigrants of Color in America, 27 CAP. U.
L. REV. 13 (1998); Edna Wells Handy, Blacks, The Bell Curve & the Bar Exam,
NAT'L. B. ASS'N MAG., Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 24; Judith C. Greenberg, Erasing Race
from Legal Education, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 51 (1994).
163. See discussion of the California experiment which led to the current MPT
infra Part XI.
164. Daniel 0. Bernstine, Minority Law Students and the Bar Examination:
Are Law Schools Doing Enough?, B. EXAMINER, Aug. 1989, at 10.
Although there are clearly discernible concerns and sub silentio discussions
of the problem of minority bar passage among many law school faculties and
in other circles as well, there are seldom any open and direct discussions
which focus, with particularity, on possible solutions to the problem. Moreo-
ver, it is extremely difficult to compile accurate nationwide data because, for
obvious reasons related to competition and prestige, law schools are unwill-
ing to share data related to minority bar passage with each other. In addi-
tion, jurisdictions are careful to protect the confidentiality of a particular
school's bar pass[ ] rates and will, in most instances, release data to a school
about only its graduates.
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sioned a national study of graduates of ABA accredited law
schools. The purpose was to "obtain complete and accurate in-
formation about bar pass[] rates . . . , as well as about factors
that may influence performance in law school and success on
the bar examination" 165 and, in particular, "to provide accurate
and reliable data regarding minority performance on bar exami-
nations nationally and within the individual states . . . ."166
"The class scheduled to enter ABA-approved law school in
fall 1991 was selected as the study group" 167 and the bar pass
rate of its members was studied over approximately six years. 168
The LSAC Report was released in 1998 and revealed the follow-
ing information:
Ethnic Group Pass Fail
American Indian 66.36 33.64
Asian American 80.75 19.25
Black 61.40 38.60
Mexican American 75.88 24.12
Puerto Rican 69.53 30.47
Hispanic 74.81 25.19
White 91.93 8.07
Other 83.07 16.93
Adapted from Table 6169
165. Henry Ramsey, Jr., Law Graduates, Law Schools and Bar Passage Rates,
B. EXAMINER, Feb. 1991, at 21 (reviewing the history of the LSAC study of which
Dean Ramsey was a principal proponent).
166. Id. at 25.
167. LSAC Study, supra note 43, at vi. One hundred sixty three of the then
172 mainland ABA accredited law schools participated in the study, as did 36 of 50
jurisdictions invited. Id. at 5.
168. Id. at 75.
169. Id. at 27.
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Although presented as reassuring, 170 and often as authori-
tative, 171 the LSAC study results are surely cause for continuing
concern. For example, black law graduates are four times more
likely than white graduates to fail the bar examination on the
first taking.172 There are, to be sure, two ways of looking at the
data-by the percentage of applicants who pass, or those who
170. Because of concern that the Report might undermine affirmative action
programs, the results were presented in a way that might best alleviate this fear.
However, in response to implicit assumptions that the apparently lower bar pass
rate of non-majority students is a valid argument against affirmative action, one
typical proponent of affirmative action wrote:
[s]ome see affirmative action as an undeserved handout and assume that it
brings unqualified and incapable people into law schools. That assumption
is simply not supported. The Law School Admission Council's National Lon-
gitudinal Bar Passage Study showed that within nine months of completing
law school, 81 percent of minority graduates successfully passed the bar
exam-the same exam administered to non-minority graduates.
Okianer Christian Dark, Principle 6: Good Practice Communicates High Expecta-
tions, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 441, 445 (1999) (citation omitted).
171. There are, however, a number of methodological flaws, or at least choices
which are open to question. For example, a major problem with the LSAC statis-
tics is that it fails to separate the first-time pass rate by jurisdiction. See Klein &
Bolus, supra note 157, at 10 (raising concerns about methodology including the
aggregations of data across states that vary significantly in both bar exam pass/fail
standards and proportions of minority applicants). The LSAC statistics failure to
separate the first-time bar pass rate by jurisdiction obscures the higher failure
rate for minority takers in jurisdictions like New York which has pass rates lower
than the national norm. In 2001-2002, for example, the first-time pass rate for the
July administration in New York was 76% (6108 of 7986). N.Y. State Bd. of Law
Exam'rs, July 2002 Bar Exam Results, at http://www.nybarexam.org/july2002.htm
(last visited May 14, 2003). The first-time rate for the February administration
was 62%. N.Y. State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, February 2003 Bar Exam Results, at
http://www.nybarexam.org/feb2003.htm (last visited Aug. 22, 2003). The LSAC
study did a gross breakdown of first-time pass rates by region, with variations
from a high of 92.83% in the Midwest, to a low of 82.90% in the Northwest. LSAC
Study, supra note 43, at 21.
172. The LSAC study also examined comparative bar pass rates by law school
clusters ("[law schools were grouped with other schools most like themselves"),
divided into six clusters (with LSAT scores and UGPA's as the major variables)
and by applicants with LSAT scores at and above or below the grand mean of the
1991 fall entering law school class. LSAC Study, supra note 43, at 28. Results of
these refinements are also disturbing, especially for African-Americans. Among
students in cluster 1 schools, black students, who constituted approximately 5.4%,
were almost six times more likely than white students to fail (failure rates of
18.94% compared to 3.56%). Id. at 28 tbl.7. Even where black students with above
average LSAT scores were compared to similar white students (where blacks con-
stituted only approximately 1.3% of all students "at or above" the LSAT mean), the
likelihood of failure was more than twice as great (11.83% to 4.64%). Id. at 30
tbl.8.
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fail. The former is important, and certainly more comforting,
but the latter, which would likely be used in the Title VII analy-
sis discussed infra,173 is quite disturbing.
The LSAC study endeavors to blunt the bad news by em-
phasizing "eventual pass[ I rates" for study participants, 174
where the numbers look much better. 75 On closer examination,
however, these reassuring numbers obscure the painful reali-
ties faced by many non-majority takers. First, of course, num-
bers cannot convey the costs-psychological as well as
financial 76 -borne by those who are unsuccessful on their first
"take," thus denying their entry into the profession by at least
six months. 77 Second, the numbers are also somewhat mislead-
ing, in that an applicant is deemed to have eventually passed if
173. See discussion of the use of the Griggs v. Duke Power test infra Part X
and see infra note 259-64 and accompanying text for the EEOC's formulation for
determining whether a challenged test has an impermissible disparate impact.
174. For example, the Executive Summary contains the racial/ethnic break-
down for "eventual bar passage" but does not mention the numbers for first-time
passage. LSAC Study, supra note 43, at viii-ix.
175. As reported in the Executive Summary:
[tihe eventual pass[ ] rates for racial and ethnic groups were: American In-
dian, 82.2 percent (88 of 107); Asian American, 91.9 percent (883 of 961);
black, 77.6 percent (1062 of 1368); Mexican American, 88.4 percent (352 of
398); Puerto Rican, 79.7 percent (102 of 128); Hispanic, 89.0 percent (463 of
520), white, 96.7 percent (18,664 of 19,285); and other, 91.5 percent (292 of
319).
LSAC Study, supra note 43, at viii. Furthermore, "[almong those examinees of
color who eventually passed, between 94 and 97 percent passed after one or two
attempts [i.e., on the second or third tries] and 99 percent passed by the third [post
initial] attempt." Id. at viii.
176. Many employers will not hire law graduates until they have been admit-
ted to the bar, or may hire them only at a contingent, lower salary, pending admis-
sion. The consequences are dire, especially since the unsuccessful taker must also
find a way to take or retake a bar prep course, and set aside adequate time for
study before her next attempt-time which could otherwise be spent earning
money or dealing with family or other personal concerns. See Glen, supra note 4.
at 1704-05 (discussing CUNY graduates' stories). Law school loans, which now
hover, on average, at around $84,400, also come due, requiring substantial pay-
ments that may be impossible to meet without a lawyer's salary. See Equal Justice
Works, Law School Costs, Law Student Debt and Attorney Salaries: Putting it all
in Context, available at http://www.equaljusticeworks.org/choose/lrapsurvey5.php
(last visited May 15, 2003) (copy on file with author).
177. This assumes that second takers will take the bar examination the next
time it is offered-in New York. The second administration after the July bar
takes place in February. Unfortunately, the LSAC study does not describe or di-
vide multiple takers by the time, as opposed to the number, of attempts, so it is
impossible to ascertain the average delay experienced.
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she is successful in any jurisdiction,178 not necessarily the juris-
diction in which she made her prior unsuccessful attempt(s).179
Admission to the bar is preferable to non-admission, but ob-
taining the privilege in a jurisdiction other than one's home
presents difficult choices and a level of cost not imposed on
those who pass the bar when they first attempt it. Understand-
ably, the LSAC study makes no attempt to measure the extent
of this cost on "eventual passers."
Finally, and as commentators have noted with some
alarm, i80 for African-Americans at least, a substantial number
of those who fail in their first attempt never make a second at-
tempt.'"' Nearly 11% of all black applicants who failed the bar
examination once never attempted it again, 8 2 thus ensuring
that a significant number of black students who successfully
178. Klein & Bolus, supra note 157, at 10 ("[Tjhe eventual rates in the LSAC
study are not the kinds of rates that are traditionally reported for bar exams. For
example, an applicant who fails in one state but passes in another is counted as a
'pass' in the LSAC study.").
179. This reflects the well known, albeit anecdotal truth, that some jurisdic-
tions with high bar pass rates consistently attract takers who may fare less well-
or expect that they will do so-than in jurisdictions in which they live, or hope to
practice.
180. The list of those "alarmed" by the "persistence gap" includes prominent
figures within the bar examiner community such as Armando M. Menocal, III, see
Performance Testing, infra note 279 (Menocal has chaired the NCBE and the Cali-
fornia Committee of Bar Examiners), as well as those generally critical of the bar
examiner establishment. But see Erica Moeser, President's Page, B. EXAMINER,
Feb. 2001, at 4, 5 ("neither of us believed that the persistence gap as described was
supported by the published data") (speaking of herself and NCBE Deputy Director
of Testing Dr. Mary Sandifer).
181. LSAC Study, supra note 43, at 56. This compares with two percent of
white and Asian-American examinees, and five percent of Hispanic examinees.
LSAC Study, supra note 43, at 56. As the author of the LSAC study has pointed
out, "black examinees . . . [who] failed the first attempt at the bar and never at-
tempted it again ... represent nearly half of those in the failed category." Linda F.
Wightman, Through a Different Lens: A Reply to Stephan Thernstrom, 15 CONST.
COMMENT. 45, 55 (1998) [hereinafter Through a Different Lens].
182. LSAC Study, supra note 43, at 56. Renard Strickland has claimed that
this statistic is "misleading," since it compares those not retaking the exam with
the total number of examinees for that group, rather than with the total number of
examinees in that group also failed the first time. Renard Strickland, The Persis-
tence Facts, AALS NEWSLETTERS, Nov. 2000 at 5. Using this formulation, the dif-
ference between African-Americans, 28%, and whites, 24%, is much less. I believe
that the original formulation of the "persistence gap" is more useful, and more
disturbing.
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completed law school will never enter the profession. 8 3 This
"persistence gap" 18 4 is one of the reasons that the number of
non-majority graduates in the profession has not increased in
any significant way over the past decade, even though the num-
ber of non-majority students matriculating in law schools has.
VII. More Perverse Effects
a) Discouraging Non-Majority Applicants
There is another way in which the bar examination may
perversely affect diversification of the bar. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that non-majority college graduates who are aware of
the disparate impact of bar examination performance on law
school graduates of their racial and/or ethnic cohort may often
eschew legal education in favor of other professional schools
which do not have such daunting post-graduation test barri-
ers. 8 5 That is to say, excellent non-majority students who
183. As one commentator has noted, "[t]oo many good lawyers are being lost
... and too many people who might not otherwise be served are having their legal
needs go unmet because of it." Handy, supra note 162, at 27. Leo Romero, who
chaired the LSAC at the time the study was released, writes of the "'persistence
gap,' . . . [w]e can conclude ... that it represents a significant loss to the profes-
sion." Leo Romero, Two Findings that Have Immediate Impact, B. EXAMINER, Nov.
1998, at 13, 14.
184. While there is no clear explanation of the reasons for the persistence gap,
a letter to the Minnesota Bar Examiners from the Deans of all ABA accredited law
schools in that state provides a possible explanation. They wrote,
delaying admission imposes substantial costs-the costs of retaking the Bar,
the costs of preparing for the Bar, and the opportunity costs associated with
lost or deferred employment until the second Bar is completed-which ad-
versely affects those without substantial economic resources. This may
cause some individuals likely to succeed on a second attempt to drop out of
the process.
Letter from E. Thomas Sullivan, Harry J. Haynsworth, Edwin Butterfuss & David
T. Link, to State Board of Bar Examiners, Mar. 9, 2000 (on file with author).
185. The number of non-majority students, particularly African American
students, accepted to and attending ABA-accredited law schools has plateaued, or
even declined, since the early nineties at the height of affirmative action efforts,
Dream Deferred, supra note 21, at 36-39, although bar pass rate was clearly not
the only causal factor. See supra note 39. The percentage of African-Americans
obtaining law degrees in 1999, 6.7%, declined from 7.26% in 1997, LAw SCHOOL
ADMISSION COUNCIL, MINORITY DATABOOK 38 tbl.VI-8, 39 tbl.VI-9 (2002). See, e.g.,
James Podgers, Progress Hits a Wall, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2000, at 94; The Commission
on Racial and Ethnic Diversity in the Profession, Miles to Go 2000, Progress of
Minorities in the Legal Profession, 2000 A.B.A COMMISSION ON RACIAL AND ETHNIC
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might well be fine lawyers and bring access to justice to under-
served communities, 186 are dissuaded from even applying to law
school 8 7 because of their belief that the likelihood of ultimate
success, i.e., admission to the practice of law, often long after
graduation, 8 8 is only slightly better than three out of four. 8 9
This belief cannot help but encourage or persuade them to look
elsewhere for their subsequent education and occupational
choices. 190 The Law School Admissions Council's statistics on
LSAT takers seem to bear this out, with flat, if not declining,
numbers, at least through 2001, for African-Americans, espe-
cially African-American men. 91 And, of course, there is a well-
founded concern that statistics reflecting the lower bar pass
rate of non-majority students will affect the admissions policies
of law schools seeking to improve their standing 92 and will oth-
erwise "temp[er] [their] enthusiasm for diversity," 93 also de-
DIVERSITY IN THE PROFESSION, report summary at http://www.abanet.org/minori-
ties/publications/milestogo.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2003).
186. See Lempert et al., supra note 155.
187. "To the extent that qualified minority youth are discouraged from seek-
ing a legal career because of an unfounded belief that the bar examination will
ultimately prevent their entry to the legal profession, a great disservice is done to
the legal profession, the minority community and all Americans." Ramsey, supra
note 165, at 25.
188. See supra notes 174-75.
189. Id.
190. The power of a test to effect the occupant pool is one that has been
demonstrated at the undergraduate level. When Bates College did away with reli-
ance on the SAT, a predictor similar to the LSAT, which in turn partially predicts
the bar exam, its pool of applicants dramatically increased. A comparison of Bates
students who voluntarily submitted SAT scores and those who chose not to do so
showed a difference of some 160 points on the exam, but no discernable effect on
academic performance or graduation rates after admission. Hugh B. Price, Fortify-
ing the Case for Diversity and Affirmative Action, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC.,
May 22, 1998, at B4. Hundreds of colleges have followed suit and "applicant pools
and enrolled classes have become more diverse without any loss in academic qual-
ity" according to Cambridge, Mass-based Fair Test. Alfie Kohn, Two Cheers for
the End of the SAT, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 9, 2001, at B12 (quoting
Cambridge, Mass.-based Fair Test).
191. Law School Admission Comm'n, Statistics on ABA Applicants for the Pe-
riod 1991-1992 to 2000-2001 (on file with author). "The peak for black students
was 9,969 in 1993-94 . . . [and then] declined until the 1998-99 applicant year,
when the actual number of black applicants increased to 8,375 from 8,216 in 1997-
98." MINORITY DATABOOK, supra note 185, at 23.
192. See, e.g., Rothmayr, supra note 124, at 769 ("[A] law school may put its
[US News] rank and ability to recruit at big risk if it admits a significant number
of non-standard students . . ").
193. Haddon, supra note 72, at 721.
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creasing the number of non-majority law students and
lawyers. 194
b) Effects on Non-Majority Students' Educational Experience
A final, intangible but negative effect is the possible experi-
ence of non-majority students' expectation of failure. To the ex-
tent this expectation exists, it is almost certainly exacerbated
by knowledge of the lower first-time bar pass rate of graduates
of similar race and/or ethnicity. This notion tracks Claude
Steele's important and provocative work on the impact of what
he calls "stereotype threat"-which may negatively affect test
takers because of their gender (his initial work),195 race or
language.
This phenomenon adversely affects the performance of tra-
ditionally strong, academically oriented students on high-
stakes tests. According to Steele, "stereotype threat" arises in
testing situations in which such students "must deal with the
possibility of being judged or treated stereotypically, or of doing
something that would conform to the stereotype," either to
others or to themselves. 196 Once a stereotype becomes relevant
and the test is seen as hinging on one of the qualities that are
related to the stereotype, students for whom the stereotype has
been triggered perform significantly less well than those who do
not fall within the same group. As Wegner notes, writing about
Steele's work, "[t]he phenomenon does not depend upon indi-
viduals' past experiences," or the existence of widespread stig-
194. Cf. Kane, supra note 74, at 21 (warning that pressures from U.S News
and World Report rankings which include LSAT scores will negatively affect mi-
nority admissions).
195. Steele originally tested his hypothesis on male and female students tak-
ing a difficult mathematics test. Claude M. Steele, A Threat in the Air: How Ste-
reotypes Shape Intellectual Identity and Performane, 2. Am. PsYcH. 613, 619
(1997). The work was then expanded to utilize the same hypothesis for non-major-
ity takers. Claude M. Steele & J. Aaronson, Stereotype Threat and the Test Per-
formance of Academically Successful African-Americans, in THE BLACK-WHITE
TEST SCORE GAP 401, 402-04 (Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips eds., 1998);
Claude M. Steele, Expert Report in Gratz v. Bollinger, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 439
(1999) [hereinafter Expert Report]; Claude M. Steele, Black Students Live Down to
Expectations, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1995, at A25.
196. Steele & Aaronson, supra note 195, at 401. For methodological reasons,
Steele has primarily studied high-achieving students, but there is no reason to
believe that "stereotype fear" does not affect middle-tier students to at least the
same extent.
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matization in society, "but appears to be situationally
triggered."197
Thus, where there is a stereotype that African-Americans
or other non-majority students cannot pass the bar exam,198 the
very existence of that stereotype, despite the fact that it is not
true, will negatively affect the bar exam performance of other-
wise fully competent non-majority students. The risk of stereo-
type threat is highest on high-stakes tests with substantial time
pressure-an accurate description of most law school exams,
and even more true of the bar exam. The bar exam is the ulti-
mate (as well as the last) timed, high-stakes exam for prospec-
tive lawyers. It is not unreasonable to posit that widely-
reported studies which show that non-Hispanic whites are sub-
stantially more likely to pass the bar exam the first time' 99 cre-
ates precisely that stereotype about all African-Americans. The
false stereotype-that because you are African-American you
cannot pass the bar exam-in turn, negatively affects the abil-
ity of African American applicants to answer questions on the
bar exam, 200 artificially depressing their scores, potentially be-
low the pass/fail cutoff. The false stereotype of incompetence
may create a vicious cycle for non-majority applicants in which
assessment of competence becomes problematic. Sadly, the ex-
istence of the stereotype may also decrease the learning exper-
iences of non-majority students throughout the course of their
law school education. 201
VIII. Why This Bar Exam?
In summary, the bar examination, as currently configured,
acts as a powerful barrier to the profession, albeit a temporary
197. Wegner, supra note 15.
198. The fact is, of course, that most non-majority students who persist in
taking the bar, like their white counterparts, do pass the bar, although not by the
same percentage on the first take. LSAC Study, supra note 43, at 56 tbl.19.
199. See, e.g., Klein & Bolus, supra note 157.
200. For an explanation of how this occurs, see discussion infra notes 557-61
and accompanying text.
201. See, e.g., Handy, supra note 162, at 25; Wegner, supra note 15. Steele
notes that the stereotype threat "may impair the test performance of school-identi-
fied African-Americans students in two ways." Steele & Aaronson, supra note 195,
at 402. The first is test performance. He describes the second as follows: "If stere-
otype threat persists as a chronic feature of the school performance domain, it may
force the affected students to disidentify with that domain." Id. (citations omitted).
[Vol. 23:343392
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one for the vast majority of law graduates. 202 Although some
applicants may suffer many takings, and literally wait years
before they are admitted, almost everyone will eventually be-
come a lawyer. Whether the wait results in increased compe-
tence 20 3 is, however, certainly open to question. 20 4 The bar
exam clearly has a disparate impact on non-majority law gradu-
ates, which deprives the profession of diversity,20 5 and yet it is
clearly no guarantee of minimum competence to practice law
unsupervised. It does not begin to test the range of skills and
competencies the profession has identified as necessary to suc-
202. According to the LSAC study, approximately 95% of all examinees even-
tually pass some jurisdiction's bar exam. LSAC Study, supra note 43, at 32 tbl.10.
The 5% does not include those who fail on the first administration but do not per-
sist, see discussion infra at notes 181-85, so the pass rate is, effectively, even
higher. Given this, the question is why all those law graduates who eventually do
pass the exam must wait for periods between several months (grading and admis-
sion for first-time passers) to several years (for multiple takers) before they can
practice law.
203. Stephen Klein surmises (incorrectly, I believe) that "even in jurisdictions
with very high standards for passing the bar exam, over 80% of the minority appli-
cants ultimately pass. It may take them several tries, but they ultimately succeed,
most likely as a result of further studying, preparation and other factors." Klein &
Bolus, supra note 157, at 15 (citation omitted). This notion that "more study" is
required to increase bar pass rate for non-majority takers is echoed in the Report
of the New York State Bar Examiners, proposing an increase in the passing score.
Report and Recommendation, supra note 18, at 18 ("The Board is convinced that
candidates who pass the exam on their second or third attempt are, at that point,
better prepared to enter the profession."). One wonders, as a number of law deans
have expressed, whether this "additional study" is of the law and skills which ap-
plicants will need to practice law or if, more likely, it is simply of test taking skills
which they will not.
204. For those who pass after the tenth or eleventh try, where it seems to me
highly unlikely that they have learned more law, rather than forgetting a larger
percentage of that which they learned during law school, I have assumed that it is
more a matter of drawing the lucky No. 2 pencil. Here again, I do not mean to
suggest that late passes will be poor lawyers, but only that they are demonstrably
less good test takers.
205. The President of NCBE has consistently taken the position that the lack
of diversity in the profession is not traceable to, nor the responsibility of, the bar
exam, but rather "myriad decision and action points along the way that contribute
to the paucity of minority candidates who enter and complete law school" including
"insufficient resolve on the part of law schools to intervene in the educational fail-
ings of students while they are enrolled in law school ...." Erica Moeser, Presi-
dent's Page, B. EXAMINER, Nov. 2000, at 5. See also Erica Moeser, President's Page,
B. EXAMINER, Feb. 2000, at 4. "In law, looking only to the bar examination seg-
ment of the [profession's] continuum for solutions overlooks the source issues that
demand society's attention." For a conflicting view, with impressive statistical
documentation, see Dream Deferred, supra note 21, at 32-34.
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cessfully practice law. 20 6 Its focus on "legal analysis," as tradi-
tionally taught through the Langdellian case method, 20 7
provides a disincentive to law schools to offer more costly and
more relevant skills training,208 and its existence perpetuates
the lack of confidence, to which it may inadvertently contribute,
that legal education cannot be trusted to graduate competent
professionals. 209
Why then, should there be a bar exam at all? Proponents
interested in professionalism must do better than relying on the
fact that the large majority of lawyers210 suffered through the
same rite of passage, 211 that the profession justifies its self regu-
206. Rogers, supra note 51, at 565
Influential studies agree that the examination is primarily an achievement
test designed to assess specific accomplishments in a student's legal educa-
tion, not a predictor of future performance. Even the most ardent propo-
nents of state bar examinations do not contend that persons who succeed on
the examination will be competent to practice law.
Id. (citations omitted).
207. See Munneke, supra note 127, at 124.
208. See discussion supra Part IV.
209. See discussion supra notes 141-50 and accompanying text.
210. This excludes lawyers admitted in states which had (or, in the case of
Wisconsin, still have) the diploma privilege, see Moran, supra note 8, as well as
those who were admitted with veteran's exemptions, see infra note 513-15 and ac-
companying text.
211. The bar exam is often referred to as a "rite of passage," see, e.g., Hansen,
supra note 11, at 1215 nn.129 & 132 (criticizing justification of the bar as a rite of
passage as simply-and erroneously-an appeal to tradition which says nothing
about the rite itself). This may, however, be a serious misnomer, as Edna Wells
Handy points out:
The bar exam has often been compared to that of a "rite of passage." This is
an unfortunate comparison because the legal profession does not provide the
structural supports typically attending a true rite. There is no pairing of an
initiate with an elder or coach. There is no guided preparation period. Nor is
there an investment by the entire legal community in the successful out-
come of the "passage." What some people really mean when they say the bar
is a rite of passage is, "I got mine. Now, you get yours!" Accordingly, I reject
the "rite of passage" model of bar exam preparation. I believe the exam to be
more like a ritual-a very specific, highly sophisticated, elaborate ritual, full
of technical minutia carefully contrived to test a student's resolve. That re-
solve must be evident from the beginning of the study period and must be
strong enough to take a student through the final day of the exam. The more
students learn about the process, the less mystery and mistake there will be
in treating the ritual with the utmost seriousness, respect and hard work.
The key is hard work. There is a direct correlation between the quality and
quantity of work done and the chances of success on the bar exam. The
394
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lation by a licensing process, 212 and that it has been difficult to
devise a better way, given the constraints of time and money
under which bar examiners labor. Or to attempt a slightly more
proactive formulation, why should the bar exam be limited to its
present, multiply unsatisfactory form?213
I argue that it is possible to create a different, more valid,
non-discriminatory test of a law graduate's minimum compe-
tence to practice law based on professional evaluation of a grad-
uate's actual performance of the MacCrate skills. This proposal
is founded analytically in Title VII's requirements of "job-relat-
edness," and historically in the context of the 1980 experiment
that has led to today's Multistate Practice Test (MPT). A brief
description of the proposal, with tentative answers to many of
the questions it raises, follows discussions of the failed project
of litigation against the existing bar (from which I take an ana-
lytical framework for assessing the proposal), and the efforts,
ultimately unsuccessful, to create a more experiential, perform-
ance-based bar examination. 21 4
harder, longer and smarter a student works, the better the chances of pass-
ing on the first try.
Handy, Why Students Fail, 1997 NAT'L B.A. MAG. 17 [hereinafter Why Students
Fail].
212. See, e.g., Michael J. Thomas, The American Lawyer's Next Hurdle: The
State-Based Bar Examination System, 24 J. LEGAL PROF. 235, 254 (1999/2000)
("Once someone has suffered the 'punishment of the hurdle' several times, self-
interest will naturally militate against arguing for reform of the system.").
213. There is a similar argument in the analogous area of law school admis-
sions. See Equality in Law School Admissions, supra note 72. Instead of ab-
stractly defining "merit" on the basis of scores on pencil and paper tests, law
schools (whose "merit"-based admissions disparately impact non-majority stu-
dents) should be required to do a "criteria audit" which identifies the characteris-
tics necessary for success given the law school's mission. Schools should then
admit those applicants who can demonstrate that they possess the requisite char-
acteristics and skills. In other words, the job-related criteria of employment law
should be utilized to create real equality in access to legal education.
214. Those who are interested only in the proposal can turn to its explication
at Part XII, infra or Glen, supra note 4. The Title VII discussion and MPT history,
however, create important legal and political justifications.
53
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:343
IX. Attempts to Change or Abolish the Bar Exam
a) Litigation
Litigation directed at the bar exam's disparate impact on
non-majority law graduates has been unsuccessful 215 for two
main reasons. First, wherever licensing examinations are in-
volved (particularly where those examinations have been or, al-
ternatively required of, applied to, and passed by the very
decision makers to whom the challenge is posed),216 equal pro-
tection challenges have fared poorly.217 Since, according to the
courts, practicing law is not a fundamental right,218 rational ba-
sis review applies. 21 9 Under that test, the challenged licensure
examination is entitled to a presumption of validity,220 which
has proven difficult and, in the case of challenges to the bar ex-
amination, thus far impossible to overcome. 22' Where bar ad-
215. See the extensive discussions in Rogers, supra note 51, Hunt, supra note
152, and Vaughns, supra note 37.
216. Hunt points out the generational composition of courts which ruled on
the challenges brought against the bar exam in the 1970's. He wrote,
[M]ost of the state officials and judges who reviewed the actions of the vari-
ous bar examiners grew up during a time when minorities were virtually
nonexistent in our nation's law schools. As a result, few, if any, of them had
any exposure to minority students or professors in their law school classes.
It is not unreasonable to suggest, as the dissent in Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d
1089, 1106 (5th Cir. 1975), noted, that some of these judges and officials
probably still harbored presumptions of racial inferiority about blacks, in
general, and aspiring black lawyers, in particular - presumptions that
colored their judgment when they considered the plaintiffs' claims of dis-
crimination in bar examinations.
Hunt, supra note 152, at 757.
217. This has been equally true when the challenges were brought in state,
rather than federal court. See, e.g., Petition of Pacheco, 514 P.2d 1297 (N.M. 1973);
Application of Peterson, 459 P.2d 703 (Alaska 1979).
218. See, e.g., Lowrie v. Goldenhersh, 716 F.2d 401, 412 (7th Cir. 1983).
219. See, e.g., Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089, 1093-03 (5th Cir. 1975) (re-
jecting plaintiffs request for strict scrutiny review and placing a heavy burden on
those who challenge licensure exams); Scariano v. Justices of the Supreme Court of
Ind., 38 F.3d 920, 924 (7th Cir. 1994).
220. See, e.g., Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979).
221. See, e.g., Delgado v. McTighe, 522 F. Supp. 886 (E.D. Pa. 1981). The fac-
tual claim in Delgado was somewhat different-and arguably stronger - than in
the Southern cases where minority applicants fared poorly on the bar exam. The
Pennsylvania Bar Examiners raised the passing score for the bar exam (see discus-
sion of the recent initiatives to extend this practice, supra notes 16-25) while in
possession of an expert's report that to do so would have "a 'profound effect' on the
percentage of blacks and whites who passed the bar examination." Delgado, 522 F.
396
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missions are concerned, courts believe that states have a
legitimate desire to regulate the profession 222 and accordingly
they "treat state efforts to preserve professional integrity with
deference." 223 Even more detrimental to a successful constitu-
tional attack is the notion that
[r]ationality does not require that a rule be the least restrictive
means of achieving a permissible end. The general wisdom of [a
state's] approach is not a matter for . . . scrutiny. A given bar
admission rule need not be the most effective means of regulating
bar admission .... Nor is it relevant that some unfairness results
from the application of the rule.224
Although no fundamental right is implicated, the racial dispar-
ity that demonstrably occurs might suggest a higher standard
of review, but that argument has been foreclosed by the Su-
preme Court's decision in Washington v. Davis.225 Thus, even
when plaintiffs have been able to demonstrate that African-
Americans are disproportionately unsuccessful on a state's bar
examination, courts have continued to insist on the rational ba-
sis test.226 Attempts to impart the standards of Title VI,227
which protects against disparate impact as well as discrimina-
Supp. at 895. The court, however, found no discriminatory intent or purpose. As
to the plaintiffs second argument, based on expert testimony, id. at 896-97, that
the bar exam was not rationally related to the goal of insuring minimum compe-
tence, the court simply reasserted the rational relationship test and found, based
on Tyler and its progeny, that the essay and multiple-choice exam was permissible.
Id. at 897. See Hunt, supra note 152, at 751-53.
222. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 361-62 (1977). For the
state's interest in character and fitness, see, e.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722-
23 (1973).
223. Scariano, 38 F.3d at 924 (citing Schumacher v. Nix, 965 F.2d 1262, 1266
(3d Cir. 1992)).
224. Id. at 925 (citations omitted).
225. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that, in order to make
out an equal protection violation, there must be proof of discriminatory racial pur-
pose, rejecting the use of disparate impact theory in constitutional cases).
226. See, e.g., Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d. 1089, 1101 (5th Cir. 1975).
227. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1964).
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tory intent, into equal protection analysis228 have been entirely
unsuccessful 229 as have challenges under Title VII itself.230
The Title VII challenges have failed for two different rea-
sons. First, courts have been unwilling to conceptualize bar ex-
aminers as employers, labor organizations or employment
agencies,231 thus excluding them from coverage under the Civil
Rights Act.232 The Tenth Amendment has also proven a bar-
rier.233 In the single case where a District Court held that the
228. Unable to prove discriminatory intent, and with the constraints of Wash-
ington v. Davis, litigants challenging the disparate impact of the bar examination
argued that "the bar examination should not be viewed within the framework of
the traditional equal protection analysis, but that the bar examination should be
considered in light of the Title VII testing guidelines promulgated by the EEOC."
Vaughns, supra note 37, at 447-48 n.95. If Title VII standards applied in the con-
stitutional analysis, however, at least one court reviewing a challenge to the South
Carolina bar exam would have found the bar exam unconstitutional. Richardson
v. McFadden, 540 F.2d 744, 746-47 (4th Cir. 1976), on reh'g, 563 F.2d 1130, cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 968 (1978) ("[W~e believe the record is inadequate to demonstrate
either 'criterion' ('predictive'), 'content,' or 'construct' validity under professionally
acceptable methods. Thus, if we were to determine that Title VII standards were
applicable, it would be necessary to reverse and declare the South Carolina Bar
Examination constitutionally invalid.").
229. Tyler, 517 F.2d at 1096, 1098-99. See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535,
548-59 (1972) (citing James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971)).
230. See, e.g., Parrish v. Bd. of Comm'rs of the Ala. State Bar, 533 F.2d 942,
949 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that there is no basis for distinguishing Tyler on the
Title VII question).
231. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(2) (2000). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000(b)-(d) (defining
"employer," "employment agency" and "labor organization" respectively).
232. In an analogous area, courts have refused to apply Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d)-(d)(6) (1994) to the NCAA which imposes eligibil-
ity requirements on member institutions, despite the fact that those requirements
have a clearly disparate impact on non-majority student athletes. See Cureton v.
NCAA, 198 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 1999), rev'g 37 F. Supp. 2d 687 (E.D. Pa. 1999). For a
discussion of the disparate racial impact, see, e.g., Kenneth L. Shropshire, Color-
blind Propositions: Race, the SAT & the NCAA, 8 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 141, 142
(1997) and the District Court opinion in Cureton. For a discussion of unsuccessful
challenges to eligibility requirements, see Nathan Hunt, Cureton v. NCAA: Fum-
ble! The Flawed Use of Proposition 16 by the NCAA, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 273, 282-86
(2000). The Circuit Court in Cureton held, alternatively, that the NCAA is not
subject to Title VI because it is neither an "indirect recipient" of federal financial
assistance, nor a "controlling authority" over institutions which themselves receive
federal assistance. Recent Cases, Title VI-Third Circuit Upholds Viability of
Standardized Test Scores as a Component of Freshman Athletic Eligibility Require-
ments-Cureton v NCAA, 198 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 1999), 114 HARV. L. REV. 947, 949-
51 (2001).
233. An alternative formulation of this argument is the conclusion courts
have drawn from Tenth Amendment analysis that "Title VII does not apply to li-
398
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Board of Bar Examiners was an "employer" because it acted for
the state in licensing professionals, 234 the Court nevertheless
denied plaintiffs Title VII claim on the grounds that principles
of federalism prevented the extension of Title VII test valida-
tion standards 235 to professional licensure examinations. 236
censure testing." Diana Pullin, Key Questions in Implementing Teacher Testing
and Licensing, 30 J.L. REV. EDUC. 383, 397 (citation omitted).
234. Woodward v. Va. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 420 F. Supp. 211, 214 (E.D. Va.
1976). Rogers makes a strong, and to my mind, compelling argument that the
District Court opinion in Woodward was correct, Rogers, supra note 51, at 577-580.
His argument is premised on the thorough analysis of the purpose and reach of
Title VII in Sibley Mem'l Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (ex-
tending Title VII coverage beyond a direct employment relationship), which at
least remains (in the D.C. Circuit) good law. A more recent case, Morrison v. Am.
Bd. of Psychiatry and Neurology, 908 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ill. 1996), summarizes
areas in which "the Sibley approach" has been successfully employed to extend
Title VII beyond a direct employment relationship. There is currently a split in
the circuits, with three circuits (the Second, Sixth and Ninth) taking an expansive
view of the coverage of Title VII as extending beyond a Title VII plaintiffs "direct"
employer, and three circuits (the Third, Fifth and Seventh) taking the contrary,
narrow view. Ass'n of Mexican Am. Educators v. California, 231 F.3d 572, 602 n.4
(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) ("We have now created a circuit
split on a national issue of great importance.").
235. These standards do, however, apply to non-licensure tests under Title
VII and analogously, under Title IX. In 1999, the Office of Civil Rights of the U.S.
Department of Education, the agency which determines accrediting organizations
for professional schools, including law schools, published a report which appears to
adopt the Griggs test for high stakes testing, Daniel Subotnick, Goodbye to the
L.S.A.T.? Hello to Equity by Lottery? Evaluating Guinier's Plan for Ending Race
Consciousness, 43 How. L.J. 141, 143 (2000) (citing U.S. DEP'T OF EDUCATION, OF-
FICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, NONDISCRIMINATION IN HIGH STAKES TESTING (1999)). The
report includes this definition:
[Tihe use of any educational test which has a significant disparate impact
on members of any particular race, national origin or sex is discriminatory,
and a violation of Title VI and/or Title IX, respectively, unless it is educa-
tionally necessary and there is no practical alternative form of assessment
which would meet the educational institution's educational needs and would
have less of a disparate impact.
Id. at 143 n.13.
When the report leaked, id. at 143 & n. 14, it provoked concern in the testing estab-
lishment, particularly at the College Board, which administers the SAT. See also
Mueller, supra note 32, at 202, 247-48 nn.4-11. Although I know of no lawsuits
brought on the basis of the Report, and suspect that newer faces at the Depart-
ment of Education may not wholly embrace it, the migration of the Griggs test to
the realm of high stakes testing suggests the validity of the approach utilized here.
236. Woodward, 420 F. Supp. at 214. See also EEOC v. Sup. Ct. of N.M., 19
FAIR. EMPL. PROC. CAS. (BNA) 448, 449-50 (1977) (while recognizing bar examiners
were employers for purposes of Title VII, found little support for a judicial con-
struction of Title VII which would allow it to expand into an area where the federal
57
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These decisions seem to be based on erroneous premises, 237
to be disingenuous 238 or just plain wrong. Nevertheless, litiga-
tion has clearly not proved a profitable path for compelling
change.
The legal arguments employed, however, especially those
utilizing Title VII, provide a compelling analysis which incorpo-
rates the two major concerns about the existing bar exam-the
lack of connection between the bar exam and the actual skills of
lawyering (or "lawyer competence"), and its disparate impact on
non-majority graduates. That analysis suggests a solution to
these concerns. Although courts have held the analysis consti-
tutionally and statutorily (as yet) inapplicable, the seminal Ti-
judicial power has been traditionally restricted). The question of whether Title VII
is applicable to state licensing agencies acting pursuant to the state's police powers
has also been answered in the negative in non-bar cases, see, e.g., Haddock v. Bd.
of Dental Exam'rs of Ca., 777 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1985); Nat'l Org. for Women v.
Waterfront Comm'n, 468 F. Supp. 317 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). But see Puntolillo v. N.H.
Racing Comm'n, 375 F. Supp. 1089 (D.N.H. 1974), motion to dismiss decided on
different grounds, 390 F. Supp. 231, 235 (D.N.H. 1975) (Title VII held to apply to
NHRC). For an excellent argument for the applicability of Title VII, see Rogers,
supra note 51, at 570-83, as well as his discussion that Title VII actually preempts
state licensing schemes which run afoul of its prescriptions. Id. at 621-23.
237. The cases which refuse to apply Title VII to state licensing cases because
of deference to the state's police power, e.g., Woodward, 420 F. Supp. at 214;
EEOC, 19 FAIR EMPL. PRAc. CAS. at 449-50, assume that the purpose of the bar
exam is to protect the public. Many commentators argue that its real purpose is
anti-competitive, that is, to limit entry into the profession so as to maintain high
salaries and/or profits for those who are admitted, see, e.g., supra text accompany-
ing notes 117-23. Alternatively, as I have argued here, supra notes 126-41, and as
others have also noted, the claim that the bar exam protects the public is invalid
because the bar exam does not effectively test the skills necessary for competently
lawyering, see, e.g., Howarth, supra note 11, at 930; Hunt, supra note 152, at 763-
69 (refuting the "Myth of the Bar Exam as a Test of Minimum Competence"), and
so does not require deference to a state's police power.
238. That is, the insistence on an excessively literal reading of Title VII un-
dermines that statute's purpose of ensuring equality of opportunity in employ-
ment, by prohibiting discriminatory practices that affect employees or potential
employees. In contrast, the decision in Ass'n. of Mexican Am. Educators v. Califor-
nia, is promising in its en banc holding (three judges dissenting on the issue) that
the California Education Department, which designed and administered the Cali-
fornia Basic Education Skills Test (CBEST), a pre-requisite for teaching in Califor-
nia public schools, was covered by Title VII even though it was not a direct
employer of persons taking the test, Ass'n. of Mexican Am. Educators v. California,
231 F.3d 572, 584 (9th Cir. 2000), and the majority opinion's assertion that "[t]here
is no overarching 'licensing' exception to Title VII." Id. at 583.
58https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol23/iss2/1
2003] THINKING OUT OF THE BAR EXAM BOX 401
tle VII testing case, Griggs v. Duke Power239 provides analytic
grounding for the proposed PSABE.
X. The Argument From Griggs v. Duke Power
Griggs held that tests which are not "a reasonable measure
of job performance" or which do not "have a manifest relation-
ship to the employment in question,"240 constitute an impermis-
sible employment practice when they have a disparate impact
on racial minorities. The Griggs concept of "job-relatedness"
was more fully explicated by reference to, and reliance on, its
use of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
guidelines and interpretations in Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody .241
The Griggs /Albemarle analysis, incorporated into Title VII
by 1991 restoration legislation, 242 requires three steps, which
can be applied usefully to the bar exam.
a) Disparate Impact
In the first step, the plaintiffs must demonstrate by "per-
suasive statistical evidence" that the challenged employment
practice has a disparate impact on a protected group. Protected
239. 401 U.S. 424, 432, 436 (1971). Although Griggs was implicitly overruled
by Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (where the Court re-
placed Griggs' strict requirement of an affirmative defense of business necessity
with the less stringent "legitimate business purpose," and redistributed burdens of
proof and production to leave the burden of persuasion with the plaintiff even after
a showing of disparate impact), Congress effectively reversed the Supreme Court
and reinstated the Griggs test by enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L.
102-166, §§ 104-105, 105 Stat. 1074 (1991). The 1991 legislation "re-establish[ed]
the three step order and allocation of proof articulated in Griggs and its progeny,"
MERRICK ROSSEIN, 1 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 2-37 (2001), and, by its legis-
lative history, made clear "that the terms 'business necessity' and 'job related' are
intended to reflect the concepts enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v.
Duke Power and in other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Antonio." Id. § 2-46 (citing 137 CONG. REC. § 15276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991)
(Interpretive Memorandum)). For a full discussion of the legislative history, see
id. § 2-5.
240. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
241. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). "[It was not until
Albemarle that the Court explained how a defendant proved [the] job-relatedness"
required by Griggs. ROssEIN, supra note 239, § 2-49.
242. See Civil Rights Act §§ 104-105. For a thorough discussion of the intent
and impact of the 1991 legislation on the first prong of the Griggs test, see Ros-
SEIN, supra note 239, § 2-5.
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groups under Title VII include racial and ethnic minorities. Al-
though bar examiners in most states have failed or refused to
keep statistics on bar passage based on race, 243 those statistics
which do exist, primarily from California, 244 but also now from
the LSAC, 245 demonstrate that non-majority students, particu-
larly African-Americans and Hispanics are repeatedly and con-
sistently less successful on first-time bar passage than majority
graduates 246
The evidence which exists for racial disparity and bar pass
rates clearly establishes disparate impact, as presently de-
fined,247 thus meeting the first prong of the Griggs test and
243. Studies of the bar exam have consistently called on bar examiners to col-
lect such information and make it available. See ABCNY Bar Report, supra note 9,
at 11; Hari Swaminathan Rogers & H. Jane Rogers, An Examination of Racial &
Ethnic Bias in the Florida Bar Examination, Final Report submitted to the Racial
& Ethnic Bias Study Commission of the Florida Supreme Court 30 (1991); JCM
Report, supra note 158. Prior to publication of the LSAC study, Professor Kathe-
rine Vaughns noted, "little comprehensive and accurate data about bar passage
rates among racial and ethnic groups exists nationwide." Vaughns, supra note 37,
at 426 n.5 (collecting earlier calls for collection of data). Cecil Hunt offers a com-
prehensive discussion of the absence of data. Hunt, supra note 152, at 726-33.
244. For example, Howarth notes the results of the July 1996 exam where, of
first-time applicants who attended ABA-approved law schools in California, "82%
of Whites passed, compared with 5 1.1% of Blacks, 64.4% of Hispanics, 74.6% of
Asians, and 71% of other minorities. The disparities were similar for first-time
takers from out-of-state ABA-approved law schools .. " Howarth, supra note 11,
at 931 & nn.24-26. A 1987 article lists the few jurisdictions which then kept statis-
tics by race and ethnicity. Dannye Holley & Thomas Kleven, Minorities and the
Legal Profession: Current Platitudes, Current Barriers, 12 T. MARSHALL L. REV.
299, 325-41 (1987).
245. The LSAC numbers were self-reported by law schools and, therefore, are
not comprehensive, but they give a generally good picture. Individual states may
have made records in one or more years; these are collected in Hunt, supra note
152, at 726-29 & n.9.
246. Id. at 15.
247. The court in Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089, 1093 (5th Cir. 1975), found
that the facts proffered by the plaintiffs met the first prong of the Griggs test.
EEOC regulations create a presumption of disparate impact when the number of
successful non-majority applicants is less than 80% of the successful majority ap-
plicants. Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1607.4(D) (2002). Applying this test to any of the individual state pass rates
which have been collected, see supra note 244 and accompanying text, offered into
evidence in cases like Tyler, or the more national rates shown in the LSAC study,
supra note 43, actionable disparate impact is always demonstrable. For example,
using the LSAC data, the first-time pass rate for majority Caucasian students is
91.93%. See supra note 169 and accompanying text, 80% is 73.54%, but the actual
pass rate for African-Americans, 61.40%, is substantially below that figure. Mexi-
can Americans, 75.80%, and Hispanics, 74.81%, just avoid the 80% rule, while Pu-
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shifting the burden to the defendantlemployer (for purposes of
this argument, the bar examiners) to demonstrate that the test
is job-related. As the Supreme Court wrote in Griggs,
Nothing in [Title VII] precludes the use of testing or measuring
procedures; obviously they are useful. What Congress has forbid-
den is giving these devices and mechanisms controlling force un-
less they are demonstrably a reasonable measure of job
performance .... What Congress has commanded is that any
tests used must measure the person for the job and not the per-
son in the abstract.248
Economic status is not a protected class,249 nor is it incorpo-
rated into Title VII jurisprudence. However, if we want to con-
sider-and ameliorate-the ways in which the bar exam
disadvantages those who have traditionally been excluded from
the profession, it is important to include the disproportionate
impact it has on students with limited financial means.250 That
such impact exists can partly be inferred by analogy to the
LSAT which, like other standardized tests which predict race
and class, 251 also correlates to bar passage. 252 It is also highly
erto Ricans, 69.53%, fall below it. For a general discussion of the statistical proof
necessary under Griggs and the 1991 legislation, see RoSSEIN, supra note 239.
248. Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971).
249. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980) ("poverty, standing alone,
is not a suspect classification.").
250. Comparing examinees who passed with those who failed, the LSAC Bar
Study found a significant correlation with socioeconomic status (SES) for Hispan-
ics and Asian-Americans, but not for blacks or whites. The percentage of first-time
passers was lower for Hispanics and Asian-Americans in the Lower-Middle SES
category, and the percentage who never passed was also highest for those in the
Lower-Middle category. LSAC Study, supra note 43, at 57-58 & tbls.20 & 21. I am
not convinced that these data, and the categories employed are sufficiently
nuanced to take into account some of the specific financial and quasi-financial
problems applicants may face. See discussion infra notes 652-57.
251. Two researchers who have looked at large data bases have found that
LSAT scores correlate with SES, Wightman, supra note 154, at 482-95 (reviewing
the SES profile of UCLA applicants by race/ethnicity, SES and other variables).
One commentator suggests that these studies "may underestimate the magnitude
of the relationship between SES and race by not adequately taking into account
the one SES variable upon which Blacks are most disadvantaged vis-A-vis Whites'
accumulated family wealth." William C. Kidder, The Rise of the Testocracy: An
Essay on the LSAT, Conventional Wisdom, and the Dismantling of Diversity, 9
TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 167, 184 (2000) [hereinafter Rise of the Testocracy]. Similarly,
the SAT correlates more closely to parental income than it does to freshman
grades. See JAMES CROUSE & DALE TRUSHEIM, THE CASE AGAINST THE SAT 126
(1988); ALLAN NAIRN ET AL., THE REIGN OF ETS 203 (1980). See, e.g., Claude M.
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likely that students who cannot afford bar prep courses 253 and/
or the recommended 10 weeks of uninterrupted bar preparation
study do less well than more affluent students.254 If what is
known about the impact of income/poverty on LSAT perform-
ance can be shown, by good research, to correlate to bar per-
formance, application of the Griggs test should lend persuasive
weight to the argument for a PSABE.255
b) Job-Relatedness
In Albemarle Paper256 the Court adopted the Uniform
Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures issued by the
EEOC257 as the standard by which the Griggs test of "manifest
relationships to the employment in question"258 must be met.
The EEOC Guidelines provide, in pertinent part, that any test
or selection procedure which has a disparate impact on mem-
bers of a protected group 259 is deemed discriminatory-and
therefore presumptively violative of Title VII-unless the test
or procedure has been validated by 260 criterion-related validity
studies, 261 content validity studies, 262 or construct validity stud-
Steele, Understanding the Performance Gap, in WHO'S QUALIFIED?, supra note 32,
at 60 [hereinafter Understanding the Performance Gap].
252. See, e.g., Moran, supra note 8, at 651.
253. See Stephen Steinberg, Mending Affirmative Action, in WHO'S QUALI-
FIED?, supra note 32, at 37-38 ("Standardized tests favor privileged groups who,
aside from the advantages that derive from better schooling, have the resources to
pay for expensive prep courses."). Rise of the Testocracy, supra note 251, at 194
("[Lower] graduation and bar passage numbers for people of color ... may be partly
attributable to non-academic factors association with the financial burdens of legal
education.").
254. In thinking about possible research projects which might move us toward
an alternative to the bar exam or an alternative bar exam, this is surely an area
which could be studied with some scholarly rigor. See discussion infra Part XIV(a).
255. See discussion infra Part XIII(b) on why the PSABE should not disadvan-
tage students of limited means.
256. Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971).
257. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.1-1607.18 (2001).
258. Griggs, 410 U.S. at 432. The "manifest relation" language was reiterated
in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
259. The groups, pursuant to Title VII, are race, sex and ethnicity. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1607.3A.
260. In the following three footnotes, I reproduce Cecil Hunt's edited and edi-
torialized version of the relevant definition of criterion-related, content and con-
struct validation. Hunt, supra note 152, at 765-66.
261. Criterion-Related Validation.
404
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ies,263 in accordance with the technical standards of the
Guidelines. 264
The existing bar examination would be hard pressed to
meet the Albemarle test. As to criterion-related validity, in the
only case where a court reached the issue (although ultimately
deciding that Title VII did not apply), it found insufficient evi-
Criterion-related validation is established when there is a positive correla-
tion between comparative success on the test and comparative success on
some measure of job performance. The degree of this relationship is ex-
pressed by a correlation coefficient, which ranges from-1.0 [i.e.,] the better
one does on the test, the worse one does on the job) to +1.0 (total identity of
relative test scores and relative job performance.).
BARBARA SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 114 (2d ed.
1983). 'The most commonly used criterion measure is supervisory rating of job
performance which is acceptable if done in a professional manner." Id. at 128. See
generally 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.14B-1607.15B.
262. Content Validation.
Tests having content validation must test a representative sampling of spec-
ified job functions or the underlying skills necessary to perform those func-
tions. Once the job content has been identified, the primary considerations
are the test makers' competence and thoroughness in test preparation and
the representativeness of the test itself in terms of the job content to be
evaluated.
See SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 261, at 130. See generally 29 C.F.R.
§§ 1607.14C-1607.15C; see also Guardians Ass'n of N.Y. City v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 630 F.2d 79, 87 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940 (1981).
263. Construct Validation. "Construct validation is established when there is
a significant relationship between the test and the identification of some trait,
such as 'intelligence' or 'leadership,' which is required in the performance of the
job." "The issue in construct cases is usually whether the constructs themselves
are related in the performance of the job." SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 261, at
153. "Construct validity is difficult, if not impossible, to prove in most cases and
requires a presentation of empirical data. . . ." Id. at 154. See generally Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425-35 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 434 (1971); Guardians Ass'n of N.Y City, 630 F.2d at 91-94; 29 C.F.R.
§§ 1607.14D-1607.15D. See also MICHAEL J. ZIMMER, CHARLES A. SULLIVAN &
RICHARD F. RICHARDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
274-76 (2d ed. 1988).
264. These standards, found at 29 C.F.R. § 1607, while not legally binding are
"entitled to great deference" Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 431. "Failure to comply with
the Guidelines, although not automatically fatal to an employment test 'dimin-
ishes the probative value of [a] defendant's' validation study"' Ass'n of Mexican
Am. Educators v. California, 231 F.3d 572, 585 n.8 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omit-
ted). Note, however, the claim that "[iun recent years the view that validity can be
divided into three types has fallen out of favor. Validity is regarded as a unitary
concept." Julia C. Lenel, Test Validation: What is It and How Should it be Done?,
B. EXAMINER, Aug. 1991, at 5, 6. See discussion of Lenel's work, infra text accom-
panying notes 374-43.
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dence that the bar exam was job-related within the meaning of
Griggs and Albemarle.265 This is, in large part, because success
on the bar examination has never been correlated with "suc-
cess" as a lawyer;266 the correlations which do exist, but which
are insufficient under the EEOC Guidelines, are to law school
performance 267-i.e. what happens before the exam, not after it.
One might more reasonably demand proof that a bar examina-
tion be an adequate measure of job relatedness through content
validation, 268 i.e., correlating the skills tested with those neces-
sary to perform the function of a practicing lawyer.
Here, unlike the problems of defining "success" presented
by criterion-related validation, there is some general agreement
about "the underlying skills necessary to perform [the] func-
tions [of a lawyer]"269 as enumerated in the MacCrate Report.270
Of the ten enumerated skills, at best, the existing bar exam
tests legal analysis and written communication, 271 and, to a
lesser extent, problem solving.272 Bar examiners have eschewed
265. Richardson v. McFadden, 540 F.2d 744, 746-47 (4th Cir. 1976). But see
Ass'n of Mexican Am. Educators, 231 F.3d at 593 (holding that the District Court
had not erred in finding the CBEST appropriately validated under Title VII).
266. That is, there is no criterion-related validation. See, e.g., John F. O'Hara
& Stephen P. Klein, Is the Bar Examination an Adequate Measure of Lawyer Com-
petence?, B. EXAMINER, Aug. 1991, at 28, 29 ("No studies have attempted to corre-
late MBE scores with 'success as a lawyer' because of the difficulty of obtaining
agreement as to a valid measure of success."). In fact, many would argue that the
number of competent and unethical lawyers in practice has long suggested the
possibility of a negative correlation coefficient. See, e.g., Edward F. Bell, Do Bar
Examinations Serve a Useful Purpose?, 57 A.B.A. J. 1215, 1216 (1971) ("There are
many grossly incompetent lawyers practicing law today who have passed a bar
examination that failed to eliminate them and [prevented] them from practicing on
an unsuspecting public."). The legal profession is not alone in this failure to use-
fully define success. As Sturm and Guinier note, "[tihe question of how to define
successful performance of both institutions and particular actors within them is a
critical step in developing fair and valid selection criteria and processes. Yet, it is
one that is in its infancy in most institutional settings." Sturm & Guinier, supra
note 22, at 1005. But see Kidder, supra note 160.
267. See, e.g., LSAC Study, supra note 43, at 55.
268. See supra note 262 and accompanying text; see also infra Part XIII(d)(1).
269. 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (2001).
270. MacCrate Report, supra note 1.
271. See supra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text. To the extent that the
Multistate Performance Test (MPT) has been adopted (now, in New York, replac-
ing one essay question from the old test), in order "to measure an important ability
that is related to, but not fully measured by, essay examinations on the MBE,"
Jane Peterson Smith, The July 1993 Performance Test Research Project, B. EXAM-
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testing the other MacCrate skills on the understandable
grounds of time and cost.273 To the extent that the bar exam is
justified as certifying minimal competence to practice law un-
supervised, 274 a strong argument can be made that, because it
fails to test the skills recognized as necessary for such minimal
competence, 275 the bar examination fails the second prong of
Griggs and so violates Title VII.276
c) An Alternative Employment Practice
Even assuming, arguendo, that the bar examination satis-
fies the second prong of the Griggs test, it is still possible to
obtain a remedy under Title VII if the plaintiff presents evi-
dence to satisfy Griggs' third prong. There the question is
whether there is an alternative employment practice available
that does not have a similar disparate effect and that would also
serve the employer's needs. 277 This question has, thus far un-
INER, May 1995, at 36, 41, it may, in a highly limited and artificially controlled
environment, provide some basis for assessing the problem solving skill. Bar ex-
aminers claim that the performance test is "designed to examine four fundamental
skills lawyers are expected to demonstrate, regardless of the area of law in which
the skills arise, legal analysis, fact analysis, problem solving and communication."
Jane Peterson Smith, MPT Update, B. EXAMINER, Aug. 1995, at 28, 28 [hereinafter
MPT Update]. While there is some limited fact analysis contained in the MPT, the
skill described by the MacCrate Report, "factual investigation," is much more com-
plex, including, inter alia, determining the need for and planning the investiga-
tion, devising a coherent and effective investigative strategy, planning and
conducting effective interviews, analyzing documents and deciding whether to con-
clude the process of fact gathering. MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 163-72.
273. See, e.g., MPT Update, supra note 272.
274. Fisher, supra note 3.
275. While the MacCrate Report explains that a new member of the profes-
sion need not necessarily "become acquainted with the full roster of skills and val-
ues while they are in law school or even before they are admitted to the bar," it
emphasizes that knowledge of those skills and values is essential for every lawyer
that is practicing law unsupervised. MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 125.
276. This argument is based on the premise that, to be job-related, a test
should be fairly representative of the skills required to perform the job, not just
one skill, or one part of the job. But see Guardians Ass'n of N.Y. City v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 630 F.2d 79, 98-99 (2d Cir. 1980); Alba v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 189 Cal.
Rptr. 879, 902 (Ct. App. 1983) ("We cannot conclude that the test was inherently
unfair because it did not include each and every subject area that the examinees
had been advised pursuant to the published examination description.").
277. See Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). It was the plaintiffs
failure to produce any evidence on this third prong of Griggs which resulted in
their losing their Title VII claim in Ass'n of Mexican Am. Educators v. California,
231 F.3d 572 (9th Cir. 2000).
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successfully, engaged the attention of bar examiners and others
concerned with creating and administering a fair, non-discrimi-
natory and content-validated bar examination.278
XI. The 1980 California Bar Experiment
To date, there has been one major attempt to alter the bar
exam in ways which would satisfy the Griggs criteria. That at-
tempt was a major research project in California by the Califor-
nia Committee of Bar Examiners (CCBE) in 1980 that resulted
in the modern MPT. The project, not unlike this proposal for a
PSABE, attempted "to determine whether it is feasible to mea-
sure a broader range of lawyering skills in a bar examination
and whether alternative testing instruments would narrow the
differences in testing rates between minority and majority
candidates." 279
a) Description
In 1979, acting on those concerns, the CCBE convened a
group of national experts in legal education, including clini-
cians, as well as psychometricians and other testing profession-
als. According to Armando M. Menocal, then Chair of the
CCBE, the law school clinicians "believed that clinical testing
278. See discussion of the experimentation which led to the present Multi-
state Practice Test (MPT) infra Part XI. Given the many criticisms of standard-
ized pen and paper tests like the SAT and the bar exam, one educational psycholo-
gist asks, "why standardized tests remain so robust, particularly in this country,"
and answers his rhetorical question, in part, by noting "the lack of an alternative
way of thinking about assessment and the paucity of alternative instruments or
methods." Howard Gardner, Vygotsky to the Rescue!, in WHO'S QUALIFIED?, supra
note 32, at 49, 53.
279. Jane Peterson Smith, The July 1993 Performance Test Research Project,
B. EXAMINER, Aug. 1995, at 36 (describing efforts by the NCBE to create a perform-
ance test based on the 1980 California Experiment). Colloquium, Performance
Testing: A Valuable New Dimension or a Waste of Time and Money, B. EXAMINER,
Nov. 1983, at 12, 14-15 (panel presented at the ABA Annual Meeting, Aug. 1983,
Douglas D. Roche, Moderator, Armando M. Menocal, III, Jane Peterson Smith, Al-
bert Sacks, Panelists) [hereinafter Performance Testing] ("The [1980 experiment]
was the product of many pressures and aspirations, not always were those pres-
sures and aspirations related or consonant." The two main concerns, however,
were "the recognition that the bar exam measured only some of the important
skills required for someone to be certified as a minimally competent lawyer ...
[and the] recognition that there [was] a large gap in the pass/fail rates between
minority and non-minority applicants on the bar exam.").
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was possible," although they had not developed tests appropri-
ate for the experiment, or even tests which they used in their
own programs. 28 0 Over the following year, funded, in part, by
the National Conference of Bar Examiners (NCBE), more than
150 people worked to develop, 28 ' and then to administer and
grade the experimental session which the Bar Examiners
planned.
There were three parts to the experiment that was admin-
istered during what was called the "Special Session." The first
was a 90-minute test using videotapes designed to measure
trial practice skills.2 2 Applicants were given information about
a case, then shown a brief segment of the arbitration or trial of
that case. Questions, such as whether an objection was valid,
appeared on the screen, and applicants were given five or ten
minutes to write answers before the next segment appeared.
The second, the Research Test, gave applicants a task-like
writing a client letter, or preparing a cross examination-based
on a "closed file" of materials including a library of legal
authorities. 28 3
The final experiment, the Assessment Center, was the most
"clinical" of the experiment, and is the precursor of the PSABE.
Five hundred volunteers were selected to participate in a simu-
lated performance test where actors played the roles of judges,
clients and witnesses. Applicants in role as counsel for plaintiff
or defendant were asked to demonstrate various lawyering
skills that were videotaped and later evaluated.28 4
280. Performance Testing, supra note 279, at 14.
281. The general design of the test was to "includ[e] a definition of the specific
skills that were to be tested and the criteria for evaluating the performance of each
skill." Id. at 15-16. The work done on design might prove quite useful in modeling
the evaluation portion of the PSABE, see infra text accompanying notes 415-25
and accompanying text.
282. Performance Testing, supra note 279, at 16.
283. Id.
284. See, e.g., Philip Carrizosa, Test Can Measure Lawyering Skills, Study
Concludes: Bar Exam Experiment, L.A. DAILY J., July 28, 1982, at 1 (describing a
major study of the 1980 experiment and the experiment itself); Jane Peterson
Smith, supra note 279, at 17, 18 (describing the 1980 experiment and subsequent
iterations in California).
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The results, in most respects, were impressive, 2 5 if largely
unreplicable. 2 6 Although, unfortunately, the experiment did
not appreciably narrow the gap between minority and majority
applicant scores, 28 7 the CCBE concluded that it more closely ap-
proximated the actual practice of law for which it certified ap-
plicants. Accordingly, they determined to add a practice
component to the California bar examination beginning in
1983.288
b) Evolution of the MPT
In the end, not surprisingly, the bar examiners adopted
only the written portion of the experiment. 28 9 In this iteration,
applicants were given files containing various documents and a
285. Armando Menocal noted:
[Tihe first thing we learned was that it could be done. It is feasible to test
clinical skills. Even the problems that are associated with the testing of oral
skills, such as alleged subjectivity and lack of uniformity could be overcome
and produce a reliable test. In short, a reliable, scorable test of clinical per-
formance could be constructed and graded; its results were as reliable in
terms of the uniformity of grading presently achieved with the essay
examinations.
Performance Testing, supra note 279, at 16. The latter is a reference to the fact
that those applicants who took the experimental bar examination also took the
existing bar examination, permitting comparison and correlation of grades.
286. Jane Peterson Smith noted,
The California Committee determined that the new test model did more
closely approximate the actual practice of attorneys-[but] there [were] lim-
itations on what California concluded it could do: it was not feasible to take
12,000 candidates a year through a two-week Assessment Center and the
time and costs associated with videotaping oral presentations made that
form of testing impractical.
Jane Peterson Smith, supra note 279, at 18.
287. Although the experiment did not substantially close the gap "between
Anglo bar pass[I rates and [those] of Asians, Blacks and Hispanics," Performance
Testing, supra note 279, at 17, the bar examiners believed that the performance
test would "change the composition of those people who [would] pass." Id. There
were, however, strong correlations between scores on the experimental test and
the MBE and traditional essay portions of the bar examination. Jane Peterson
Smith, supra note 279. For the reasons which I believe might-or should-cause a
different, non-discriminatory result on a PSABE, see infra Part XIII(j).
288. Jane Peterson Smith, supra note 279, at 36. The Alaska Bar Examiners
added a performance test component in 1982, Jarvis, supra note 8, at 36.
289. Bar examiners concluded that it would be "financially impossible to du-
plicate the ... experimental exam for the 5,000 to 8,000 examinees each spring
and summer." Carrizosa, supra note 284. Armando Menocal explained, "[w]e con-
cluded that the [substantially modified written] performance test could serve as a
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limited "library" with statutes, cases and Restatement sections
from a fictional jurisdiction. For each of the files, they were
asked to perform some lawyering task, like drafting a legal
memorandum or preparing a cross examination plan for a wit-
ness. In the first administration of the California performance
test, applicants spent a full day of the three day bar examina-
tion on the task-three and a half hours for each file. 290 Al-
though it was intended as a substantial improvement on the
existing bar exam, 291 observers noted that it was limited by its
written format 292 and that, in many ways, it primarily tested a
single performance skill, legal analysis, 293 already tested on the
existing bar exam.
proxy, albeit a rough proxy, for the two-day oral and written clinical exam." Per-
formance Testing, supra note 279, at 17.
290. Performance Testing, supra note 279, at 17. The other two days were
spent on the traditional tasks of existing bar examinations, a one-day MBE and
one-day essay exam. Id.
291. Those who planned and created the 1980 experiment also expected that
the inclusion of performance testing would have a significant impact on law
schools. Id. at 20.
If performance of lawyer-like activities is a significant test because it is a
significant part of a lawyer's career, it may also be true that performance is
a significant component of legal education. The appearance of performance
testing on bar exams will make study of performance [clinical] skills in law
school an authentic part of professional preparation. Adding the perform-
ance test in California acknowledges and authenticates the study and teach-
ing of practical skills.
Id.
292. Harvard Dean Albert Sacks noted:
I am somewhat... bothered by the fact that there seem to be constraints to
do everything in writing. I understand the reasons, but at the experimental
stage, I would prefer to see more experiments with oral testing. There are
some things I don't think you can do.. .with nearly the same effectiveness as
in an oral examination. I think it is a challenge to the people who make up
the tests as to whether they will succeed in testing certain important skills
if they limit themselves to written tests.
Id. at 21.
293. Dean Sacks referred to the performance skill as "case analysis," describ-
ing one of the limitations of the modified, written performance test as lacking the
skill of "fact-gathering," a skill included, to some degree, in the 1980 experiment.
Performance Testing, supra note 279, at 21. He characterized the more idealized,
still unrealized true "performance" test as "a way of the future" "intended to in-
clude not just legal analysis but the ability to collect and raise facts, interviewing,
negotiating, counseling and drafting - and not just drafting in the formal sense but
writing more generally plus a number of trial skills .... Id. at 21.
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The National Conference of Bar Examiners ("NCBE") be-
gan studying this form of performance testing in California in
the 1980's, and in 1990 proposed a substantially shorter ver-
sion.294 In 1992, state bar examiners requested an even more
truncated version,295 resulting in the NCBE's July, 1993 Per-
formance Test Research Project.296 The original seven-hour,
two-file, four-task test was now reduced to a 90-minute written
exam 297 which, according to the NCBE, tests four MacCrate
skills: legal analysis, fact analysis, problem solving and commu-
nication. 298 State bar examiners have embraced the MPT as a
way of fully examining competence by testing the MacCrate
skills. As the Director of the Georgia Office of Bar Examiners
wrote, "If a part of our public protection function is to assure
competence, then we should be testing applicants to see if they
possess these [MacCrate] skills and can apply them."299
In fact, as it currently exists, the MPT only slightly ex-
pands upon what is already tested in the existing bar exam.300
For example, as already discussed, MacCrate communication is
294. Applicants performed two sequential tasks in one three-hour period.
Jane Peterson Smith, supra note 279, at 37.
295. Bar examiners asked whether the three-hour exam could be split into
two 90-minute questions, so that they could have the option of administering one
or both questions. Id.
296. MPT Update, supra note 272, at 28. The project and its research find-
ings are set forth in Jane Peterson Smith, supra note 279, at 37-41. See also Ste-
phen P. Klein, Relationships Among MBE, Essay and July 1993 Performance Test
Scores (1994), report prepared for NCBE. Klein found that there was a reasonably
high correlation between the performance exam and the MBE and state essay
questions, with some variations among the states where the test was adminis-
tered, Alaska, California, Colorado, Georgia and Virginia. Id.
297. To be fair, two separate 90-minute questions, involving different tasks,
are offered, but states have the option (exercised, for example, by New York) of
utilizing only one. MPT Update, supra note 272, at 28.
298. Id. For an excellent critique of the limitations of the MPT "file," see
Kordesh, supra note 91, 314 ("One of the unique aspects of the MPT is its compara-
tive narrowness ... [iut uses a few cases, a statute perhaps, and maybe a procedu-
ral rule ... the candidate must suspend all generalized knowledge that she might
have about the area of law to be tested.").
299. Hulett H. Askew, Why Georgia Adopted Performance Testing, B. EXAM-
INER, Feb. 1998, at 30, 30.
300. Curcio, supra note 14, at 379 ("[T]he MPT is just another way of testing
the same skills tested by other portions of the [bar] exam."). The NCBE's own
study confirmed that the MPT mainly tests skills tested elsewhere on the exam.
Id. at 379 n.68 (citing Marcia A. Kuechenmeister, A Performance Test of Lawyering
Skills: A Test of Content Validity, B. EXAMINER, May 1995, at 23, 27).
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a complex skill, incorporating both written and oral communi-
cation.301 Given the amount of time necessary to read the file,
digest the materials contained in it, and formulate a "solution"
to the problem presented, there is very little time30 2 for the writ-
ing component, and the applicant's answer can hardly be ex-
pected to adequately demonstrate (or the bar grader to
effectively assess) the nuances of the MacCrate skill.303 Bar ex-
aminers claim that the MPT also tests fact analysis. 30 4 Again,
however, the actual skill described in the MacCrate Report is
not "fact analysis" but "factual investigation. ' 30 5 The latter in-
cludes numerous nuanced aspects for which no plausible claim
of inclusion in the MPT can be made.
The efforts leading up to the MPT, and particularly the
1980 experiment, were, unquestionably, a genuine innovation.
301. See supra text accompanying notes 130-34. For example, the "general
prerequisites for effective written or oral communication" include:
[a]ccurately perceiving and interpreting the communications of others
(whether those be written, oral or non-verbal communications); reading, lis-
tening and observing receptively; and responding appropriately; and attend-
ing to emotional or interpersonal factors that may be affecting
communications.
MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 174.
302. Even at the earlier stage of a three or three and a half hour performance
question, the Director of Testing for the California Committee of Bar Examiners
had expressed concerns about the "constraint of time." Performance Testing, supra
note 279, at 18.
303. See supra notes 130-34. Of the numerous specialized kinds of legal writ-
ing included in the MacCrate skills, few are tested on the MPT, and if there is only
one MPT question, only one, probably writing a memoranda of law or a client letter
will be tested. There is no reason to believe nor has it been shown, that the single
limited writing skill tested is appropriately representative of all the writing skills
which might be tested. See, e.g., Performance Testing, supra note 279 (Armando
Menocal III commenting, "I .. .hope that these tests become more and more
clinical in the sense of getting away from just having the applicants write a memo-
randum on the law and instead have applicants draft legal documents such as
affidavits, interrogatories or discovery plans.").
304. MPT Update, supra note 272, at 28.
305. MacCrate Report, supra note 1:
To effectively plan, direct and (where applicable) participate in the process
of factual investigation, a lawyer should be familiar with the skills, concepts
and processes involved in determining whether factual investigation is
needed, planning an investigation, implementing an investigative strategy,
organizing information in an accessible form, deciding whether to conclude
the investigation, and evaluating the information that has been gathered.
Id. at 163. Each of these skills is broken down into numerous sub-skills, virtually
none of which are engaged in the MPT.
71
414 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:343
From its inception, the MPT experiment almost certainly in-
volved more realistic evaluation of performance of lawyering
skills over simulated but more extensive domains of practice. 30 6
Unfortunately, after its evolution, the performance test now
looks more like the essay portion of the traditional bar exam,
and tests roughly the same skills, 30 7 albeit, in a different, more
"realistic" looking and cost-effective 308 package. However gen-
erously one views the MPT, it only marginally improves upon
the skills-testing limitations of the traditional bar exam.309 The
promise of California's ambitious 1980 experiment remains, for
understandable reasons of limited resources, 310 unfulfilled, and
there is presently no examination which could satisfy the third
prong of the Griggs test.
306. See discussion of evaluation of minimum competence, infra note 396 and
accompanying text.
307. See supra note 300. The essay section already purports to test legal rea-
soning and analysis and, to the extent that it requires written answers in full
sentences, at least minimally tests written communication skills. Curcio, supra
note 14, at 378 ("[B]ecause the MPT requires the applicant to digest a lot of infor-
mation in a short amount of time and then produce a written product with no time
for editing, it is questionable whether it really measures skills different than those
measured by the essay portion of the exam.").
308. The expense of the Assessment Center experiment understandably made
it impractical for wider administration, while the diminished case file questions
offered on the MPT are scorable in roughly the same way and at the same cost as
traditional bar essay questions. But, as Sturm and Guinier note, although
"[sitandardized tests can be administered to huge numbers of applicants at rela-
tively low cost ... [the] view of 'cost-effectiveness' focuses on short-term expenses
of selection [and] . . . fails to take into account the costs to institutions of using
selection criteria that do not predict successful performers." Sturm & Guinier,
supra note 22, at 980.
309. A law professor who teaches preparation for the MPT suggests that, be-
cause of the extensive material which must be read and digested, it is actually
more about time management than other lawyering skills. Interview with Su-
zanne Darrow-Kleinhaus (Apr. 24, 2002). See also Curcio, supra note 14, at 377-78
("[Tihe artificial timeframe means that someone who could actually solve the prob-
lem in practice if they had time to think about the problem ... [to] research the
issue and organize their thoughts by writing and rewriting their answer may
never get that chance .... ").
310. There is no practical way, within the existing structures of any state's
bar examination, to perform the extensive testing and evaluation involved in the
1980 experiment for the more than 40,000 applicants who take the bar exam each
year. This is precisely why a paradigm shift in the structure-or at least some
portion of it-is necessary. Only by greatly increasing the resources for evaluation
to include court personnel or others, well trained and supervised, can the more
individualized evaluation of a greater domain of skills become possible.
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My proposal for a PSABE and a pilot project to test it is
offered in the spirit of, and, I hope, as heir to the visionary work
of the California Bar Examiners in 1979 and 1980 in their at-
tempt to better test lawyering skills and their less than success-
ful attempt to eliminate the unacceptable disparity in bar pass
rates between majority and non-majority applicants.
XII. A Proposal To Meet The Griggs Test
The proposal, which I have detailed elsewhere, 311 has been
designed to meet the third prong of the Griggs test and, hope-
fully, to accomplish that which was intended by the 1980 Cali-
fornia experiment. As a genuine performance test,312 it would
require applicants who elect it to spend sufficient time313 doing
varied work, in a public service setting,314 that would permit
them to be professionally evaluated 31 5 on their competence in
each of the MacCrate skills.316
Though firmly grounded in the law and analysis of Title
VII's examination of job-relatedness, the PSABE would consti-
tute a small, but real, paradigm shift in the way we certify en-
trance into the profession. From a timed paper and pencil test,
to an evaluation, over time, of an individual's actual capacity to
do the job of a lawyer is a sea change, but one for which a com-
311. Glen, supra note 4.
312. This latter idea, obviously critical for legitimizing the PSABE, came from
Lee Shulman, the President of the Carnegie Foundation, while he was part of a
site team visiting CUNY for Carnegie's multi-year, five profession study of the
transmission of professional values. See Wegner, supra note 15. It was Lee, a
psychologist by training, who introduced me to the concept of "portfolios of compe-
tencies." For a discussion of portfolios of competencies, see, e.g., D. Wolf, Portfolio
Assessment: Sampling Student Work, 46 EDUC. LEADERSHIP 35 (1989).
313. My original proposal was for three hundred fifty hours, or ten weeks. See
infra note 347. The Bar Committee Report proposes three months. See BAR COM-
MIrrEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 6. Either should be more than ample time for
evaluating an applicant's performance.
314. My proposal, like that of the Bar Committees, places the PSABE in the
court system, see infra Part XIII(a), but other settings might be equally
appropriate.
315. Court personnel-experienced lawyers and judges-would be trained to
conduct the evaluations by law school clinical teachers, who would also engage in
evaluations and "shadow" evaluations during a pilot project. See infra Part
XIII(e).
316. See Glen, supra note 4, at 1725-26; infra Part XIII(c).
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pelling analogy already exists in legal education. 317 This is the
transition from "grading on" to law review to the now common,
and sometimes dominant mode of "writing or publishing on."318
In determining who has the skill and capacity to write for and
edit a law journal devoted to legal scholarship, legal education
began with a quantitative proxy for necessary skills-first-year
law school grades 319-and has now moved-partly based on di-
versity concerns about the earlier system-to a performance-
based evaluation of candidates' actual writing skills.320
Whether or not law reviews have improved as a result of
this change in assessing applicants, they certainly have not suf-
fered, nor has whatever confidence they previously engendered
decreased or disappeared. Certainly they are more diverse,
both by gender and race. Once frequent criticisms of law review
boards as elite and homogeneous have been muted or disap-
peared. The law review analogy, chronicling the transition
from a quantitatively measurable, "objective" proxy, to a more
experiential, job-related evaluation which also increases diver-
sity, strongly supports a similar change in the way law gradu-
ates gain entrance into the profession.
While the core concept is simple, implementation, not to
mention the political will which will be necessary to make it
happen, is far more complicated. In what follows, I ask-and
propose some tentative answers to-a number of questions
317. I owe this insight to Diane Yu.
318. See, e.g., Rosenkranz, supra note 101 (describing the history of law re-
views and debunking the assumption of "merit" in selection and service); Fidler,
Law Review Operations and Management, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 21, 52-59 (1983) (sur-
vey of selection processes).
319. The problems inherent in the use of grades to measure or predict ability
for legal scholarship mirror those in the use of the quantitative bar exam to (alleg-
edly) predict competence as a lawyer. Rosenkranz, supra note 101, at 893 ("[Tlhe
capacity to spot and discuss issues quickly and superficially is a far cry from the
meticulousness and thoroughness that law review writing and editing demand.").
That is, like the bar exam, "grading on" may be "actually perverse."
320. In 1976, less than 10% of law review members "wrote on;" by 1980, that
number increased to 40%. Robert E. Riggs, The Law Review Experience: The Par-
ticipant View, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 646, 650-51 (1981); and today, the majority of
journals permit "writing on." Michael J. Closen & Robert J. Dzielak, The History
and Influence of the Law Review Institution, 30 AKRON L. REV. 15, 47-48 (1996).
For a discussion of why "publishing on" more directly measures the necessary
skills other than a writing competition (which fails to adequately test legal "re-
search skills, analytical ability, style and originality." Rosenkranz, supra note
101, at 898), see Rosenkranz, supra note 101, at 894-99.
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about a PSABE. Some are obvious, often implicit in the very
concept, while other more sophisticated and nuanced questions
have arisen in the many conversations I have had over the past
three years.
Finally, I briefly discuss some of the efforts which might be
necessary or helpful in moving the PSABE forward. The first of
these is research, which could be followed, like the California
experiment, by a well-designed pilot project. Such a pilot would
allow us to test, evaluate and fine-tune a PSABE before consid-
ering whether to add it permanently to the process by which we
certify the minimum competence to practice law which is the
pre-requisite to entry into the profession. I conclude by setting
out the special case for a PSABE in New York, based on find-
ings and recommendations of an evaluation of the bar exam
commissioned by its Court of Appeals more than a decade ago.
XIII. Questions and Answers About Implementation of
the PSABE
a) In What Institution Might the PSABE be Performed?
1. Legitimacy, Capacity and Geography
Any PSABE would need to be legitimated by the institution
in which the public service was performed, in light of that insti-
tution's own institutional capacity, 321 and also in the public
mind. The PSABE would also require that the institution offer
geographic capacity; that is, it would need to be available every-
where across the state so as to be equally accessible to gradu-
ates, regardless of where they lived or attended law school.
321. Besides having the capacity to observe, train and evaluate, the institu-
tion should itself, as far as possible in this society, be free of bias and self-conscious
about issues of discrimination both overt and covert. In this respect, state court
systems would seem promising venues because of their decades-long commitment
to uncovering and eliminating bias, primarily through the gender and race bias
studies in which they have engaged. The majority of states and several federal
circuits have commissioned reports on diversity in their respective legal systems
and established diversity task forces to address the issues of gender, racial, and
ethnic discrimination, see, e.g., Myra C. Selby, Examining Race and Gender Bias in
the Courts: A Legacy of Indifference or Opportunity, 32 IND. L. REV. 1167 (1999)
(listing state race and gender bias task forces), and its impact on fairness in the
courts. See, e.g., Patricia L. Gatling & Majorie Heidseick, The Effects of Diversity
in the Office, PROSECUTOR, May-June 2001, at 26.
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An obvious institution which fits these criteria is a state's
judicial system. The courts are located in every county, and
have, for the majority of the citizenry in most states, a high
level of legitimacy. In most states, it is the judiciary, generally
acting through the state's highest court, which hires and super-
vises bar examiners. The court system is, therefore, already ul-
timately responsible for the bar examination.3 22 Because the
court system delegates responsibility for certifying competence
to practice law to bar examiners, 323 it is also surely capable of
utilizing other trained employees within the system where eval-
uating performance, rather than creating and scoring a paper
and pencil exam, would be the criterion for admission.
In suggesting the court system, I do not mean to privilege
litigation or litigation skills over what most lawyers, who never
see the inside of a courtroom, actually do in their practice. To
the contrary, skills utilized by transactional lawyers and coun-
selors-like negotiation, counseling and practice manage-
ment-can be employed and evaluated in the court setting,
while the existing bar privileges the litigation model, testing,
for example, criminal procedure and evidence.
2. Motivation
The court system is also (using New York as an example)
desperately in need of volunteers to perform pro bono services
on its behalf. The Chief Judge of New York, Judith Kaye, has
instituted a number of "access to justice" initiatives, all of which
require resources which the legislature has either failed to pro-
vide or provided only at minimal levels. 324 Traditional pro bono
322. Rules for admission are promulgated by the highest state court in every
state, with additional authority in the legislature in a minority of the states, COM-
PREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 13, at 3 Chart 1.
323. Most bar examiners, that is, members of the governing body on admis-
sion (in New York, the New York State Board of Law Examiners) are chosen by the
state's highest court and serve, for pay, part-time, in addition to whatever other
legal position they may hold, usually in the private bar. They may, in turn, hire
and supervise "graders," who are also private lawyers, but who become employees
of the judicial system in their official capacity. See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 461 (McKin-
ney 2003).
324. See, e.g., Judith S. Kaye, Speech at the Access to Justice Conference, 29
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1081, 1082-83 (2002). The idea for the court system as the
home of the PSABE arose from a luncheon held by Chief Justice Kaye and Chief
Administrative Judge Jonathan Lippman with the Deans of all New York area law
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efforts have not been effective in meeting the court system's "ac-
cess to justice" needs; the PSABE could provide thousands of
person hours of enthusiastic and highly-motivated assistance in
this critical endeavor.
Assuming, for a moment, that a program could be designed
for 350 or 400 hours of service, there remains the question of
cost to the court system. Training court employees as evalu-
ators requires a substantial investment by the system; supervi-
sion and assessment would take time from other duties which
employees would perform in the absence of the PSABE appli-
cants. Planning and evaluation of the process would create ad-
ditional costs. 326 How could these costs be justified, given the
enormous demands already made on a vastly overburdened
system?
It is possible that, despite the cost, the court system would
enjoy a net benefit from the work that applicants would accom-
plish during their period of service. 326 It is, however, more
likely that any marginal gain might be insufficient to encourage
a court system to make the necessary commitment of time and
resources. But if the system were assured that additional help
would be forthcoming from persons it had already certified as
competent (and, therefore, presumably useful), courts' motiva-
tion for participation might greatly increase.
To create such motivation, I propose a 150-hour court-at-
tached pro bono commitment over the two to three years follow-
schools. In describing her many excellent initiatives, Judge Kaye implored the
deans to encourage faculty and students to volunteer in these initiatives, ranging
from the "self representation" offices where pro se litigants are assisted in various
tasks, to alternative dispute resolution provisions which many courts have
instituted.
325. These costs would be minimized in a pilot project in which two or three
courts, at most, would be involved. See BAR COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5,
calling for a pilot in the New York City Civil Court in the first year, and adding one
upstate court in the second. In addition, there is at least a good chance that a
foundation or other funder might provide resources to defray some of these costs to
the court. See infra Part XIII(1) and accompanying text. Imagining the alternative
on a statewide basis is, however, a far more daunting proposition.
326. Although there would need to be a set time (whether in hours, days or
weeks) during which actual observation and evaluation would take place, appli-
cants would also, throughout their placement, assist in the court's work. In my
experience on the bench, law student interns were, at best, a break-even proposi-
tion. The situation of applicants, already law graduates, should improve their
usefulness.
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ing an applicant's admission by the PSABE. The aspirational
pro bono target for all lawyers is 50 hours per year,327 so requir-
ing that amount of service for a two-year period would not be
overly onerous for the applicant. 328 On the other hand, the
availability of thousands of well-trained volunteer attorney
hours329 might make a substantial difference to the courts. In-
creased staffing resulting from a PSABE pro bono commitment
could enable court initiatives which would otherwise be purely
aspirational within existing resource constraints. As an added
bonus, this commitment to pro bono service in the years imme-
diately following graduation could imbue PSABE applicants
with an ongoing dedication to one of the core MacCrate val-
ues,330 the betterment of the profession.
3. Cultural Competence
There is an important area of lawyer competence, although
not extensively discussed in the MacCrate Report, which the
courts are particularly well-situated to teach and evaluate.
This competency, which my colleague, Sue Bryant, and her Yale
Law School collaborator, Jean Koh Peters, call "cross-cultural
lawyering"331 is increasingly critical to good practice in this new
327. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (2002).
328. At two hours a week, or a day a month, most applicants should be able to
fulfill this pro bono responsibility consistent with their other professional and per-
sonal responsibilities. This is made more attractive, or feasible, by the fact that
courts, more and more, operate beyond a 9-5 weekday schedule. In New York, for
example, Small Claims Court (with opportunities for volunteer mediators) sits in
the evening; the court system, sensitive to the problems of self-represented liti-
gants, is actively seeking to operate offices to serve them outside regular office
hours. See, e.g., NYC CONSUMER AFFAIRS: GUIDE TO SMALL CLAIMS COURT, availa-
ble at http://www.nyc.gov/htm]Jdeal/html/smallclm.html (last visited Apr. 22,
2003).
329. If a pilot project involved as few as 100 applicants for each of two years,
the courts would gain 30,000 hours.
330. "Striving to improve the profession," includes the court system. See Mac-
Crate Report, supra note 1, at 117-19. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Cultures of
Commitment: Pro Bono for lawyers and Law Students, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2415
(1999) [hereinafter Cultures of Commitment].
331. This is the term used in materials which they jointly developed as part of
CUNY Immigrant Initiatives, a project which, inter alia, created "modules" on im-
migration law considerations and immigrant perspectives for non-immigration law
teachers in basic substantive areas like contracts, criminal law, family law, and
labor law, as well as in clinical teaching. Their materials are available from Immi-
grant Initiatives at CUNY School of Law. A more scholarly account of the project
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century. The demographics of the United States suggest that
ever-increasing numbers of Americans will be immigrants, or
the children of immigrants. 332 These immigrants, who have
particular legal constraints and opportunities, as well as differ-
ing cultural and historic experiences within the legal system,
comprise a large portion of the client base of those who will be
graduating from law school in the next decade. Similarly, as
American society becomes increasingly diverse,333 lawyers will
need to understand the cultural differences between clients, ad-
versaries and judges334 who are of different races and ethnici-
ties. One of the most powerful arguments for diversity335 and,
by extension, for affirmative action 336 in law schools is precisely
and subject matter is contained in Susan Bryant, The Five Habits: Building Cul-
tural Competence in Lawyers, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 33 (2001).
332. Data from the 2000 Census indicates that more than 10% of the US pop-
ulation (some 28,400,000 people) were born abroad. Lisa Lollack, The Foreign Born
Population in the United States: March 2000, Current Population Reports, P20-
534, U.S. Census Bureau, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 2001). The 1990 Census re-
ported that the foreign-born population was 19,800,000 or 7.9% of the nation's peo-
ple. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Triennial Comprehensive Report on
Immigration, Executive Summary, available at http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics
aboutins/repsstudiesaddition.html (last modified Nov. 4, 2002). Thus the foreign-
born population increased over 43% in ten years. Add to these statistics the fact
that "age-specific fertility rates tend to be higher for foreign-born than for native-
born women," it is clear that "[i]nternational migration is furthering the nation's
ethnic and racial diversity while enlarging its foreign-born population." Jennifer
D. Williams, U.S. Population: A Factsheet, Report of Congressional Research Ser-
vice (June 12, 1995).
333. California is the first state to have "tipped" from a majority to a minority
of non-Hispanic whites. See Todd S. Purdum, Non-Hispanic Whites a Minority,
California Census Figures Show, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2001, at Al. If current
trends continue, it is estimated that by 2050, a bare majority, 53% of the popula-
tion, will be non-Hispanic white. In 1995, non-Hispanic whites accounted for al-
most three of every four Americans. Daphne Spain, America's Diversity: On the
Edge of Two Centuries, 1 PRB REPORTS ON AMERICA 11 (May 1999).
334. These are in addition to witnesses, jurors, agency officials and court per-
sonnel, to name just a few other participants in the legal system.
335. See, e.g., David Dominquez, Beyond Zero Sum Games: Multiculturalism
as Enriched Law Training for All Students, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 177 (1994); Paul
Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom?, 47 STAN. L. REV. 855
(1995).
336. This, of course, is the underlying premise of Bakke v. Bd. of Regents of
the Univ. of Cal., 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J., outlining the constitu-
tionality of race-based admissions policies to promote the educational goal of diver-
sity). Much of the evidence adduced by the student interveners in the University
of Michigan Law School affirmative action trial demonstrated the value of law
school diversity both in creating a marketplace of views and opinions and in equip-
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to equip graduates for the multicultural world in which they
will practice. While this is generally not yet a "skill" explicitly
taught in law school, I suspect that if the MacCrate Commission
were writing today, it would be more prominently discussed and
incorporated in the MacCrate skills and values. 337
Courts are wonderful places to observe diversity in action;
they are integrated, by race, class, ethnicity and immigrant sta-
tus, as perhaps no other institution in American society. 338 Liti-
gants, jurors, and to an increasing degree, judges and court
employees personify the multiculturalism that characterizes
America today. Courts utilize interpretation in its formal
sense339 as well as informally and more figuratively. 340 As such,
they provide an ideal opportunity for applicants to learn,341 ap-
ply and reflect on cross-cultural lawyering skills which will well
ping law students to function effectively outside their individual and/or racial
backgrounds. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
337. Sensitivity to cultural differences is explicitly included in the MacCrate
skills of Communication and Counseling: "View[ing] situations, problems, and is-
sues from the perspective of the recipient of the communication, while taking into
account the possibility that one's ability to adopt the perspective of another person
may be impeded by... [an insufficient understanding of the other person's culture
.... .MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 173. Gathering "[i]nformation about the
client's perspective on the decision to be made .. . including . .. [tihe extent to
which (and the ways in which) the client's perspective, perceptions, or judgment
may differ from those of the lawyer because of ... cultural differences." Id. at 178-
79.
338. For the importance of diversity in the judicial system, see Paul D. Car-
rington, Diversity!, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 1105, 1150 ("Given the role that courts play
in our polychromatic society ... it is an important independent value that there be
a significant number of judges and advocates identifiably connected to those of like
color whose rights and liabilities must be determined in those courts.").
339. Many courts in most states now have interpreters in one or more lan-
guages on staff, and maintain lists of interpreters in other languages to utilize on
an "as needed" basis for litigants and witnesses in actual trials.
340. Interpreters may not only translate the words of non-English speakers in
court proceedings, they may also assist them in understanding the justice system
and its processes. In this respect, they function as "cultural interpreters." Vir-
ginia Benmaman, Legal Interpreting: An Emerging Profession, 76 MOD. LANG. J.
445, 446 (1992) (The interpreter must command a "high level [ofl cross-cultural
awareness and sophisticated skills, including the ability to manipulate dialect and
geographic variation, different educational levels and registers, specialized vocab-
ulary, and a wide range of untranslatable words and expressions").
341. A segment on cross-cultural lawyering skills might be profitably incorpo-
rated in the post-graduate introductory course. Applicants will also, of necessity,
learn by doing, which is why it is also important to have some structured and
facilitated reflection on their experiences.
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serve them and their clients-in addition to the larger society-
when they enter practice. 342 The PSABE would present a
unique opportunity for applicants to observe and develop cul-
tural competence.
Courts are not, however, the only possible venues for the
PSABE. Many government law offices, District Attorneys' of-
fices, Legal Aid, Legal Services and Public Defenders' offices al-
ready have excellent training programs and high-quality
supervision. Their work generally requires proficiency in most
of the MacCrate skills, 343 albeit in some instances focused in
criminal law and procedure, rather than civil procedure and
substantive civil law. 344 Such offices are often held in high es-
teem in the communities in which they are located; almost cer-
tainly most could also profitably utilize additional person
power. Law firms and corporate counsel could also be utilized,
although, in order to maintain a public service/public interest
focus, the work done by applicants might have to be confined to
more traditional pro bono tasks. While these latter settings
would create a host of additional problems, 345 they might also
provide appropriate placements for evaluation of applicants'
competence in the MacCrate skills.
342. See, e.g., THE ABA GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS NEGOTIATIONS
(James R. Silkenat & Jeffrey M. Aresty eds., 2000) (describing the need for lawyers
to be sensitive to cross-cultural issues when practicing outside the U.S.).
343. Familiarity with alternative dispute resolution procedures would proba-
bly not be available in many of the offices involved in the criminal justice system; if
that skill were deemed sufficiently important, the placement might be supple-
mented by a shorter period of work in, for instance, a court-affiliated dispute reso-
lution organization.
344. The disadvantage here, if it is important that the PSABE test the Mac-
Crate skills in the context of the substantive law currently tested on the bar exam,
is that fewer substantive areas would be implicated; on the other hand, the ex-
isting bar, somewhat problematically, tests criminal procedure rather than civil
procedure. See Glen, supra note 4, at 1726-27. Arguably, the ability to utilize any
fairly complex body of law, regardless of subject matter area, is the skill new law-
yers need more than memorization of black letter law-often immediately forgot-
ten-for the bar exam.
345. These would almost certainly include, inter alia, consistency of tasks and
evaluation, uniformity of supervisory training and public confidence. Similar
problems arising from diverse, non-centralized placements arise in systems of tu-
telage or apprenticeship like the credentialing system employed in Canadian prov-
inces. See, e.g., Curcio, supra note 14, at 398-401.
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b) How Would the PSABE Avoid Replication of the
Disadvantages of the Existing Bar?
One concern is that the PSABE not replicate the discrimi-
nation inherent in the present bar exam. That is to say, it
should not be more expensive, take substantially more time, or
otherwise exacerbate the differences between those who are al-
ready likely to do well on the bar and those who do not. The
question is how to make the PSABE economically feasible so as
not to disadvantage those already disadvantaged by class and
financial capacity.3 46 Setting a reasonable time requirement for
participants' placement in the court system (or elsewhere) pro-
vides an answer.
Consider a requirement of three hundred fifty hours of pub-
lic service in the court system for the PSABE. This divides
nicely into ten weeks of seven-hour-a-day, five-day weeks, or
about the same number of weeks that applicants taking the ex-
isting bar exam would devote to study and preparation. Three
hundred fifty hours is a substantial period of time, that would
likely satisfy the public. As an analogy, three hundred fifty
hours of law school instruction constitutes 37.5%, or more than
346. I have not here discussed the potential of a fourth year after law school
for a clerkship or tutelage as is the case on the continent, and, in substance, in
Canada, see Hansen, supra note 11, at 1234-35 (arguing for a mandatory post
graduate clerkship), although some of my colleagues in legal education have sug-
gested that three years of law school is too long. See, e.g., Sexton, supra note 25.
This latter proposal has filled the President of the NCBE with dismay. See Erica
Moeser, President's Page, B. EXAMINER, May 2000, at 4, 5. ("At a time when boards
of bar examiners often seem to be lamenting inadequacies in the level of basic
skills and the knowledge of basic legal principles of new law school graduates, it is
almost unfathomable that progress would be marked by spilling those graduates
out of law school any earlier."). Certainly extending law preparation by another
year exponentially increases the difficulty for those for whom law school is already
a serious financial challenge. And, unless there were someone to pay for such a
fourth year, it would increase even more the astronomical debt limits which those
who can afford to take such debt on find themselves burdened with at the end of
their legal education and upon their admission to the bar. See Lewis A. Korn-
hauser & Richard L. Revesz, Legal Education and Entry into the Legal Profession:
The Role of Race, Gender, and Educational Debt, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 829 (1995).
The case of the UK, Canada and even more so of Japan are also cautionary. There
the number of law graduates far exceeds the number of tutelages available, so
discrimination, whether based on pure "merit" (however that might be defined) or
otherwise prevails, surely not an appropriate model for an alternative which seeks
to decrease discrimination and increase diversity in the bar. See Roche, supra note
47, at 33.
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1/3, of a law student's ABA-required education. 347 Saving the
cost of a bar preparation course also makes it more likely that
applicants of limited financial means could afford to devote ten
weeks to unpaid work.348
It should be noted, however, that the proposal of three hun-
dred fifty hours, like the proposal that the court system be the
supervising and accrediting entity, is only an opening bid.349
Either a greater or lesser number of hours might be appropri-
ate. It is also possible that the placement might not need to be
continuous-i.e., that it could be done in "shifts" that corre-
sponded to an applicant's rotation. Thus, an applicant might
spend three or four weeks assisting a judge in research, writing,
conferencing and settling cases, and return later for a month in
the self-representation part, assisting pro se litigants. She then
return for yet a third placement working in alternative dispute
resolution. A pilot project would help to determine whether
"splitting" the applicant's service would be feasible for the court
and for performance evaluation. These possibilities are offered
as additional ways in which to ensure that the PSABE would
not disadvantage those disadvantaged by the existing bar.
c) How Would the PSABE Test More MacCrate Skills?
Even with the addition of the MPT, the existing bar exam
tests only a small proportion of the MacCrate skills-primarily
legal analysis and, to a much lesser degree, problem solving and
written communication. 350 The PSABE, on the other hand is de-
347. The ABA requires a minimum of 56,000 minutes (or 933.33 hours) of in-
struction for graduation. STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS Standard
304(b) (2001). Three hundred fifty hours is thus slightly more than thirteen of the
credit hours required for graduation, albeit in a far more concentrated form. Stan-
dard 304(a) requires 130 days of regularly scheduled classes per academic year
(although few students, especially upper division students, will have classes all
five days of the week). Utilizing this standard, the PSABE would require 1/8 or
12.82% (50 days of 390). At 500 hours, the percentages would be 53.5 for hours,
and 15.38 for days.
348. Although difficult, it would be possible for an applicant to work (at night,
or on weekends) while taking the PSABE.
349. For example, the Bar Committees call for three months, or twelve weeks,
which would total four hundred twenty five hours. BAR COMMITTEE REPORT, supra
note 5, at 10.
350. See discussion supra notes 300-05. At present, most of the professional
responsibility or ethical issues with which the MacCrate Report is so justifiably
concerned are tested in the MPRE. The performance test piloted in California per-
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signed to test virtually all of those skills-adding to those al-
ready tested: oral and other forms of written communication,
counseling, fact-gathering, familiarity with litigation and alter-
native dispute resolution, and time management. All these
skills would, of course, be utilized in the context of several bod-
ies of substantive and procedural law, depending on the particu-
lar court.351 To the extent that the existing bar tests
"knowledge" of a number of primarily substantive areas of law,
the breadth of the "domain knowledge" required in the PSABE
should be reassuring.
A court-based PSABE provides a tailor-made opportunity
for applicants to perform,352 and be evaluated on all these
skills.353 Assigned to work with a judge, an applicant would
utilize legal analysis and reasoning, problem solving, legal re-
search and written communication skills while drafting opin-
ions or bench memos. She could demonstrate oral skills in
presenting that work to the judge, while also practicing negotia-
tion in inevitable and ongoing settlement conferences. Assigned
mitted inclusion of ethical issues in some context, but the 90-minute MPT question
which many states have adopted hardly permits in-depth examination of an appli-
cant's ability to "recognize and resolve ethical dilemmas." MacCrate Report, supra
note 1, at 203. For a critique of the MPRE, the MCQ which currently "tests" pro-
fessional responsibility, see Curcio, supra note 14, at 380.
351. I have proposed that the pilot take place in the Civil Court of the City of
New York because it is a court I know well, and because it provides rich opportuni-
ties for performance and evaluation. Glen, supra note 4, at 1724-25. In the Civil
Court, for example, applicants would encounter and employ contract, tort, prop-
erty, administrative and business associations law, utilize the rules of evidence
and a great variety of provisions in the New York Civil Procedures Law & Regula-
tions (CPLR). In addition, issues of, inter alia, agency, tax and family law might
also be encountered. The New York State Supreme Court-or any state's trial
court of general jurisdiction-would provide equal, if not more, varied
opportunities.
352. The literature describing court-based internships suggests that they pro-
vide excellent opportunities for learning and enhancing legal research and writing,
legal analysis, advocacy skills, negotiation, mediation and workplace skills includ-
ing time management and professional values. See Stacy Caplow, From Courtroom
to Classroom: Creating an Academic Component to Enhance the Skills and Values
Learned in a Student Judicial Clerkship Clinic, 75 NEB. L. REV. 872, 879-87 (1996)
(describing how court placements can provide equally excellent opportunities for
evaluation of those and other MacCrate skills).
353. Careful design will be necessary to plan an appropriate rotation which
will simultaneously give the applicant opportunities to employ the skills, permit
trained observation and evaluation, and actually assist the court (create "value-
added") in the performance of its responsibilities.
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to a Pro Se or Self Representation Office, the applicant would
engage in fact investigation, including interviewing litigants
and examining documents. She would also have the opportu-
nity to counsel pro se litigants. Spending weeks in a court
would surely familiarize the applicant with the litigation pro-
cess; similarly, in courts with mandatory mediation and/or arbi-
tration, the applicant could both observe and participate in
alternative dispute resolution procedures. 354 Given the court's
workload and the applicant's own assignments and responsibil-
ity, organization and management of legal work would be a sig-
nificant part of the applicant's experience-and the supervisor's
ability to assess. Finally, as I can attest from fifteen years of
experience, ethical issues arise frequently, requiring recogni-
tion and resolution before the court can proceed.
d) Would the PSABE Constitute a "Valid" Test of the
MacCrate Skills?
One of the first objections heard in conversations about the
PSABE is that, because it is somehow "subjective" in contrast to
the "objectivity" of the existing bar exam, it would not consti-
tute a valid test of minimum competence to practice law. There
are many ways to talk about and/or define test validity.355 In
354. In the Civil Court of the City of New York, for example, all civil cases
under $10,000 in value are subject to mandatory arbitration. The N.Y. Code title
22, section 28.2 provides for mandatory arbitration of claims up to $10,000 for each
cause of action in New York Civil Court and up to $6,000 in the rest of the State for
cases commenced in the Supreme Court, County Court, District Court, or a City
Court where the Chief Administrator has so ordered. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. 22, § 28.15 (2000). The law does not apply to cases filed in Small Claims
parts. In New York Civil Court, the mandatory arbitration program operates only
in New York County. Interview with Fern Fisher-Brandveen, Presiding Judge of
the N.Y. City Civil Court, in New York, N.Y. (July 21, 2002). In the small claims
division of that court, claims are heard either by a judge or by volunteer (which, if
appropriately trained, see Glen, supra note 4, at 1726 nn.115-116, could include
PSABE applicant) arbitrators.
355. See Arthur L. Coleman, Excellence and Equity in Education: High Stan-
dards for High-Stakes Testing, 6 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 81, 104-05 (1998) ("The
term validity is generally understood to refer to the accuracy of conclusions drawn
from test results and to actions taken on the basis of those conclusions: 'In ...
essence, test validation is an empirical evaluation of test meaning and use. It is
both a scientific and a rhetorical process, requiring both evidence and argument.'")
(citations omitted); Jennifer C. Braceras, Killing the Messenger: The Misuse of Dis-
parate Impact Theory to Challenge High-Stakes Educational Tests, 55 VAND. L.
REV. 1111, 1194-95 (2002) (Although "the scientific concept of test 'validity' has
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what follows, I use the work of psychometricians and other test-
ing professionals who have been engaged in the discussion
about performance testing, particularly as it relates to, or goes
beyond, the MPT, and has been relied on for assistance in con-
struction and justification of the bar examination.
The starting point for licensure examinations is the pre-
mise that "competence could be measured directly only if we
could observe a[n] [applicant's] performance over the full range
of encounters [defining the scope of practice] and evaluate that
performance unambiguously. Since this is impossible, compe-
tence can never be measured directly."356
Given this absolute limitation,357 all performance testing358 re-
quires the tester to "look at samples of behavior taken under
controlled conditions and then draw conclusions about [an ap-
plicant's] ability to perform in the complete domain of practice.
become confused and the subject of much disagreement... 'validity' generally re-
fers to a test's accuracy-that is, its ability to predict accurately future perform-
ance (as in the case of the SAT) or its ability to measure accurately the knowledge
and skill level that the test purports to measure (as in the case of educational
assessments)") (citations omitted).
The most widely accepted professional standards that are relied on in devel-
oping testing instruments are the Standards for Educational and Psycho-
logical Testing . . .of the . . .American Educational Research Association
(AERA), the American Psychological Association (APA) and the National
Council on Measurement in Education, which include three criteria against
which test use is evaluated.
AM. EDUC. RESEARCH ASs'N ET AL., STANDARDS FOR EDUCATIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGI-
CAL TESTING (1999) [hereinafter JOINT STANDARDS]. Professor Jennifer Mueller
summarizes the three criteria, validity, reliability and fairness, as follows:
A valid test measures what it claims to measure and, where used for predic-
tive ... purposes, predicts what it claims to predict .... The second [crite-
ria] is reliability . . . the same test taker, taking the test multiple times,
should get roughly the same scored .... [Flairness means that a test should
measure the same skill or knowledge for all students who take the test. The
test should not systematically over predict or under predict the results of
members of any particular group.
Mueller, supra note 32, at 211.
356. Rachel Slaughter et al., Bar Examinations: Performance or Multiple
Choice, B. EXAMINER, Aug. 1994, at 4.
357. Although the court-based PSABE provides the possibility of observing
and evaluating virtually all of the MacCrate skills, it cannot permit their observa-
tion and evaluation in the entire "domain of possible encounters defining the scope
of [legal] practice." M.T. Kane, An Argument-based Approach to Validation, ACT
Research Report Series 90-13 (American College Testing) (1990).
358. Professional licensure is only one subset of the larger category of per-
formance testing.
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The soundness of these conclusions or inferences depends on
three key dimensions of the measurement procedure: evalua-
tion, generalization and extrapolation."359
1. Evaluation, Generalization and Extrapolation
Evaluation determines whether the observed performance
is excellent, adequate, poor or unsatisfactory. 360 Generalization
questions whether we can infer from the performance(s) ob-
served that the applicant would perform similarly on other sim-
ilar tests. Extrapolation asks whether we can infer from the
applicant's test performance that she will perform similarly in
the actual practice of law.361 Assessment measures differ as to
the strength of the inferences which can be made in each of
these categories. A psychometrician's table, drawn from the
model of a leading testing expert,362 compares and contrasts
evaluation, generalization and extrapolation in three assess-
ment methods: direct observation of practice, so-called "per-
formance testing" based on simulations, and "objective tests."363
359. Slaughter et al., supra note 356, at 7-8.
360. Obviously, one could provide greater nuances-as does, for example, the
letter grade system used by most educational institutions (A+ to D-), but there is
very little validity in fine distinctions. See, e.g., Abiel Wong, "Boalt-ing" Opportu-
nity?: Deconstructing Elite Norms in Law School Admissions, 6 GEO. J. ON POV-
ERTY L. & POL'Y 199 (1999). For purposes of the PSABE, however, these four (or
even the cruder satisfactory and unsatisfactory) seem sufficient if the ultimate
goal is to predict minimum competence. In the same way that the existing bar
exam permits above average performance on one essay question to balance below
average, or even failing performance, on another, skills evaluation should permit
for some compensatory scoring, and implicitly, influence. This argues for the use
of a four-tier evaluation of each distinct skill. An excellent score in one area should
balance a poor, but not unsatisfactory, evaluation in another. Consistent excel-
lence might also appropriately offset an unsatisfactory evaluation in a single area,
especially since more MacCrate skills would be evaluated; at present (and cer-
tainly in the past, prior to any performance testing), of course, we admit applicants
without any knowledge of their mastery of these skills.
361. Slaughter et al., supra note 356, at 8; Kuechenmeister, supra note 77, at
26-27.
362. Kane, supra note 357.
363. Slaughter et al., supra note 356, at 9.
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Table 1 (adapted from Kane, 1992)
Characteristics of Three Methods for Assessing
Professional Competence
Evaluation
(Scoring)
Generalization
(Reliability)
Extrapolation
(Prediction)
1. Direct Experts may disagree Samples of perform- Professional compe-
observation of on the relative merits ance are generally tence is directly
performance of different courses of small and unrepre- assessed.
in actual action. sentative. Ability is evaluated
practice Levels of agreement Variability from one in complex, realistic
Among experienced observation to the situations.
raters are typically next tends to be fairly Observation may
poor. large. influence perform-
Subjectivity and bias Inferences to the ance.
are only partially con- larger domain may Observations are
trolled by using checkl- not be accurate. inconvenient and
ists and training raters Overall Inference: + expensive.
carefully. Overall Inference:
Overall Inference: + ...
2. Simulations Specific and detailed Observations will Even for high fidelity
("Performance scoring criteria can be have high variability simulations, the
tests" of vari- developed and raters from one case to the inference from a score
ous types) can be trained to use next. to a conclusion about
these criteria. A larger and more competence in prac-
Client problem and con- representative sample tice is based on
text can be standard- of performance can be assumptions.
ized to a high degree. evaluated compared Empirical evidence
The optimal solution to direct observation supporting the rela-
for the problem may be of performance. tionship to practice is
unclear-the more realis- A larger number of not strong.
tic the problem, the simulations are Items appear more
less likely experts will needed for adequate like real-life tasks
agree in rating per- generalization to the than multiple-choice
formance. domain of practice. questions.
Overall Inference: ++ Overall Inference: ++ Overall Inference: ++
3. Objective Tests can be graded Inferences from per- Written objective
Tests objectively. formances on a sam- tests provide direct
Experts agree on the ple of objective items measures of certain
scoring key. are highly dependa- learning skills
Tests generally focus on ble. (knowledge and skills
factual questions or Examinees can related to perform-
straight-forward appli- respond to several ance in practice) but,
cations of well-estab- hundred items in a at best, provide only
lished principles or few hours resulting in indirect indications of
procedures. very precise estimates performance in a real
Questions involving of knowledge. practice situation.
judgments about com- Sample a wide The cognitive skills
plex issues that will domain of knowledge. tested by written
meet stringent criteria Overall Inference: objective tests are
for objectivity can be +++ generally considered
constructed but are necessary, although
harder to develop than probably not suffi-
straightforward knowl- cient, for effective
edge-based questions. performance.
Overall Inference: +++ Empirical studies on
the relationship
between test perform-
ance and performance
in actual practice are
generally not feasible.
Overall Inference: +
430
Assessment
Method
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Accepting, arguendo, all the premises of the chart, 364 "objective
tests," like the current bar examination, are notably weak in
what would seem to be the most important dimension, 365 the
ability to predict future performance. 366 Conversely, the high-
est level of inference about the critical component of extrapola-
tion occurs where there is direct observation of actual practice.
If one were to assign numerical values to the plusses in the ta-
ble, the comparative scores would be
objective tests 7367
simulation 6
direct observation 5
These "scores," which are used to prove the point that the ex-
isting "package" of bar exam options (MBE, essays [state-con-
structed or MEE] and performance test [MPT]) give the most
complete information regarding inferences of professional com-
petence, 368 are of questionable value if one changes the assump-
tions in the table.
If "direct observation" was replaced by a carefully con-
structed PSABE, score of that factor should equal or surpass
that of both objective tests and simulation. Note particularly
the low score given for generalization based on the proposition
364. Obviously, I disagree with many, including the assertion that "written
objective tests provide direct measures of certain learning skills," or that they
"sample a wide domain of knowledge," as opposed to rote memorization.
365. If the purpose of the bar exam is to predict minimum competence to prac-
tice law unsupervised, see Fisher, supra note 3, then the inability to make that
prediction with some degree of confidence would appear to constitute a fatal flaw.
366. As Slaughter writes, "In moving from direct observations of performance
to objective tests . . .we lose strength in our assumptions about how accurately
those scores are likely to predict performance on similar tasks [sic] in practice."
Slaughter et al., supra note 356, at 8. I "[sic]" the statement because one clearly
does not perform the same tasks required on any bar exam in practice. In an oft-
cited article, Susan Sturm and Lani Guinier argue against "one-size-fits-all" stan-
dardized tests, not only because of their impact on diversity in the workforce, but
also because they are of limited utility in predicting performance in the job for
which they are used. Sturm & Guinier, supra note 22, at 970.
367. Inability to test "judgments about complex issues" should reduce the
evaluation score for objective tests to 2; similarly, the incorrect assumption that "a
wide domain of knowledge" is being tested should also reduce the generalization
score to 2. If this were the case, objective tests would score no higher than
direction observation, and lower than simulation.
368. Slaughter et al., supra note 356, at 8; Kuechenmeister, supra note 77, at
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that samples of performance are generally small and unrepre-
sentative. Observation, by trained evaluators, over a 10-week
(or more) period would surely entitle the direct observation
method to a score of three, rather than one.369 This is particu-
larly true since any "disadvantage" of inference to the larger do-
main 370 would disappear if the observation was of virtually all
the larger domain. Thus, even if evaluation remains problem-
atic,371 the PSABE's direct observation would provide the same
level of confidence ostensibly offered by the existing bar exami-
nation. With more skepticism about claims made for the objec-
tive test method, 372 direct observation would emerge as clearly
superior. That is, the comparative scores would now look more
like this:
Evaluation Generalization Extrapolation
Objective Tests ... ++[+] +
Simulations ++ ++ ++
Direct Observation/PSABE +[+1 ... ...
369. Kuechenmeister notes that "many of the disadvantages of performance
testing can be overcome if time and expense are not a problem." Slaughter et al.,
supra note 356, at 12. The PSABE deals with time by expanding the observations
over many weeks, and with expense by utilizing existing resources (court person-
nel and the court domain) in a way which actually increases, rather than depletes,
those resources (by providing assistance during the PSABE itself, and through
subsequent pro bono service obligation).
370. "Domain" here is used with regard to other questions which might be
asked on another administration of the test, in the case of objective tests, or other
choices as to the applicants' other skills which might be observed. As
Kuechenmeister points out with regard to objective tests, "It is not feasible to as-
sess the full domain of content and skills on any one administration because of
time constraints and examinee endurance." Kuechenmeister, supra note 77, at 33.
This is why generalization is so important in time limited tests, like the present
bar examination, and why it should be substantially less important for observa-
tions over a lengthy period of time. "Domain," especially on the MBE, also includes
the range of subjects, if not lawyering skills, that are tested. As I suggest, an
equally large, if not larger, domain of law is present in, and would necessarily be
utilized by applicants in the PSABE. See discussion infra notes 485-87 and accom-
panying text.
371. I do not believe this is necessarily the case.
372. See, e.g., Kidder, supra note 251, at 169 (arguing that the regression
model of test bias, used to validate the LSAT and the SAT, is flawed in that it may
"actually mask bias by relying on a criterion (law school grades) that also may be
contaminated by bias against women, people of color, and a host of other outsider
groups").
432
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Objective tests (the current bar exam) and the PSABE
would now have the same "validity" score of seven. If I am cor-
rect, either that the current bar exam deserves less than three
for generalization, or that, by developing uniform instruments
for evaluation, and instituting a set of checks and balances, the
evaluation score for the PSABE would rise to two, the PSABE
would garner a superior score.
If "[tihe goal is to design a process that will provide the
most useful information [in assessing an applicant's competence
to practice law] given a jurisdiction's limited resources," 373 the
PSABE should certainly be given a try.
2. Validation and Reliability: The "Argument-Based
Approach"
Another way of assessing any test used to license for a par-
ticular occupation or profession is suggested by Julia Lenel, for-
merly the Director of Law Programs at the American College
Testing Programs, Inc. (ACT) who was responsible for develop-
ing the MBE and MEE.3 7 4 Her analysis provides a useful way of
predicting the validity of a PSABE, as compared to the accepted
validation of the existing bar examination.
Dr. Lenel notes that,
the two most important attributes of a test are its reliability and
its validity. Validity refers to the appropriateness or soundness of
test-score interpretations while reliability refers to the accuracy
or precision of test scores. In assessing the validity of a test, one
asks, "Are the interpretations or inferences made on the basis of
this test score appropriate? Does the test actually measure what
it is intended to measure?" In assessing reliability, one asks, "Is
this test score an accurate measure of the ability the test is in-
tended to measure?" If a test is not valid, the reliability of the test
scores is irrelevant.375 If the test scores do not measure what they
are supposed to measure, it does not matter how accurate they
are. For this reason, the validity of a test is its most critical
attribute. 376
373. Kuechenmeister, supra note 77, at 27.
374. Lenel, supra note 264, at 14.
375. This is a statement of the principle which I use to criticize the validity of
the existing bar exam, see supra Part IV(a).
376. Lenel, supra note 264, at 5.
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Lenel reviews evolving concepts of validation, 377 describing
the result as, "a change in belief about the kinds of evidence
that must be gathered to support the validity of a test,"378 and
then employs the work of M.T. Kane379 and his "argument-
based" approach to validation. She applies this approach to the
existing bar examination as follows: validation must examine
the assumptions and inferences inherent in the interpretation
of the test. Given its purpose of protecting the public,380 the "in-
terpretative argument" for the bar exam is
377. She notes that views about what constitute test evaluation have evolved
from dividing validity into three different types, criterion related validity, content
validity, and construct validity, as provided in Am. EDUC. RESEARCH AsS'N., ET. AL.,
STANDARDS FOR EDUCATIONAL TESTING (1974) to validity as a unitary concept, or, to
put it another way, all types of validity as forms of construct evaluation. Id. at 8.
She writes:
According to this viewpoint, every examination is a measure of some hypo-
thetical construct. Even if the construct is not part of a well-articulated the-
ory, the interpretation of test scores involves a structure of assumptions and
inferences that can be tested. Validation, then, is the process of evaluating
these assumptions and inferences.
Lenel, supra note 264, at 8. This is the procedure I have used in applying the Kane
scoring typology to a PSABE. See supra text accompanying notes 360-73. It also
collapses the usual three types of validation which are set forth in the much earlier
EEOC Guidelines, see supra notes 261-63 and accompanying text, though without,
as discussed here, changing the result in validating the PSABE or, for that matter,
the existing bar exam. For a discussion of the concept of "validity," as fluid and
ever-changing, see Coleman, supra note 355, at 104. Coleman was Deputy Assis-
tant Secretary for Civil Rights in the Clinton Department of Education.
378. Lenel, supra note 264, at 8 ("When an individual is asked to validate an
examination, a major problem he or she will face is deciding which kinds of validity
evidence should be collected."). Lenel notes that for licensure exams, evidence of
predictive validity is the most important, but creates difficulties because of the
problem of "identifying an appropriate performance or criterion measure." Id. at 6.
In other words, how do we know or how can we identify and "nail" what constitutes
competence in lawyering? This has hitherto for been the largest single problem for
bar examiners. I suggest, and by their creation and/or acceptance of the MPT they
would appear to agree, that the MacCrate Report provides us conceptually with
the necessary criteria insofar as it describes the fundamental skills necessary for
competent practice. The difficulty which remains for bar examiners is to persua-
sively argue that the MPT effectively (validly?) tests those skills.
379. Kane, supra note 357. Note that "argument" about the validity of assess-
ment is part of validity's rhetorical content, Coleman, supra note 355.
380. Licensure examinations are intended to protect the public, as demon-
strated by the 1997 definition of the U.S. Department of Health, Education & Wel-
fare (now, relevantly the U.S. Department of Education) of licensure as "a process
by which an agency of government grants permission to an individual to engage in
a given occupation upon the finding that the applicant has attained the minimal
degree of competency required to ensure that the public health, safety and welfare
434
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[A] conclusion based on two premises: (1) Because there are criti-
cal abilities (i.e., skills or knowledge) that are necessary for the
safe and effective practice of law, individuals who lack these abili-
ties will not perform effectively; and (2) individuals who receive
low scores (i.e., scores below the passing score) on a bar examina-
tion, lack these critical abilities to a substantial degree.
38
'
Investigating Premise (1), the validator must identify "the
skills or knowledge that should be included in the domain of
critical activities. '" 38 2 This is commonly done by reliance on the
judgments of a panel of experts. 38 3 The alternative method in-
volves a job or task analysis identified by Lenel as "the method
of choice for .... licensure examinations." 38 4 Exploring the pos-
sibility of constructing a good job analysis for the existing bar
examination, Lenel points out difficulties based on the varying
practice situations available to entry level lawyers. 38 5 Given li-
censure's obligation to secure protection of the public,38 6 it is
disturbing that, as she notes, "it is possible that some skills or
abilities that are critical to competent practice are acquired on
the job rather than prior to being admitted to the bar."38 7 Thus,
will be reasonably well-protected." U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION &
WELFARE, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES, CREDENTIALING HEALTH MAN[SIC]POWER,
DHEW PUBLICATION No. [05] 77-50057 (1977). That said, state governments regu-
late those occupations practiced within their jurisdictions deemed to require licen-
sure and oversight in order to protect public health, safety, and economic well-
being; there is no federal level licensure that supersedes the states. Some profes-
sions have national qualifying examinations that are recognized in most states as
part of the licensing process, but there is little reciprocity regarding recognition of
qualifications or licenses since requirements vary state to state.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Bar examiners do this, to some extent, in determining the subject matter
to be tested, both on the MBE and on the essay portion of bar exams. See, e.g.,
Howarth, supra note 11. They do much the same when they ask: "What does a
competent practitioner need to know about a particular subject which is being
tested?" See Duban, supra note 60.
384. Lenel, supra note 264, at 9 (citing JOINT STANDARDS, supra note 355, at
64).
385. This difficulty is related to the notion of a "unitary profession." See supra
notes 67-78 and accompanying text.
386. Lenel, supra note 264, at 10. The implication that one cannot or does not
have the full range of skills necessary for minimally competent law practice di-
rectly undercuts the justification for licensure.
387. Id. (emphasis added). Lenel states that, "It is not reasonable to require
candidates to demonstrate skills that they have not yet had an opportunity to ac-
quire." Id. Perhaps this is not reasonable for those applicants whose law school
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while relevant to a job analysis, those skills and abilities are
not, somehow, "appropriate content for a bar examination. '" 38 8
We currently have a high level of confidence in identifica-
tion of the "critical skills or knowledge," as a result of the opin-
ions of experts 389 who, in essence, performed a "job analysis" of
the profession 390 for the MacCrate Report. For the PSABE, Pre-
mise (1) would reasonably appear to be established, while for
the traditional bar exam, there would be less evidence, and/or
evidence to the contrary.
As for Premise (2), Lenel describes the "normal procedure"
for testing the "problematic assumption"391 that the contents of
bar examinations are relevant to law practice as using the infor-
mation obtained through analysis of Premise (1) "to define the
domain of critical abilities and to develop a table of specifica-
tions for the examination." 392
For the existing bar exam, this can be done, at best, only
partially, because of the same time, space, and examinee endur-
education has failed to provide them with opportunities to acquire critical skills,
but is it reasonable to claim you are protecting the public, when you know that
applicants you are licensing lack essential skills? To this, Lenel states parentheti-
cally, "This also raises the question whether such skills should be acquired prior to
licensing, but that is a topic for another paper." Id. The profession, if not the
academy, has resoundingly answered that question in the MacCrate Report. Much
of the argument for a PSABE is to encourage law schools to teach the skills we
know are critical, as well as to require applicants to demonstrate competence in
those skills before they are admitted to practice. And secondary to its purpose of
providing opportunity for evaluation, the PSABE itself incorporates a fair amount
of "on the job training." See infra Part XIII(k)(2).
388. Lenel, supra note 264, at 10.
389. The MacCrate Commission was made up of leading experts from the
realms of practice, legal education and the judiciary. I know of no one who has
seriously criticized the composition of the Commission or the expertise and experi-
ence of its members.
390. In formulating the ten "fundamental lawyering skills" and four "funda-
mental values of the profession," the Commission sought comments not only from
those practicing law, but also those who work with lawyers. The tentative draft
resulting from this first round formulation was circulated nationally to the profes-
sion in 1991. MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at xii. It is hard to imagine a more
thorough, comprehensive process of job analysis for a diverse profession.
391. For the existing bar exam, Lenel considers one of the imbedded assump-
tions in this Premise, that bar examination scores are a measure of the critical
abilities, problematic because "the contents of bar examinations are often attacked
for having limited relevance to the practice of law." Lenel, supra note 264, at 10.
392. Id.
436
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ance limitations previously noted.393 Having identified the "do-
main" as that described in the MacCrate Report, the PSABE's
extended observation would obviate these limitations. More
significantly, in Lenel's construct, "the format of a test may not
be amenable to assessing certain [critical] abilities."394 Here
again, the (projected) evidence about the PSABE is more likely
to support the necessary inference of an inclusive domain.395
Lenel also notes that the second embedded assumption-
that the passing score marks the cut-off between incompetence
and minimum competence-is problematic. It is, however, criti-
cal. As she writes:
If a test validator cannot make a plausible and persuasive argu-
ment (preferably based on empirical studies) that individuals who
score below the passing score generally are not competent to prac-
tice law and those who score above the passing score are at least
minimally competent, then the test cannot be considered valid.396
As to the existing bar examination where the cut-off ap-
pears both arbitrary and protectionist,397 this seems an under-
393. "There is a limit to the number of questions that can be included on a
[written] test .... Id. In contrast, the PSABE permits innumerable observations
of the full domain of skills, as well as the contextualized use of substantive law in
testing the knowledge of which is, by this definition, severely curtailed on a paper
and pencil test.
394. Id. The example she uses is oral communications skills, but she could
have chosen a number of other MacCrate skills, including negotiation, client coun-
seling, alternative dispute resolution, or even legal research (to the extent that it
involves the real life practice situation of a relatively unbounded universe of poten-
tial source material, unlike the tightly closed universe of the MPT), none of which
can be assessed on the existing bar exam.
395. This is because virtually all of the MacCrate skills could be observed and
evaluated in the PSABE. See supra note 316 and accompanying text and infra
Part XIII(d).
396. Lenel, supra note 264, at 11.
397. The argument that the bar examination is more about limiting competi-
tion than ensuring competence has often-and with some basis-been made. See,
e.g., Rogers, supra note 51, at 584-87; supra text accompanying notes 116-20. The
difference in passing scores among jurisdictions also suggests at least some degree
of arbitrariness. See, e.g., Kordesh, supra note 91, at 308 nn.26-27 (Georgia re-
quires a minimum score of 115 on the MBE, with a combined score of 270 on the
MBE and essay portions; in Minnesota, an MBE score of 145 is sufficient to pass
the bar. Connecticut has a combined score requirement with no required mini-
mum on either portion. Pennsylvania now requires a minimum scaled score of 130
on the MBE and 135, with a minimum combined score of 270) (citations omitted).
On the connection between raising the cut-off point, see Dream Deferred, supra
note 21.
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statement, especially in light of the movement to increase
passing scores and thus lower bar pass rates.398 The PSABE
might not be better, although intuitively it seems that it
would,399 but it certainly could not be worse.400
Having arguably collected evidence which would allow one
to substantiate the two stated premises, 401 the argument-based
method continues by requiring the validator to test competing
hypotheses-that is, whether the test is measuring other, irrel-
evant factors. 40 2 These might include assertions, inter alia, that
the existing bar exam actually tests only memorization; that
scores are a function of who grades the exam rather than the
examinee's knowledge; that it tests general intelligence-or
test-taking skills-instead of competence to practice law; that it
is biased against women or minorities, etc. Testing these alter-
native hypotheses requires studies specifically designed to
398. See supra text accompanying notes 16-20; Merritt et al., supra note 20. If
the arguments for engaging in this score raising are actually premised in the belief
that previous scores were too low to ensure competence (although there has been
absolutely no evidence propounded either for or against that proposition), then the
bar examiners are admitting that many practicing attorneys lacked minimum
competence, although they were certified as possessing it at the time they took and
passed the bar exam. For obvious reasons (including the lack of any evidence),
they cannot make this claim; without the claim, it is difficult to justify raising the
passing score, especially when to do so will almost certainly have a disparate im-
pact on non-majority takers. See Dream Deferred, supra note 21, at 32-36.
399. Evaluators would assess competence (excellent, adequate, poor, unsatis-
factory) on identified tasks which when aggregated, would more closely approxi-
mate a line between minimal competence and incompetence, than numerical
scores assigned to questions and scaled against other takers' answers and scores.
Judgments would still need to be made-for example, if numerical values were
assigned to each of the categories, i.e., 4 to 1, and averaged across the evaluation of
each skill, we would need to decide whether an average of adequate (3) was neces-
sary (as opposed to something between average and poor) and/or whether, even if
the numerical average met our numerical cutoff (3, 2.5, 2), an applicant would
"pass" with an evaluation of incompetent on one or more of the skills observed.
400. This assumes competent and reasonably consistent evaluators. See dis-
cussion infra Part XIII(e).
401. Lenel seems, although with some qualification, to believe that this can be
done on the cutoff issue for the existing bar exam. Lenel, supra note 264, at 11. If
this criteria of validity were honestly applied, we would have to conclude (in the
absence of any empirical studies correlating bar pass scores to "competence" in
practice, however that might be defined) that the bar exam is invalid as a licensure
test. The point here, however, is to demonstrate that by criteria so loosely applied
as to avoid this dilemma by current bar examiners (and the NCBE), the PSABE
would, at worst, be equally valid.
402. Id. at 12.
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study each one individually. 403 The validator can only form the
"validity argument"-or a persuasive claim that the test is what
it purports to be, and does what it purports to do (and is re-
quired by general principles of licensure, and the due process
clause)4 04-after such studies have been successfully completed.
The "competing hypotheses" about the existing bar exam
have neither been adequately tested,40 5 nor, where tested, been
convincingly dispelled.40 6 We could-and should-also formu-
late competing hypotheses for the PSABE. For example: the
role of evaluation bias; that it proves competence only in the
controlled setting of the court system, rather than in un-
supervised practice, etc. As competing hypotheses arise, they
should, like those for the existing bar, be subjected to the best
studies which can be designed and executed. Surely the public
deserves no less from those whose competence is certified by bar
examiners. There is, however, little reason to believe that the
competing hypotheses would prove any stronger for the PSABE
than for the existing bar exam; if they did, the PSABE could
and should be discontinued.
Even after the validity argument can be made-thus far, I
suggest, it can be done at least as persuasively for the PSABE-
the social consequences of the test must be considered. That is,
the evaluation moves from the technical to the political. 40 7
403. Id. Lenel cautions, however, that because "Bar examinations are the tar-
get of considerable criticism, [iut may not be reasonable to expect validators to in-
vestigate every [competing hypothesis]." Id.
404. For a finding that a test was "unfair" in constitutional terms, because it
did not test what had been taught, see Debra P. v. Turlington, 474 F. Supp. 244
(M.D. Fla. 1979), affd in part, vacated and remanded in part, 644 F.2d 397 (5th
Cir. 1981).
405. Evidence that bar passage is somewhat correlated to LSAT scores hardly
proves that success on the former-as well as the latter-is not a function of test-
taking skills, as opposed to legal competence. Certainly, that claim has never been
made for the LSAT by LSAC. And, of course, "the LSAT has never been (nor was it
ever intended to be) validated as a predictor of actual performance as a lawyer."
Kidder, supra note 160, at 197 (citing Wightman, supra note 154, at 29-31).
406. If anything, the LSAC Bar Passage Study confirms rather than disproves
allegations of disparate impact on non-majority applicants. See LSAC Study,
supra note 43.
407. As Lenel describes, using unproven but widely-accepted allegations of ra-
cial bias as a "hypothetical," "a test that is technically sound may still be judged
unfair and possibly invalid." Lenel, supra note 264, at 12. Social consequences,
especially as they may include differing results for different sub-groups, of takers
439
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Drawing on the work of leaders in the measurement field, Lenel
writes:
It is no longer enough to show that a test is technically sound and
measures what it is supposed to measure. The social impact of
testing must also be evaluated. The test user must ask, "What
are the consequences of testing?"408 What unintended conse-
quences is the test having?40 9 Are these consequences accept-
able?410 Is the test still serving its function? 411
Creating and testing a PSABE, rather than working toward
the unlikely possibility of abolishing and/or replacing the ex-
isting exam should be especially attractive. An alternative
which corrects for the inadequacies of the existing bar exam412
by deploying new resources and testing more lawyering skills
could relieve some of the pressure on the current system and
those who believe it should be maintained "as is." Especially
where applicant perception 413 and other unintended conse-
quences are involved, 414 a PSABE could dispel skepticism and/
is part of the third requirement for "validity" in the JOINT STANDARDS, supra note
355. See also Coleman, supra note 355, at 106.
408. To this, one answer, propounded by the MacCrate Report, is that law
schools are not encouraged, much less compelled, to teach the full range of lawyer-
ing skills.
409. For example, if there were a widespread perception that non-majority
takers have only a 50% chance of passing the first time, has that perception caused
non-minority applications to law school to fail disproportionately (thus decreasing
the diversity of an already disproportionately white bar). See discussion infra Part
XIII(j). Or, alternatively (and less controversially), does the bar examination's reli-
ance on testing doctrine rather than lawyering skills result in decreased commit-
ment by law schools to teaching those skills as part of their curriculum?
410. For example, can we continue with a bar exam which has the conse-
quence (to whatever extent it is "responsible") of a bar which does not reflect the
diversity of the society which the law governs and regulates?
411. Lenel, supra note 264, at 13. For example, given the widespread dissatis-
faction with and distrust of lawyers and the legal system, can we assume the bar
exam is adequately protecting the public?
412. This refers particularly to those involving time and expense constraints
over which well-intentional bar examiners have no control.
413. Testing professionals agree that, when validating an examination, exam-
inees should believe the test to be a fair measure of "critical knowledge or skills."
See, e.g., Performance Testing, supra note 279 at 36 (describing the process by
which applicants were questioned on their perception of the "fairness" of the 1980
California experiment).
414. "Researchers increasingly suggest that both the intended and unin-
tended effects of a test should be studied and validated." Mueller, supra note 32,
at 211.
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or hostility and encourage results deemed critical by the profes-
sion. Giving an applicant the opportunity to choose how her
lawyering skills would be tested might increase both her
chances of passing and her confidence in the fairness of the
process.
In summary, using either or both models employed to jus-
tify the current system, the PSABE should prove at least an
equally "valid" and acceptable testing mechanism.
e) Who Would Evaluate PSABE Takers, How Would They be
Trained and How Would we Avoid Bias?
1. Identity
In the long term, a PSABE's on-the-job evaluations should
be done by court employees-experienced lawyers415 and
judges-who have been appropriately trained. 416 Those employ-
ees must also be given periodic opportunities for reflection with
their colleagues and trainers, other testing professionals and/or
members of the "bar examination establishment.1'4 7 In the
shorter term-i.e., for a pilot project-skilled law school clinical
teachers would be critical in training and assisting selected
court personnel. This combination could produce opportunities
for fine-tuning subsequent training, improving the evaluation
process, especially for first-time court employees, increasing the
ability to generalize across observations, and providing feed-
back, which is a critical part of learning.418
415. It is important to remember that the existing bar exam is graded by prac-
ticing lawyers who are selected and trained by the bar examiners. The Bar Com-
mittees' Proposal would require all "site supervisors" to have at least five years of
experience. BAR COMMIT-FEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 13.
416. See infra text accompanying notes 419-38. Training, and requiring du-
ties in addition to those in their existing job descriptions would require consulta-
tion with, and cooperation from, their relevant unions. See discussion infra at
notes 678-80 and accompanying text.
417. By this I mean the institutions, groups and individuals who are involved
in the bar examination process - the state supreme court or court of appeals which
controls admission to the bar, the bar examiners of the particular state, the NCBE,
state and other important bar associations, psychometricians and testing profes-
sionals relied upon by bar examiners and perhaps also the bar review industry.
418. See generally Goode, supra note 146, for a discussion of the importance of
feedback in a clinical setting.
441
99
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:343
2. Training
Law school clinicians will be critical in designing and ad-
ministering training for court employee evaluators. In 1979,
the California Bar Examiners called upon the relatively unde-
veloped expertise of clinicians in constructing the test and eval-
uating the performance of applicants. 419 More than twenty
years later, clinicians have developed a sophisticated pedagogy
and extensive literature of evaluation. 420 While much of this is
focused on evaluation as part of a learning, rather than a sort-
ing or weeding process, clinicians, like other law school teach-
ers, are required to assess-and thus sort-their students in
the process of awarding letter grades. Clinical teachers have
developed assessment methodologies, 421 and have utilized them
in training others to do so, most commonly in the context of ex-
ternships where practitioners who supervise law students par-
ticipate in the evaluation and grading process.422
More can be learned from the experience of the 1980 Cali-
fornia experiment. Bar examiners-themselves almost all prac-
419. See Performance Testing, supra note 279, at 14, for Armando Menocal's
description of the limitations of clinical expertise at that time.
420. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Grosberg, Should We Test for Interpersonal Lawy-
ering Skills?, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 349, 355-56 (1996). "The principles of competent
skills performance ... do not remove all subjectively from ... evaluation-nor do
the criteria for effective answers to traditional doctrinal essay questions-but they
do rest on careful analytical breakdowns of the component parts needed to achieve
effective performance." Id.; Amy L. Ziegler, Developing a System of Evaluating in
Clinical Legal Teaching, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 508 (1992); Roy T. Stuckey, Appren-
ticeships and Clinical Education: The Only Real Performance Tests?, B. EXAMINER,
Aug. 1986, at 4, 7.
421. For example, I asked one CUNY clinical teacher how she would assess
competency in the MacCrate skill of interviewing (part of fact development). She
described reviewing an "interview plan" prepared by a student prior to the inter-
view itself (looking at, e.g., the student's understanding of the case, possession of a
"theory of the case" which might be enhanced or altered by the results of the inter-
view, etc.), observing the interview for, e.g., skill in eliciting relevant facts, and
then comparing (in consultation with the student) the results of the interview with
the interview plan. Interview with Janet Calvo, CUNY Professor (Apr. 2001).
"Evaluating an instance of lawyering performance, especially an oral performance,
usually requires different methods of analytical assessment than would be used in
evaluating a written essay answer, but this is a difference of degree and not of
kind." Grosberg, supra note 420, at 356.
422. There is, by now, a fairly extensive literature on externships, see J.P.
Ogilvy, Introduction to the Symposium on Developments in Legal Externship
Pedagogy, 5 CLINICAL L. REV. 337 (1999), and symposium articles summarizing
pedagogical goals, program design, field supervision and evaluation.
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titioners-were taught to evaluate the performance of the 500
participants who were videotaped performing various lawyering
tasks in the "Assessment Center" portion of the experiment.423
Those who evaluated the overall experiment found that the re-
sulting performance assessments were as reliable as assess-
ments made in grading the traditional bar exam. 424 A PSABE
would differ in the increased and more varied domain of prac-
tice observed. There is, however, no reason to believe that the
training and evaluation methods employed in 1980 would not
be a useful source for training court employees to assess PSABE
applicants. 425
More recent practices developed to grade, where more sub-
jective measurements of legal knowledge and skills are in-
volved, can be helpful in designing training for court employee
evaluators. These include the methods utilized by bar examin-
ers to avoid bias and increase uniformity of scoring MPT ques-
tions and essays.426 Experience from other countries may also
provide guidance. In the Canadian credentialing process
(which varies slightly from province to province), law graduates
are required to successfully complete a six-week to six-month
teaching term as well as a six to twelve month period of arti-
cling (clerkship).427 The teaching term faculty may be required
to grade projects which are completed by applicants during
their hands-on, skills-based training.428 Students are also
tested during the term to determine whether they are mini-
423. See discussion supra Part XI(a).
424. See supra note 285.
425. For example, the BAR COMMITTEE REPORT suggests, "formulation of ap-
propriate evaluation criteria ... and formats for an on-the-job assessment ... be
developed cooperatively by ... court personnel and ... outside consultants ....
Live or videotaped demonstrations will be prepared which model appropriate feed-
back techniques and serve as a baseline for evaluation." BAR COMMITTEE REPORT,
supra note 5, at 13-14.
426. MPT graders are given a uniform scoring instrument, "Drafters Point
Sheet and Grading Guidelines," which describes the factual and legal points en-
compassed in the lawyering task to be performed by the applicant. Following ad-
ministration of the MPT, graders may participate in a national grading workshop.
See Smith, supra note 84, at 46. Similarly, there are techniques for increasing
reliability by essay graders. See Julia C. Lenel, The Essay Examination: Part III:
Grading the Essay Examination, B. EXAMINER, Aug. 1990, at 16, 18.
427. Curcio, supra note 14, at 398-401 (describing the Canadian model).
428. Id. at 399.
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mally competent in specific lawyering skills. 429 The experience
of attorney supervisors in the teaching term in assessing lawy-
ering skills should be examined and, where successful,
incorporated.
Finally, there is an enormous literature on job assess-
ment 430 outside the licensure context 431 which could be drawn
upon in constructing a valid evaluation model and training for a
PSABE. 432 Significantly, the EEOC's Uniform Guidelines on
Employee Selection Procedures (adopted by the Supreme Court
in Albemarle and incorporated into Title VII as establishing the
kinds of validation which legitimate employment tests)433 note
that, for criterion-related validation, "[t]he most commonly used
criterion measure is supervisory rating of job performance
which is acceptable if done in a professional manner."434 Such
performance-based assessment has already been widely and
successfully employed.
The provocative work of Susan Sturm and Lani Guinier
suggests that the process of developing "dynamic and interac-
tive" models of assessment which are "integrated into the day-
to-day functioning of the organization" could also enhance op-
portunity and diversity in ways different from, and politically
429. Id. at 400.
430. See Kenneth Pearlman, Twenty-First Century Measures for Twenty-First
Century Work, in TRANSITIONS IN WORK AND LEARNING: IMPLICATIONS FOR ASSESS-
MENT (Bd. on Testing and Assessment & Nat'l Research Council eds. 1997); PER-
SONNEL SELECTION IN ORGANIZATIONS (Neal Schmitt et al. eds., 1997); E.L. Baker
et al., Policy and Validity Prospects for Performance Based Assessments, 48 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 1210 (1993); WARREN W. WILLINGHAM ET AL., PREDICTING COLLEGE
GRADES: AN ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONAL TRENDS OVER Two DECADES (1990); LINDA
DARLING-HAMMOND ET AL., A LICENSE TO TEACH: BUILDING A PROFESSION FOR 21ST
CENTURY SCHOOLS (1995).
431. Lawyers themselves have developed models and techniques, for example,
for assessing the skills of law students they have hired. See, e.g., Alice Alexander
& Jeffrey Smith, Law Student Supervision: An Organized System, LEGAL ECON.,
May-June 1989, at 38; Henry Rose, Lawyers as Teachers: The Art of Supervision,
LAW PRAC. MGMT., May-June 1995, at 28.
432. A new LSAC-funded study conducted by Professors Marjorie M. Shultz
and Sheldon Zedeck of the University of California at Berkeley is in the early
stages of using empirical studies to define the skills necessary to succeed as a law-
yer, to be followed by development ofjob-based predictive instruments by Professor
Zedeck, an authority on job-relatedness and Title VII. Marjorie M. Shultz & Shel-
don Zedeck, Presentation at the AALS Annual Meeting, Where are we Headed?
Improving the Competence of Law Schools (Jan. 5, 2003).
433. See supra notes 256-64 and accompanying text.
434. SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 261.
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more appealing than traditionally understood affirmative ac-
tion programs.435 Their work conceptualizes new methods of
evaluation, which move "from prediction to performance." In-
corporating "[r]ecent developments in the assessment area,
such as portfolio-based 436 and authentic assessment,"437 Sturm
and Guinier ask questions 438 and provide a valuable context in
which evaluation training can be developed.
3. Avoiding Bias
The kind of on-the-job performance evaluation and assess-
ment utilized in a PSABE raises a potential for bias which al-
ways exists in more subjective evaluations. 439 There are no
simple answers, but my personal experience in the court system
gives me some measure of confidence that where those who are
trained to do the evaluations are themselves of diverse race and
gender, and operate within an inclusionary structure, their
evaluations can be fair and unbiased.440 Nonetheless, the eval-
uation process must be designed explicitly to minimize or com-
435. Sturm & Guinier, supra note 22, at 1012-13.
436. For a discussion of professional portfolio-based evaluation in the educa-
tional context, see HAMMOND ET AL., supra note 430, at 81-84; see also RUTH MITCH-
ELL, TESTING FOR LEARNING: How NEW APPROACHES TO EVALUATION CAN IMPROVE
AMERICAN SCHOOLS 20-21 (1992).
437. Sturm & Guinier, supra note 22, at 1013.
438. Among the "challenges" they pose are "how to integrate the assessment
process into the activities of the organization," a question which goes directly to
the issue of designing a real-life, real-time, court-based performance evaluation,
and to the develop "mechanisms of evaluation that are accountable to concerns of
both performance and inclusion." Sturm & Guinier, supra note 22, at 1010-11.
The latter raises the potential problem of bias in a more subjective assessment
scheme.
439. See Vaughns, supra note 37, at 425; Steinberg, supra note 253, at 39-40.
"[S]tudies have consistently found that performance appraisal ratings of women
and people of color are prone to bias." Steinberg, supra note 253, at 39-40. See
generally Virginia A. O'Leary & Ranald D. Hansen, Performance Evaluation: A
Social-Psychological Perspective in PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT AND THEORY 197
(Frank Landy et al. eds., 1983).
440. Studies of teamwork in multiracial settings (of which the court system is
surely one) suggest that the ability to work as co-equals in interdependent and
cooperative teams can reduce bias. See, e.g., Samuel L. Gaertner et al., The Con-
tact Hypothesis: The Role of a Common Ingroup Identity on Reducing Intergroup
Bias, 25 SMALL GROUP RES. 224, 226 (1994).
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pletely avoid bias and should include a system of checks and
balances.441
Uniformity of evaluation criteria is critical to anticipating
and avoiding bias.442 Research shows that hiring and promo-
tion outcomes are better for women and minorities-i.e., less
biased-when procedures are formalized rather than entirely
informal and thus vulnerable to abuse.443 This strongly sug-
gests that the evaluation process for a PSABE needs to be both
accountable and transparent. Criteria need to be agreed upon
and consistently and explicitly applied. As Sturm and Guinier
suggest:
The challenge posed ... is to develop systems of accountable deci-
sion making that minimize the expression of bias and structure
judgment around identified . . .norms. For each assessment,
[evaluators] would articulate criteria of successful performance,
document activities and tasks relevant to the judgment, assess
[applicants] in relation to those criteria, and offer sufficient infor-
mation about the candidates' performance to enable others to ex-
ercise independent judgment. 444
Those who planned and implemented the 1980 California exper-
iment had concerns about bias which, through use of criteria
like those suggested by Sturm and Guinier, proved largely un-
founded. Once again, there is much of value to be derived from
their work.
The other end of the spectrum from negative bias is the pos-
sibility, which also may arise in law school grading,445 that su-
pervisors and evaluators might develop friendships with, or a
441. The BAR COMMITTEE REPORT would accomplish this by use of a variety of
evaluation devices, "graded" by different people, including evaluation on a simu-
lated task, and a written test, like the MPT, but without its time constraints. See
BAR COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 15-16. While the elaborate system of
checks and balances the Committees propose might be feasible-and extremely
useful-for a pilot, expansion to a large universe of applicants could result in the
same problems generated by the 1980 Assessment Center experiment.
442. This is one of the recommendations contained in the BAR COMMITTEE RE-
PORT, supra note 5, at 16.
443. See Paul Osterman, Too Formal?, in WHO'S QUALIFIED? supra note 32, at
72.
444. Sturm & Guinier, supra note 22, at 1014.
445. Concern for unconscious bias-favorable as well as possibly discrimina-
tory-is one of the reasons most law schools require written examinations (as op-
posed to papers, where students and teachers may have repeated interaction, or
clinical work, in which anonymity is impossible) to be blind graded.
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sense of responsibility for applicants that could result in overly
favorable assessments. Unlike discriminatory bias or prejudice
against an applicant, the potential danger of an overly-
favorable assessment lies in the undeserved pass or, in testing
terms, a false positive. In the PSABE, such bias could result in
"passing" applicants who were not minimally competent. (Pre-
sumably, this did not occur in the 1980 California experiment,
since graders had neither supervisory responsibility over, nor
personal contact with applicants whose videotaped performance
they were evaluating).446 This raises two separate questions.
First, is there a way to avoid or protect against pro-appli-
cant supervisor bias447 such that there can be as much confi-
dence in the results of the PSABE as in those of the existing bar
exam?448 Here, we should examine and draw upon the consider-
446. Certainly videotaping would permit a range of assessments by a number
of evaluators, obviating the potential for this kind of bias. Unfortunately, it would
run into the same cost barriers which caused the California bar examiners to es-
chew videotaped tests after the 1980 experiment. More limited use of videotaping,
as part of the pilot could, however, help ascertain the existence and extent of such
positive bias so that appropriate corrective measures could be devised.
447. Although I use the term "supervisor" here, the danger of positive bias is
most likely to arise when "supervision" crosses over into "mentoring." See Michael
Meltsner et al., The Bike Tour Leader's Dilemma: Talking about Supervision, 13
VT. L. REV. 399, 423 (1989). A mentor "imparts knowledge, aimed at a more gener-
ally applicable and less result-oriented form of learning, rather than the transmis-
sion of skill that flows from task supervision. Mentoring partakes of identification
.... The mentor expects and plans for the success of the mentee." Id. at 423.
While there are real benefits possible in a mentoring relationship, see infra Part
XIII(k)(2), part of training court employees to supervise and assess applicants' per-
formance is teaching them to recognize and distinguish between the roles of super-
visor and mentor.
448. Attempts have been made to test the hypothesis of racial or gender bias
on the part of bar exam graders. See, e.g., Klein & Bolus, supra note 157. While
the purpose of these studies has been primarily to detect unconscious cultural bias
(since the graders know neither the race nor the gender of the women or minori-
ties), it also necessarily includes a favorable bias towards those who write or rea-
son like the graders. While the studies have shown that graders of different
genders and races generally award similar scores to questions, regardless of the
race and/or gender of the applicant, the issue of bias, especially toward an invisi-
ble, but shared, cultural norm cannot be entirely ruled out. The persistent and
seemingly fixed disparate impact of the bar exam on non-majority applicants sug-
gests not only that qualified applicants may be being excluded but, at least infer-
entially, there might also be positive bias toward some majority takers who are
otherwise "unqualified."
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able work done and the best practices which have emerged from
workplace and educational assessment and evaluation. 449
In a pilot project, utilizing both law school clinicians and
court employees, the former could provide assessments unre-
lated to and unaffected by any supervisory role. Those assess-
ments could be used to test hypotheses of positive or negative
bias by supervisors, 450 and to standardize the final, determina-
tive evaluations of minimal competency. Multiple assessments
of individual applicants, utilizing articulated standards, cou-
pled with time for reflection and comparison of views, would go
a long way to ensure fairness and absence of bias.45 1 Such as-
sessments could also inform training and procedures if the pilot
were expanded. There is no simple answer to the possibility of
supervisor bias, but experience and careful "evaluation of the
evaluation" will surely be critical in a pilot project, and in any
subsequent decision about whether to continue or expand a
PSABE.
The second question is less about practice than values. As
with every test which purports to weed the incompetent from
449. Sturm and Guinier have responded to similar concerns and criticisms
about subjectivity in their emphasis on workplace evaluation over pencil and paper
tests. See Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, Reply, in WHO'S QUALIFIED? supra note
32, at 100.
[This] concern [that moving beyond dominant reliance on tests necessarily
leads back to the systems of informed, subjective, and biased decision mak-
ing that tests were in part developed to prevent] is well founded, but in our
view, unduly static and reactive. The approach to selection need not simply
reflect a choice between these polar alternatives. We are urging interactive
experimentation within institutions to permit more accountable and trans-
parent decision making.
Id. at 100.
450. Trained professionals, such as experienced clinical teachers, would as-
sess each applicant's minimal competence on the same tasks evaluated by supervi-
sors. Any substantial variations would suggest a methodologically sound base for
determining the likelihood of identification bias (substantially more passes) or dis-
criminatory bias (fewer passes for one gender or ethnicity). A constant assessment
by one evaluator, paired with assessments from multiple supervisors would even
out the assessment process and result in greater uniformity-and fairness-of re-
sult. This is similar to a technique presently utilized in grading the existing bar
exam.
451. The BAR COMMI'EE REPORT calls for the "design of a system of evalua-
tion that not only minimizes bias and is fair, but one that is subject of the kinds of
checks and balances provided by the use of multiple evaluation devices." BAR COM-
MITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 15.
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the competent, there is a danger of error-both false positives
and false negatives452-requiring thoughtful consideration of
the costs of each. That is, it is necessary to be clear about the
limits of our tolerance for both underinclusive (excluding the
competent) and overinclusive (including the incompetent) re-
sults. As to the former, as already discussed, the existing bar
exam may be significantly underinclusive, especially for non-
majority takers who have or might otherwise demonstrate their
competence. 453 The consequence of underinclusion is the contin-
uation of a bar which fails to represent the diversity of the soci-
ety it serves, and results in a corresponding lack of access to
justice for non-majority communities. 454 At the same time, the
persistence of lawyer disciplinary actions, malpractice cases
and client dissatisfaction suggest some degree of over-inclusive-
ness which both society and the profession have continued to
tolerate.
The question is what degree of over-inclusiveness we are
willing to tolerate from a PSABE. Here the findings of the
LSAC Bar Study are instructive. They establish, as observers
would guess, that eventually almost every applicant who per-
sists will pass a bar exam455 and be admitted to practice. Only
five percent of takers who persist 456 never pass the existing bar
452. Different statistical models used by psychometricians treat selection out-
comes and selection errors differently, depending on whether false positives or
false negatives are perceived as a worse outcome. See Michael A. Olivas, Constitu-
tional Criteria: The Social Science and Common Law of Admissions Decisions in
Higher Education, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 1065, 1087 (1997).
453. For anecdotal support for this proposition, see discussion infra notes 543-
54 and accompanying text, describing two professionally successful CUNY grads
who failed the bar twice.
454. See, e.g., Lempert et al., supra note 155, at 438-39 (describing the "statis-
tically significant tendency of [Michigan] alumni to disproportionally serve persons
of their own race or ethnicity" which, as "an aspect of... Michigan's commitment
to train more minority lawyers," has "increased the numbers of its graduates pro-
viding services to African American and Latino individuals and organizations and
to low- and middle-income individuals").
455. See LSAC Study, supra note 43, at viii. However, it may not be in the
jurisdiction where the applicant first applied.
456. As previously discussed, a substantial number of African-Americans who
failed the bar on their first taking never attempted the bar exam again. See supra
note 181 and accompanying text. It is impossible to determine whether, with per-
sistence, they would have been "eventual passers," but anecdotal evidence sug-
gests that many would. See discussion infra notes 550-61.
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exam.45 7 If we believe that a licensure test with an overall even-
tual pass rate of 95% is adequately protecting the public, 458 ei-
ther the degree of over-inclusion in the existing bar
examination regime is acceptable, or legal education is doing a
sufficiently good job that almost all graduates of ABA-accred-
ited law schools are appropriately admitted to the bar.459 If the
latter is true46 0-and, as a legal educator I would hope that it
is-then we should be able to tolerate any over-inclusion which
might result from the PSABE with equal comfort. 461 If the for-
mer is the case, we should be able to tolerate a similar margin of
457. LSAC Study, supra note 43, at 31 tbl.9. The actual percentage is 5.2.
458. I am certainly not suggesting that the bar passage rate be decreased by
arbitrarily increasing passing scores. See supra text accompanying notes 16-25. I
think, however, that this figure says something about the boundaries of our toler-
ance for error in admission of less than minimally competent practitioners.
459. Note that I characterize this as "appropriately admitted" rather than
minimally competent to practice law unsupervised. It is problematic that admis-
sion via the existing bar guarantees the latter while the very purpose of design of
the PSABE is to do so in a different and more efficacious way.
460. Hansen argues that arguments like those he attributes to Dean Gris-
wold, that law schools are too easy on and for students are, if they were ever true,
now simply outdated. See Hansen, supra note 11, at 1216. He notes that the bar
exam is not a student's only serious hurdle to beginning a law career, but rather,
that
[T]here are many hurdles students must pass over before being admitted to
practice. They include the LSAT, [competitive] acceptance to law school...
law school assignments and examinations, and in many law schools [now in
all ABA-accredited law schools, see ABA STANDARDS, supra note 36, Stan-
dard 302(a)(2)] a substantial writing requirement. These are all serious
hurdles ....
Hansen, supra note 11, at 1216 (citing Griswold, supra note 39, at 82-83).
461. This is, of course, is also an argument for the proposition that we do not
need any bar exam at all. See Hansen, supra note 11, at 1235; MacCrate Report,
supra note 1, at 277-84. Unlike the existing bar, the PSABE would confer addi-
tional benefits - potentially increased public confidence, much needed assistance
to the courts, and the potential for furthering the MacCrate value of providing pro
bono assistance.
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error for the PSABE,462 especially in light of its other antici-
pated benefits to legal education 463 and the profession.
464
f) What Prerequisites Should There be for PSABE Takers?
In addition to designing an evaluation process and method
for training evaluators, a number of other practical issues need
to be addressed prior to any pilot project of a PSABE. One issue
is, broadly speaking, the question of preparation. This, in turn,
has two aspects: preparation during law school and post-law
school preparation for the work applicants would be required to
do during the PSABE.
1. Preparation in Law School
If we seriously mean the PSABE to be a real, alternative
bar exam, it must test skills and knowledge learned during the
course of an applicant's legal education. Many of the MacCrate
skills that the PSABE would test are already present in the cur-
ricula of every law school; others are not. For example, the
traditional curriculum includes legal analysis and reasoning, le-
gal research, and at least some degree of problem solving.
465
ABA accreditation standards ensure that all law students are
taught professional responsibility, 466 so, at the very least, stu-
dents should be knowledgeable about applicable rules and pro-
462. There is, of course, no way to determine the precise degree of over-inclu-
sion in the existing bar regime, nor would there be any way to ascertain it for a
PSABE. Without agreement on what constitutes competent practice (this is some-
what different from identifying the skills required for competent practice), the
tools to measure it and to correlate it to bar passage in either regime, over-inclu-
sion or the degree of "false positives" can never be known with certainty. The
ongoing Berkeley Study may, however, provide some assistance. See Shultz &
Zedeck, supra note 432.
463. If, for example, a PSABE and increased student demand resulted in law
schools offering more experiential and skills-based courses, lawyers who took those
courses and passed the existing bar might be more competent to practice upon
admission. That is, the PSABE might well have a positive influence on at least
some number of those who chose not to take it; that positive effect might balance
out any negative effect from possible PSABE over-inclusion.
464. This assumes that the PSABE would not replicate the disparate impact
which the existing bar exam has on non-majority applicants, thus potentially in-
creasing diversity in the profession. See supra Part V.
465. All these skills are required by ABA accreditation standards, see ABA
STANDARDS, supra note 36, Standard 302(a)(1), and are (with the exception of legal
research) tested on the existing bar exam.
466. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 36, Standard 302(b).
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cedures.467  The standards also require instruction in legal
writing, and at least one upper class writing opportunity for
every student.468 Written communication is, therefore, already
part of every law school curriculum, 469 although the full range of
writing skills may or may not be either explicitly or implicitly
taught.470 Oral communication skills are also taught 471 -or
467. Most law schools fulfil the ABA requirement through a mandatory course
which covers the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, the ALI Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, and relevant state professional responsibility rules, regula-
tions and disciplinary procedures. This primary technical compliance has been
criticized. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 665, 732-34 (1994). A much smaller number of law schools, including
CUNY, have heeded these concerns and designed methods for teaching profes-
sional responsibility "pervasively," throughout the curriculum. See, e.g., DEBORAH
L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE METHOD
(1994). It is this latter mode of instruction which seems more likely to equip stu-
dents with the MacCrate skill of "recognizing and resolving ethical dilemmas."
MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 138-40. The skill includes both knowledge of
the various ethical standards and ways by which they are enforced, and the com-
plex ways in which such dilemmas arise and the processes by which a lawyer
should attempt to resolve them.
468. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 36, Standard 302(a)(2). Writing has, how-
ever, often been treated as a by-product of the traditional curriculum or, to the
extent that it is explicitly "taught" as a stepchild, an endeavour of substantially
lower prestige-and financial investment by many law schools. See, e.g., Peter
Brandon Bayer, A Plea for Rationality and Decency: The Disparate Treatment of
Legal Writing Faculties as a Violation of Both Equal Protection and Professional
Ethics, 39 DUQ. L. REV. 329, 353 (2001); Jenny B. Davis, Writing Wrongs, A.B.A. J.,
Aug. 2001, at 24. The ABA's expansion of 302(a) to include an upper division writ-
ing opportunity has, in part, been a response to the articulated concerns of firms
and other employers of lawyers which have contributed to a greater awareness of
the need for clearer and more focused writing.
469. The essay portion of the existing bar exam tests at least a portion of legal
writing, but hardly the full range of skills included in the MacCrate definition of
written communication. See supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
470. In addition to breaking down effective communication into general pre-
requisites for presentation, specialized requirements in legal context (like how to
choose and utilize facts), and requirements for legal citation form, the MacCrate
skill notes substantive and technical requirements for specialized kinds of legal
writing like drafting executory and litigation documents, and legislative drafting.
See supra note 133. Depending on the law school-and law teacher-courses like
wills and trusts may or may not have more experiential drafting component, while
courses in trial advocacy might include drafting litigation documents as might live-
client clinics, which might also offer transactional drafting. An elective in legisla-
tion might teach some of the skills of that specialized form of legal writing.
471. These skills might be taught, for example, in courses in Appellate Advo-
cacy or Trial Practice.
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practiced and critiqued 472 -in virtually all law schools, and
some form of moot court activity, whether a formal, graded part
of the curriculum or a student-organized voluntary activity, is
offered. And, in many ways, the experience of law school, with
its multiple and conflicting time demands, provides an opportu-
nity to learn and practice time management skills.473
With the exception of legal research, oral communication,
and specialized legal writing, the existing bar exam purports to
test these skills, at least to some degree, and presupposes that
they have been acquired during the applicant's legal education.
The PSABE would not, therefore, require additional instruction
in any of these skills.
The additional MacCrate skills, factual investigation, coun-
seling, negotiation, litigation and alternative dispute resolution
procedures, 474 may or may not be part of a law school's curricu-
lar offerings, and may be taught individually (i.e., courses in
negotiation, counseling, or mediation) or more holistically, tra-
ditionally through live client or simulated clinics, 475 or super-
vised externships. 476 If the PSABE is to test such lawyering
skills, applicants who elect it should be required to have studied
and learned some, if not all, of these additional lawyering skills
during the course of their legal education. Because law schools
472. The Socratic method, still a primary tool of legal instruction, requires
students to engage-perhaps less reflectively-in many of the MacCrate communi-
cations skills. But see Lani Guinier, Becoming Gentlemen: Women's Experiences at
One Ivy League Law School, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 3, 4 (1994) (criticizing the So-
cratic method for its negative and "silencing" effect on women).
473. Clinicians and other experientially based teachers would argue that this
process can be learned and should be taught. See, e.g., Munneke, supra note 127,
at 139.
474. Most, if not all, law students gain some familiarity with litigation proce-
dures through the study of civil and/or criminal procedure, evidence, and by the
general use of the case method. Some of the more sophisticated aspects of the
MacCrate skill of understanding and familiarity, like "the lawyer's ethical obliga-
tion to screen the merits of the case before instituting litigation," "strategic assess-
ment of what motions to file," and "the skills of preparing and conducting witness
examinations," require more advanced and explicit instruction. See MacCrate Re-
port, supra note 1, at 191-94.
475. See, e.g., Grosberg, supra note 420, at 349; Barry et al., supra note 145,
at 16.
476. See Ogilvy, supra note 422; Meltsner et al., supra note 447; Caplow,
supra note 352, at 874.
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vary so widely in clinical experiences offered to students, 477 the
prerequisites for taking the PSABE would almost certainly dif-
fer by school, with a baseline to be set,478 in advance, 47 9 by the
existing bar examiners or other appropriate persons. 480
For example, a live-client clinic might provide instruction
and reflection in factual investigation, counseling, negotiation
and litigation, as well as legal analysis, research and communi-
cations skills. Most clinics also include exposure to, and reflec-
tion on, ethical issues which arise in the course of
representation. The remaining MacCrate skill, alternative dis-
pute resolution, might be learned in a mediation course. To-
gether, a clinic and mediation could cover the skills which
generally are not taught as part of the basic, more traditional
bar-focused curriculum.
Two immediate potential benefits of the PSABE and this
sort of prerequisite are readily apparent. First, student de-
mand would give law schools the incentive to offer a variety of
477. Some clinics are based entirely on simulations, while others involve su-
pervised live-client representation. Clinical experiences may be offered in one se-
mester, for as few as three credits, or across the third year, for as many as sixteen
credits. The subject matter will vary enormously, as, for example, at CUNY, from
domestic abuse, to criminal defense, to immigrants' and refugees' rights. The focus
may be entirely on litigation, solely transactional, like tax assistance clinics, or
somewhere in between (as, for example, in CUNY's elder law clinic). Some schools
also offer "practice courses" which, while not strictly "clinical," provide instruction
in the same skills. See, e.g., Ralph M. Cagle, Teaching Practice Skills in Law
School: The University of Wisconsin Experience, B. EXAMINER, Feb. 1998, at 6;
Grosberg, supra note 420, at 361.
478. The base might require some minimum number of clinical credits, plus a
showing that all the MacCrate skills were taught in the totality of courses taken by
the applicant, or depending upon the kind of clinic, supplementation from a laun-
dry list of courses like Negotiation, Alternative Dispute Resolution, etc. The BAR
COMMITTEE REPORT calls for eight credits of clinic and/or simulation and skills
courses plus New York Practice. See BAR COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 6, 7.
I propose twelve credits.
479. Students would need to know, usually by the end of their first year,
which courses they had to take from among the more advanced, and usually more
heavily elective, courses offered in the second and third years.
480. If the PSABE was embraced by a state's bar examiners, they, in consul-
tation with legal educators, could define the base or "floor" of courses and credits
an applicant would be required to have taken successfully. If the PSABE was first
offered as a pilot program growing out of a task force recommendation, a task force
and/or its consultants might design a set of requirements that would be subject to
subsequent fine-tuning. If the PSABE pilot was offered only to graduates of the
state's own schools, the initial task would be far easier in comparing course con-
tent for those schools, as opposed to all 185 ABA-accredited schools.
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course and clinical experiences which teach all the MacCrate
skills.48' Second, there could be increased public confidence (as
well as that of the bar itself) that law schools had fully and ap-
propriately educated those graduates who opted for the
PSABE,48 2 as well as confidence in the guarantee of minimal
professional competence for those certified by the PSABE
process.
Finally, there is the issue of substantive knowledge, ac-
quired through courses defined by subject matter, and tested
selectively (but, the bar examiners assure us, validly) on the
MBE, to a lesser extent (in coverage, if not depth) on the essay
portion, whether MEE or state-specific, and also, to an even
lesser degree on the MPT (where a "file" of reference materials
is provided). Although substantive legal knowledge is not the
primary focus of the PSABE, the PSABE could be constructed
so that most, if not all,48 3 of the "big six" tested on the MBE
(Constitutional Law, Contracts, Criminal Law, Evidence, Real
Property and Torts) as well as the additional subjects tested on
the MEE (Business Organizations, Commercial Transaction,
Family Law, Wills/Estates/Trusts, Conflicts of Law & Federal
Civil Procedure [or, in the case of state constructed essays, state
procedures, criminal and civil]) would be part of the substantive
domain experienced and employed by applicants during their
court-based public service. Since there is room for reasoned dis-
agreement about the subjects presently tested (for example,
many more practitioners interact with administrative agencies
than with criminal courts), the substantive coverage of the
PSABE would be more a matter of design than of formal replica-
tion. It should, however, satisfy those who believe that a bar
exam should require applicants to demonstrate familiarity with
(if not memorization of) major bodies of law as well as, and per-
haps more important, the ability to utilize that law in solving
real legal problems.
481. See, e.g., Barry et al., supra note 145, at 19 n.150; infra text accompany-
ing notes 587-89.
482. By analogy, the public and the bar presumably have confidence in Wis-
consin law graduates, based on their successful completion of a required curricu-
lum that results in the diploma privilege. See Moran, supra note 8.
483. This would depend, for example, on whether the applicant's PSABE took
place in a court with civil rather than criminal jurisdiction, or vice versa.
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2. Post-Graduate Preparation
Appropriate prerequisites are also needed to assure the
court system that applicants already possess minimum compe-
tence in skills necessary to perform the functions assigned to
them, although that alone would not necessarily be sufficient
preparation for meaningful work in the courts. Familiarity
with, and some expertise in, the particular subject matter han-
dled by the court in which an applicant is placed are critical to
an applicant's "hitting the ground running," as is knowledge of
particular court processes and procedural rules. This suggests
the need for a post-law school, pre-PSABE course of three to five
days, which could be developed and taught jointly by academics
and court personnel.
For example, in New York City applicants placed in the
Civil Court48 4 which has, inter alia, jurisdiction over residential
and commercial landlord tenant disputes, 48 5 would need to
know relevant landlord/tenant law, 48 6 as well as the rules and
procedures unique to the Civil Court.48 7 A comprehensive tour
of the court 488 and observations with appropriate time for, and
facilitation of reflection, 4 9 could round out the introductory
484. For a more extensive discussion of the Civil Court, and why it would pro-
vide an excellent setting for the PSABE, see Glen, supra note 4, at 1724-25.
485. N.Y. Crry Civ. CT. ACT § 204 (2001).
486. First or second year required property courses may include some refer-
ence to this body of law, but it is highly unlikely that graduates would have suffi-
cient specialized knowledge, unless their law school offered a landlord/tenant or
housing law course or clinic.
487. As a court of limited jurisdiction, the Civil Court has its own statutory
procedures, in addition to general rules of New York practice which are also appli-
cable. Demonstrating the capacity to work with a particular set of rules and prac-
tices should generate confidence that a successful applicant could learn and utilize
other procedural and regulatory frameworks in the course of their practices.
488. The value of such a tour, including various clerks' offices, with explana-
tions of their functions, should not be underestimated. Many law school graduates
literally have never set foot in a court, much less been introduced to how to file
papers or retrieve information, or even how to find the library. If a law school
graduate is going to be involved in litigation at all, minimal competence suggests
knowing one's way around at least one courthouse in the jurisdiction in which one
is admitted.
489. This is important not only to give applicants a sense of the "style" of the
court, its judges and its personnel, but also of its limitations. In a place like the
Housing Parts of the New York City Civil Court, the problems faced by tenants-
and, to a lesser extent, by landlords-may be solvable only with the assistance of
public agencies or through public benefits, like emergency rent payments. The
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course. Satisfactory completion of such a course would prepare
an applicant to be a useful participant in the PSABE. It would
also give the court system confidence that the applicant had suf-
ficient knowledge and skill to provide competent assistance in
the variety of settings through which she would be rotated.
g) How and When Would Takers Be Selected for a Pilot?
If the PSABE was administered as a pilot program, with
limited placements available, how would applicants be selected?
Since a pilot seems both practically490 and politically 491 neces-
sary, only a limited number of applicants would have the oppor-
tunity to participate. 492 The most likely means of selection
would be a lottery, perhaps with a certain number or percent-
age of places open for each accredited law school in the state.493
Civil Court's affirmative obligation to be involved in the "enforcement of state and
local laws for the establishment and maintenance of housing standards," N.Y CITY
CIv. CT. ACT § 110 (2001), may depend on enforcement and/or inspection by appro-
priate city agencies. While not specifically enumerated in the MacCrate Report,
understanding institutional competence is an important lawyering skill.
490. Whatever "plan" is devised for service and evaluation in a particular
court, it will almost certainly require at least modest changes once operative. Run-
ning two or three administrations with a limited group of applicants in two or
three courts will allow the court system to become comfortable with the process
before it is asked to accommodate large numbers at more sites. It will also permit
study and fine-tuning before any decision is made to adopt the PSABE as part of
the state's bar examination process. See infra Part XJV(c).
491. I can imagine no possibility that a PSABE would be adopted without
testing-nor should it be. This is the way other new components of the bar exam
have entered general use. See supra Part XI(c) (discussing the MPT). The same
process should be employed here.
492. Unlike prior experiments, where applicants taking the existing bar exam
also volunteered to take the new version, it seems unlikely that PSABE applicants
could reasonably be asked also to take the MBE and essay portion of the bar exam.
The amount of bar review study necessary for the latter (usually around ten
weeks), coupled with the ten to twelve weeks of the PSABE itself, would be a pro-
hibitive investment of time for virtually all law graduates, especially those already
disadvantaged by economic status or family or other responsibilities. I recognize
the traditional preference for this double-blind approach (although as it has been
employed in, for example, the MPT, it risks the conflation of self-selection) but I
believe it would be unnecessary for the PSABE. If the bar exam's critics are even
partially correct about the existing bar exam's defects, which the PSABE is de-
signed to remedy, "success" on one should not necessarily predict "success" on the
other. The issue of public confidence may be raised and used as an argument
against the PSABE, but I believe a carefully constructed and monitored pilot
should suffice, especially if it is fully explained.
493. It would appear practical-and justified-to limit the pilot to law schools
in the state in which the PSABE was administered. Those designing and monitor-
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This leads to a second issue, relevant not only to any pi-
lot,494 but to the PSABE itself, if adopted: the timeframe in
which applicants would need to elect the PSABE instead of the
existing bar exam. Substantial lead time would be necessary
because the course of study pursued by an applicant in her sec-
ond and third years might differ significantly, depending on the
option chosen. 495 The most reasonable time for students to
make these choices would, therefore, be at the beginning of
their second year.496 For the first administration of a pilot pro-
gram, this would give ample time for fine-tuning the PSABE,
training evaluators, readying the site or sites, etc. An earlier
election would thrust a choice on students with insufficient ex-
perience to realistically assess their post-graduate career plans
and opportunities, or to adequately assess their own strengths
and weaknesses. 497 Any later selection would raise serious tim-
ing issues for accumulating the requisite skills credits.
ing the pilot would have sufficient familiarity with those schools and their curricu-
lar offerings to construct or approve reasonable prerequisites. Publicity about the
PSABE and application process could be better controlled and made more consis-
tent in a limited number of schools with geographical proximity to bar examiners
or members of a task force creating the pilot.
494. The issue would be more complicated-and potentially costly-for appli-
cants in the pilot. With a limited number of spaces available through a lottery
system, the election and selection would have to be made early enough to allow the
applicant to make the necessary changes in her upper level course selection de-
pending on whether or not she was selected for the PSABE. There will also almost
certainly be some number of applicants who change their minds. For those se-
lected for the pilot, withdrawal should be allowed without penalty.
495. This is true not only because the PSABE would have prerequisites, see
supra text accompanying notes 474-80, but also because students taking the tradi-
tional bar will generally take a heavier concentration of courses in subjects tested
on it, see supra text accompanying notes 52-55. Given the finite number of credit
hours available after the first year, and required second and/or third year courses,
knowing which bar they will be taking will almost certainly affect some or many of
the course choices students will make.
496. This would give them three more semesters to take courses necessary to
meet the prerequisites for the PSABE, since the choice of third semester courses is
usually made towards the end of the first year.
497. Students could, in consultation with faculty and/or skills teachers, assess
whether they were excellent or mediocre standardized test takers and/or what
their interests and talents were in areas like counseling, mediation, etc. The point
is not that students who would not be competent lawyers could elect an "easier"
bar examination. Rather, it is that those who would be excellent lawyers but who
may have difficulty on standardized written tests should be allowed to have their
lawyering skills tested, instead of being disqualified because of limited competence
458
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h) How Would the PSABE Be "Graded" and What Happens
if a Taker Fails?
As already suggested, many decisions will have to be made
about how the PSABE is graded, 498 including whether an appli-
cant must demonstrate minimum competence on each of the
MacCrate skills tested, or whether excellence in some should
compensate for deficiencies in one or more others.499 However
this is resolved, there is also a question about the consequences
of "failure."500 Should an unsuccessful applicant be permitted to
take the existing bar exam if she chooses? 501 Or might she be
permitted to retake the PSABE, or the portion or portions of it
that she failed?50 2 If the latter, when should the retake be of-
in a skill (timed, high-stakes test-taking) which has never been proven essential to
competent lawyering.
498. See supra note 399.
499. In most states, the existing bar exam allows for higher scores on one por-
tion to balance lower scores on another. This "blending" of scores is not, however,
universal, as many states require some minimum score on each section. See supra
note 397. On the essay portion, however, I know of no state where a "failing" grade
on a single essay-or two-automatically results in a failing grade on the entire
bar exam. That is, insufficient knowledge on a domestic relations question does
not necessarily doom to failure an applicant who demonstrates mastery in busi-
ness associations and other subjects tested on a particular administration.
500. There is also, implicit in all of this, a challenge to the existing practice in
which some percentage of bar takers must fail. Although, for the sake of "correla-
tion," we could pass only the same percentage of PSABE takers as takers of the
existing bar exam, this would totally undermine the whole premise of the PSABE.
If every PSABE taker demonstrated minimal competence to practice law un-
supervised, I would argue that every PSABE taker should pass. If and/or how
such a result might affect the public or the profession's view of the PSABE or the
existing bar is a question for another day.
501. If this process were adopted, it could give us some very interesting com-
parative data from which we could generate meaningful questions. How might we
feel about an applicant who could not demonstrate, through observed practice,
minimum competence in some or all of the MacCrate skills, but who subsequently
passed the paper and pencil test that is the existing bar? Would this suggest that
the applicant had improved, or, rather, that the PSABE was a "better" or more
rigorous test? Would we have the same confidence in the applicant's competence
that we might have had in the absence of the PSABE? If the applicant also failed
the existing bar exam, would we understand that result to mean that both tests
were successfully "weeding" for incompetence? In addition to questions raised by
allowing unsuccessful PSABE applicants to substitute the existing bar exam, it
would also be necessary to decide whether or not they could make unlimited at-
tempts at either or both tests.
502. There is an analogy in architectural licensing where the "exam" has
many parts, generally taken at different times. Once an applicant has achieved a
passing grade on a particular section, she is not required to repeat it, but may
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fered, 503 or might the applicant be allowed to continue her
PSABE until she was successful? 50 4 Because of the PSABE's
combined teaching and evaluation functions, I would argue for
the latter,505 although reasonable people could surely differ in
their opinions on this.50 6
retake the sections on which she has been unsuccessful until she "passes." See
generally Licensing of Architects in The United States of America, National Coun-
cil of Architectural Registration Boards, available at http://caus5.arch.vt.edu/pro-
grams/Masters/EESA-NCARB.pdf (last visited Aug. 20, 2003). Given that the
potential consequences of substandard work by an incompetent architect are po-
tentially at least as grave as those of an incompetent lawyer, there is no reason to
believe that serial re-testing of lawyers, like architects, would not adequately pro-
tect the public.
503. The PSABE might be offered several times a year, at the same time as
the existing bar exam, or, more flexibly, throughout the year, including the possi-
bility of non-sequential segments (i.e., two weeks of research and writing and oral
communication which the applicant could complete at a different time than two
weeks of fact investigation and counseling). This would depend on the capacity of
the court system, and of the particular courts in which applicants were placed.
Applicants might prefer a single ten or twelve week period directly following grad-
uation, making them more immediately available for full-time legal employment,
while courts might prefer to space applicants' service over a longer period, perhaps
even continuously throughout the year. This is, it would seem, one of the very
practical issues which could best be decided in the concrete rather than the theo-
retical. If, however, unsuccessful applicants had to wait to retake part or all of the
PSABE, there might be a real educational benefit. Instead of the generalized, test-
taking focused bar-prep retake courses to which unsuccessful applicants now flock,
we might see the emergence of mini-courses in individual skills like negotiation or
mediation which would actually improve the initially unsuccessful PSABE taker's
skills in a way which would make her not only a successful re-taker, but a better
lawyer.
504. For example, if an applicant would have passed but for deficiencies in
mediation, would she be permitted to do another round, or rounds in that area
until her performance was deemed minimally competent? This idea has an anal-
ogy in some law school grading practices whose goal is "mastery" rather than
sorting.
505. If the ultimate goal is to ensure competent lawyers, rather than simply to
disqualify applicants who have not yet achieved competence, the teaching and
learning aspects of the PSABE should be fully utilized. These include repeated
instruction coupled with a second and even third evaluation, until the applicant
really gets it right. This is the model of evaluation employed in most clinical
teaching. See Grosberg, supra note 420.
506. The BAR COMMITTEE REPORT proposes a quantitative score, to be derived
from each of the assessment devices used (in addition to on-the-job assessments of
various skills, the Report calls for a simulated skills evaluation, the MPRE, and a
written test instrument). The weights to be given to each section would be deter-
mined by those designing the pilot. There would be a passing score, and those who
failed would only have the option of taking the existing bar exam, although, "sub-
ject to the limitation of a three month period [of PSABE placement] . . . an appli-
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Here, as in other experiments, the actual creation of a pilot
PSABE can only occur through a process which will necessarily
involve many very smart, well meaning and experienced people
deciding the answers to these and other questions.
i) How Could the PSABE Avoid Creating a Two-Tier System
of Certification?
Another concern which must be addressed is whether, in
creating the PSABE, we might inadvertently structure a two-
tier system which could negatively impact those who chose it
over the existing bar exam. That is, either employers, or the
public, or both might consider the PSABE as less rigorous, less
legitimate, or less likely to ensure competence in lawyers who
were admitted as a result of passing it. Although there is no
definitive way to answer this concern prior to testing a PSABE,
there are several reasonably compelling arguments that should
assuage undue concern.
1. The Argument from History
First, we already have examples of lawyers who have been
admitted to the bar without taking any bar exam. The most
obvious example is those who have utilized the diploma privi-
lege in states which permit or, in the past, have permitted it.5 °7
Although Wisconsin is the only state which currently has a di-
ploma privilege for graduates of its two in-state law schools,
those states which have abandoned the privilege in recent de-
cades, Mississippi, Montana, South Dakota and West Vir-
ginia508 provide the more interesting example. In each of those
states, there are now cohorts of lawyers who are graduates of
the same law schools50 9 who did, and who did not, take the bar
cant [might be able] to repeat a task for which a failing score was [initially]
received." BAR COMMIrrEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 18.
507. For a history of the diploma privilege in all the states and U.S. territo-
ries, see George N. Stevens, Appendix to the Diploma Privilege: Bar Examination
or Open Admission, 46 B. EXAMINER, 15 (1977).
508. As of 1980, these four states, in addition to Wisconsin, had a diploma
privilege. See Hansen, supra note 11, at 1192-93 n.7.
509. This fact is why the Wisconsin experience may not be as compelling an
analogy. The diploma privilege has been in place for seventy years for graduates of
Marquette, and since the beginning of the bar exam for graduates of the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin. See Moran, supra note 8, at 646-48. The graduates of the Uni-
versity of Wisconsin and Marquette Law Schools have achieved roles of such
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exam. There are no studies 510 testing whether consumers or
employers in Mississippi or West Virginia have any preference
for lawyers from one cohort over the other 511 or any views about
either cohort's relative competence. I suspect, however, that
they do not, if they are even aware that there is a distinction in
the basis for admission. Similarly, lawyers admitted in Wiscon-
sin, pursuant to the diploma privilege can be admitted on mo-
tion in New York without taking the New York, or any other,
bar exam.512
There is another equally interesting example. For many
years, in New York513 and, no doubt, in other states, veterans
were exempt from taking the bar exam if they graduated from
law school within a certain period of their service. 51 4 This ex-
emption, which in New York, lasted through the Vietnam War,
also provides two matching cohorts, although the passage of
time suggests that fewer and fewer members of both cohorts are
still practicing. It is interesting that neither I, nor anyone I
prominence in public and legal life that one might argue it is the recognized and
respected law schools from which they graduated which ensures public and em-
ployer confidence. Following this hypothesis, it is understandable that potential
members of the Wisconsin bar from out of state schools would need to prove them-
selves as well as demonstrate knowledge of Wisconsin law (which in-state gradu-
ates would already be presumed to have) on a written bar examination.
510. This, therefore, is a possibility for the research agenda I discuss later.
See discussion infra Part XIV(a).
511. Over time, of course, the diploma privilege lawyers will be older and
older-and more experienced-in comparison to those who have passed the bar
exam. This is a variable which could cut either way, but would need to be sepa-
rated out from the issue of the basis for admission.
512. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 520.10 (McKinney 1998) (permit-
ting admission on motion of attorneys admitted in jurisdictions which have reci-
procity with New York, in addition to other practice qualifications).
513. I owe this insight to Justice Alfred Lerner, who also brought to my atten-
tion one of the most prominent attorneys who benefited from the veteran's exemp-
tion, the Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of International Trade, Nicholas Tsoucalas.
Other notable lawyers who never took a bar exam include Bernard S. Meyer, a
former judge of the New York Court of Appeals, Robert McKay, a former Dean of
New York University Law School and Melvin Wulf, former Legal Director of the
American Civil Liberties Union (Meeting of the Committee on Legal Education
and Admissions to the Bar of the New York State Bar Association, New York Law
School, Oct. 30 2000).
514. See Rule III for the Admission of Attorneys and Counselors at Law, 1945
N.Y. Laws 2169; Civil Practice Annual of New York 9-10 (Gloria C. Markuson &
Gerald Kaplan eds., 1969). Finding the documentation for this now expired privi-
lege was no mean task, and I owe a debt of thanks to Ricardo Pla for uncovering it
for me.
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have spoken with about this, had any idea that there was such
privilege, or that there were lawyers practicing in New York
who had neither diploma privilege nor bar passage as the basis
of their admission to the profession.515 Despite the respect and
gratitude which members of the public feel toward those who
have served their country in the military, it would be hard to
assert that service as an infantryman or Navy gunner was such
assurance of minimum competency to practice law that it could
be substituted for some testing or certification process. That is,
unlike the diploma privilege-or the PSABE-there can be no
plausible claim that the alternate basis for admission "weeds"
applicants by knowledge and skills. It does not, however, ap-
pear that anyone-either members of the public, or employ-
ers-was troubled by the distinction. 16 One possible conclusion
from both the diploma privilege and veterans exemption cases
is that, basically, no one knows the difference.517
2. The Importance of Description
The second point is the importance of the way in which the
PSABE is presented and described. The danger, of course, is
that without adequate "buy-in" from all stakeholders, the
PSABE might incorrectly be seen as a bad variation on affirma-
tive action, already discredited by many, and experienced as
providing more special opportunities for "less qualified" minori-
ties.518 If, as I have argued, the PSABE is actually a better test
515. This is understandable for my younger colleagues, but I graduated from
law school only a decade after the Korean War and while the Vietnam War was
still in progress, as did many of those to whom I related this information. As both
a trial and appellate judge, I undoubtedly had veterans' exemption lawyers prac-
ticing before me, but that fact never came to my attention.
516. Comparing the cohorts of veterans' exemption and bar exam takers is
another research project which could prove fruitful, as is a comparison of attitudes
about each cohort, if such a research project could be designed and executed.
517. Resumes include, and most employment questionnaires for lawyers ask
for the date and jurisdiction of admission, not the basis upon which admission was
obtained.
518. Obviously, I do not believe this characterization, either of affirmative ac-
tion, or of the PSABE, but sadly it is possible, given the backlash against affirma-
tive action which we have experienced in the last several years. But see, e.g.,
Charles R. Lawrence III, Essay, Two Views of the River: A Critique of the Liberal
Defense of Affirmative Action, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 928 (2001) (rebutting this argu-
ment and challenging the manner in which traditional standards of merit perpetu-
ate race and class privilege).
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of minimum competence to practice law (because it permits as-
sessment of all the MacCrate skills) or if it can be persuasively
claimed that the PSABE is similar to the test that bar examin-
ers would choose to employ if both adequate time and funding
were available, 519 then there should be no reason to discount the
abilities of those who gain admission by its successful comple-
tion. Although one motive for creating an alternative is increas-
ing the diversity of the bar, it is important not to racialize the
PSABE, 520 nor to confine any pilot to non-majority students or
students only from non-elite schools. 521 Focusing on the real-
life, real-time opportunity to evaluate skills the profession has
identified as essential should persuade employers and the pub-
lic alike-or at least anyone who is paying attention-that
those who pass the PSABE are at least as competent, if not
more competent, than those who pass the traditional pencil and
paper test.522
3. Effect on Employers
As a practical matter, it would be valuable to survey a wide
variety of potential employers to ascertain whether the PSABE
would have any effect on their hiring decisions. If potentially
negative effects surface, an appropriate education campaign
can be designed and tested. It would be equally important for a
pilot program to obtain prior commitment from the employers of
choice for those who selected the PSABE that they would treat
admission based on the PSABE the same as admission pre-
519. Here the analogy to the 1980 California experiment is useful. See supra
Part XI.
520. As Claude Steele writes:
It is important that people realize th[e] shift [away from a paper and
pencil model of evaluation] is not an evasive one, motivated to avoid holding
minority students to the same standard as everyone else. It is a shift that
recognizes real limitations in a testing system, limitations, tied to race, that
if not avoided can cause unjustified discrimination ....
Understanding the Performance Gap, supra note 251, at 60.
521. I do not suggest that any pilot project would do so deliberately, but
rather that care must be taken to ensure the broadest representation of
participants.
522. There is another interesting analogy-and possible study-in the case of
multiple takers. Anecdotally, at least, no one ever asks her lawyer how many
times she took the bar exam before passing nor, except perhaps for the most elite
employers, does the number of attempts matter once a lawyer has been admitted.
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mised on the existing bar exam. While there would probably be
no way to obtain such commitment from every potential em-
ployer of every pilot PSABE applicant, agreement from the ma-
jor players-the large firms,523 Legal Aid and Legal Services
offices, 524 District Attorneys' offices and judicial clerkships 52 5-
would go a long way to reassure those who might elect to par-
ticipate in a pilot project. There is also a substantial possibility
that employers would actually prefer prospective employees
who took the PSABE because of the experience and additional
practical training it would afford. 526 Finally, the law review
523. Unlike other employers, the large firms often make offers as early as the
end of a student's second summer. They commit to employment without any cer-
tainty that the student will pass the bar and be admitted on a first try. Given this
and the highly competitive nature of large firm hiring, it seems highly unlikely
that such firms would be concerned with the basis on which their new associates
were admitted. This is partially confirmed by the response of a partner in a large
firm called by a reporter who publicly broke the story of the PSABE and the Bar
Committees' Joint Report. "I'm not sure [which way an applicant was admitted]
would make any difference to us, said Robert J. Kafin, chief operating partner of
Proskauer, Rose LLP. We don't care a lot about what bar examiners do." Thomas
Adcock, Pilot Proposal Would Make Public Service Count on Bar Exam: City and
State Bar Committees to Endorse in Rare Joint Report, N.Y. L.J., June 28, 2002, at
16.
524. Unlike large firms, Legal Aid and Legal Services offices do not generally
hire on a set timetable, but rather as vacancies or new positions arise. Thus, they
would be in no position to give assurances to individual PSABE applicants, but
they could, and could reasonably be expected to, make such a commitment for any
new hire. The assistance which many of these offices give to multiple takers, see
examples cited infra notes 543-54, suggests strongly that it is the fact of admis-
sion, not its basis which is their real concern. Legal Aid and District Attorneys'
offices are also different from other employers because pursuant to a Practice Or-
der, graduates may practice immediately on employment, and may continue to
practice through a first bar exam failure and until they have been notified of the
second. N.Y. JUD. LAW §§ 478, 484 (McKinney 2003).
525. Like large firms, many federal judges make commitments to their future
clerks in the second year of law school, so there is little reason to believe that the
PSABE would be a concern. This is especially likely since most clerkships are only
a year in duration. This suggests that admission is less important for judges hir-
ing clerks than for other employers. If, as I propose, the court system is the insti-
tution in which the PSABE occurs, it is reasonable to believe that state court
judges would welcome, rather than discriminate against, clerkship applicants who
already had experience and some certified competence in the court system.
526. Employers are often skeptical about the value of the existing bar exam.
See, e.g., supra note 522. In discussions about the proposal at the NYSBA Commit-
tee on Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, at least one member opined
that the problem, should the PSABE be adopted, would be an insufficient number
of placements, since virtually all employers would encourage graduates to elect an
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analogy527 strongly suggests that it is the fact of, not the means
of, admission which is ultimately important to employees and
others.
j) Why Might Non-Majority Students Perform Better?
Since much of the impetus for this essay and the idea of a
PSABE528 is to relieve non-majority bar applicants of the disad-
vantages of the existing bar regime, it is important to know, or
at least to have a founded belief that the PSABE would avoid
the disparate impact of the current examination. A favorite de-
fense of the existing bar exam is that nothing else makes-or
could make-a difference, so why not keep doing what has al-
ways been done, and done "successfully?"529 If there is a prob-
lem, as some argue, then it is with non-majority students, 530
legal education531 or the educational system generally 532 or with
examination from which they could also gain practical experience and refine skills
(personal communication, NYSBA Committee meeting, New York, NY, Apr. 2002).
527. See supra text accompanying notes 317-20.
528. The need to test what lawyers actually need to know, and the skills that
are required for competent practice, as well as to encourage law schools to teach
those skills is a separate and, I believe, entirely sufficient basis for change. The
California experience, see supra Part XI, though not entirely successful as a true
performance exam, proves this point.
529. Bar examiners have used the LSAC study, particularly its findings on
eventual pass rates, see supra text accompanying notes 174-79, to minimize the
disparity between majority and non-majority pass rates. See, e.g., Ann Fisher, Re-
flection on the LSAC National Longitudinal Bar Passage Study, B. EXAMINER, Nov.
1998, at 6:
The completed study was released in June 1998 into an environment that
has become hostile to affirmative action programs. The bar passage study
now provides empirical evidence that minority candidates have a high suc-
cess rate at law school and on the bar examination. The study replaces pes-
simistic, anecdotal information about minority bar pass[ I rates.
Id. See also Laura Taylor Swain, Thoughts on the LSAC Bar Passage Study-
Good News and Good News, B. EXAMINER, Nov. 1998, at 16 (stating the "good
news" of the LSAC study is that "it shows clearly that the disparity in pass [] rates
is not due to some mysterious, inexplicable, and irrational bias built into
examinations").
530. See, e.g., Klein & Bolus, supra note 157 ("disproving" a number of hy-
potheses which would place responsibility for the disparate impact on the bar
exam, and instead blaming non-majority students for their "failure" because of
their less adequate educational preparation).
531. Erica Moeser, President of NCBE, repeatedly makes this assertion. See,
e.g., Erica Moeser, President's Page, B. EXAMINER, Nov. 2000, at 4, 5; Erica Moeser,
President's Page, B. EXAMINER, May 2001, at 4. Moeser also attributes many of the
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society.5 33 It is to these factors that we should turn our efforts.
If it is not possible to suggest a plausible basis for believing the
PSABE would "do better," there may be less reason to test the
concept. In the absence of data that can only be generated by a
pilot project,534 I offer two strong "hunches," a third less devel-
oped, and the beginnings of an analytic argument, which is the
subject of fuller exegesis by others. 535
1. Observations from Experience
My first hunch is anecdotal. It is based on my own and my
CUNY colleagues' observations of non-majority students who
have performed superbly in law school and subsequently in
practice, but who, surprisingly, did not pass the bar on first-
and sometimes second-takings. CUNY, like only two other
ABA-accredited law schools, requires an extensive clinical expe-
criticisms of the existing bar to what she sees as "sour grapes" from law schools
with poor bar pass rates.
While a number of law schools seek bar passage information and use it for
retrospective evaluation and prospective action, some law schools have
adopted less meritorious strategies. One such strategy is to attack the bar
exam itself .... When law schools deal with grim bar examination results, it
is easy to 'shoot the messenger' by criticizing the test.
Id. Although conceding that there is much more that law schools could and should
do to train competent lawyers, legal education's failures, to the extent they exist,
should not detract from honest, engaged and principled criticism of the existing
bar exam.
532. See, e.g., Vaughns, supra note 37, at 457. "[C]hildren of color continue to
receive unequal education in this country... the lack of academic preparedness-
a suggested reason for poor performance in law school and on bar exams-results
from a disparity in educational attainment among racial and ethnic group mem-
bers." Id. (citation omitted). Vaughns also constructively criticizes legal education
for its failure to provide appropriate and effective intervention for educationally
disadvantaged students. Id. at 456.
533. This includes the so-called "pipeline" argument. See, e.g., Erica Moeser,
President's Page, B. EXAMINER, Feb. 2000, at 4; Erica Moeser, President's Page, B.
EXAMINER, Nov. 2000, at 4, 5. While the goal of increasing diversity in the profes-
sion requires a hard look at-and major efforts to improve-the path for non-ma-
jority students through the entire educational system and into law school, the need
for this work should not let the bar exam entirely "off the hook" for its possible
impact on the pipeline. See supra notes 185-94.
534. It is possible to imagine-and to design-a research project which might
give more empirically-based assurance. See infra Part XIV(a).
535. The publication of the Carnegie Foundation study of which Judith Weg-
ner is principal investigator and author should go far to stimulate discussion and
debate in this area, see Wegner, supra note 15, as should the LSAC-sponsored
study of what constitutes success as a lawyer, see Shultz & Zedeck, supra note 432.
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rience for every third-year student. Students are supervised in
live-client representation for one or two semesters, for twelve to
sixteen credits. The clinic curriculum is planned and executed
so that students perform-and are evaluated on-virtually all
of the MacCrate skills.536 Although the goal of clinical experi-
ence is mastery, rather than sorting,537 trained clinicians are
nevertheless required to assess performance and assign letter
grades for the semester's work. These grades, together with
nuanced evaluations, 538 represent the level of skill a student
has attained in professional competencies.
In the past, a number of our best non-majority clinic stu-
dents-who have also gone on to be excellent practitioners-
have failed the bar on first taking, despite the fact that faculty
evaluation has provided a high level of confidence that they pos-
sess, at the very least, minimum competence to practice law un-
supervised. Their ability, as demonstrated by excellent
evaluation, has equaled and often surpassed majority students
who have done well in clinic, and who have passed the bar on
first taking. The CUNY experience shows that when non-ma-
jority students are given real lawyering tasks, employing a vari-
ety of skills at a relatively high level, affecting the lives of real
human beings, they perform as well and often better than their
majority counterparts. 539 This is true even though they know
536. In a typical client representation, students are required to interview the
client, research relevant law, investigate facts, apply the law (at a minimum, to
create a "theory of the case"), test the proposed course of legal action against other
possibilities, present the argument orally, counsel the client orally, and generally
compose one or more legal documents, such as motions, pleadings and/or memo-
randa of law.
537. Students who are not initially successful at one or more skills are given
feedback and the opportunity to improve, rather than simply given a lower grade
that serves to distinguish them from their classmates. Mastery is a goal required
by the role the third-year clinical experience plays in assisting law students' tran-
sition from school to practice, and is part of the professional responsibility of pro-
viding competent representation. See MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 207-12.
538. Clinical teachers write separate evaluations for each student on each of
six competencies. Personal Communication with Susan Bryant, Director of CUNY
Clinical Program (Dec. 27, 2002).
539. See Waters & Boyes-Watson, supra note 32, at 17:
Assessment through opportunity to perform often works better than testing
for performance. Various studies have shown that 'experts' often fail on 'for-
mal' measures of their calculating or reasoning capacities, but can be shown
to exhibit precisely those same skills in the course of their ordinary work.
Those who assess individuals in situations that more closely resemble ac-
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that they will be evaluated or assessed in their work.540 These
non-majority students' experience with the bar suggests that it
is something about the test, rather than their ability, which
keeps them from success on their first attempt.
This hypothesis is not based solely on the evaluations of a
particularly gifted group of clinical teachers. 541 Their conclu-
sions about student competence-or excellence-have been ver-
ified by the employers for whom those students work after
graduation, but before eventual bar passage542 as demonstrated
by the following two examples:
Several years ago, CUNY had an extremely talented543 Af-
rican American student 544 who, in her first year, won a prestigi-
ous and competitive Earl Warren Scholarship from the NAACP
Legal Defense and Education Fund (LDEF) where she interned
her first summer. The lawyers at LDEF, well-known for their
rigor, uniformly praised her performance working on compli-
cated legal issues under heavy time pressure. In the student's
tual working conditions make better predictions about those individuals' ul-
timate performance.
Id.
540. This fact is potentially important, especially insofar as there is some rea-
son to believe that it is the fact of evaluation or assessment-best documented as
"test anxiety"-which contributes to the existing disparity in bar pass rates.
541. CUNY has been a leader in clinical education since its inception, is con-
sistently ranked in the top ten clinical programs nationally by peer evaluation, and
has, among clinical faculty, two former presidents of the National Clinical Law
Association.
542. Significantly, in New York, graduates employed by District Attorneys'
Offices and Legal Aid under the student practice rule, N.Y. Jud. Law §§ 478, 484
(McKinney 2002), may continue to practice in court after an initial bar failure, and
until a second failure has been reported or May after their graduation, whichever
occurs sooner. One Deputy District Attorney who has been involved in training
young Assistants in the Kings County District Attorney's Office speculates that
minority graduates may take the July and/or February examinations even if they
are insufficiently prepared, in order to accept an offer from her office, and to "take
a shot" that they will be successful. Sometimes, despite their excellent perform-
ance as Assistants, they are not. (Personal Communication from Carol Moran,
Deputy District Attorney, Kings County District Attorney's Office (Apr. 8, 2002)).
543. Like many CUNY students she came to the Law School with an ad-
vanced degree-an M.S.W. from Columbia-and after a career in public service,
including several years as a social worker at the Legal Aid Society Juvenile Rights
Division.
544. All information about both students discussed here, whose names are
withheld to maintain their privacy, has been checked directly with the students
and verified with records kept at the Law School. Telephone Interview with Anon-
ymous Students, (Jan. 2002) (on file with author).
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second summer, she worked at a major New York City law firm
where she was so successful that she was offered full-time em-
ployment following graduation. In her third year of law school,
the student took the 12-credit Equality Concentration where
her faculty and supervisors' evaluations were again highly
favorable. Based on semester-long observations, they uniformly
predicted that she would be an excellent lawyer. This graduate
has now been at her "white shoe" firm for slightly more than
three years. She has performed almost flawlessly, with consist-
ently excellent evaluations from her firm supervisors. Unfortu-
nately, she failed the bar on her first two takes, finally passing
on the third. She described her bar experience as humiliating
and pointless, in part, because she sees the exam as having so
little relationship to the work she is actually doing as a highly-
paid and responsible large firm associate. 545
There was another gifted African American student 546 who
also excelled at law school during all three years of law school.
In her third year, she took the Housing Concentration 547 where
she was supervised by a legendary (in part, for his extraordina-
rily high standards) legal services attorney who gave her the
highest evaluations. On graduation, she won a competitive two-
year IOLA fellowship with which she did domestic violence
work in a New York City Legal Services office. This graduate,
forewarned of the possibility of failure, took both the Connecti-
cut and New York bars, although she had no intention of prac-
ticing anywhere but New York. She notes, savoring the irony in
retrospect, that she passed the Connecticut bar on the first
try548 and was sworn in on November 1, four weeks before learn-
ing that she had failed in New York. Although she was already
545. This graduate was fortunate because her employer had no strict rules-
like those, for example, of Legal Aid and District Attorneys' Offices-requiring ter-
mination after a second failure. See supra note 542. It is a testament to her excel-
lent performance that the firm was willing to continue her employment through a
third and ultimately successful take. Most graduates are not so fortunate.
546. This student came to CUNY at the age of 30, after a successful career as
an executive assistant, and with an LSAT score above the 70th percentile.
547. Concentrations are highly supervised external placements, designed on a
clinical, not an externship, model, and carrying 12 credits.
548. As a particularly telling fact, although Connecticut requires a scaled
MBE score of 133, and New York requires a scaled MBE score of 133, she passed in
Connecticut and failed in New York. See Report and Recommendation, supra note
18, at 2, 9.
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practicing law, with superior evaluations, she was "totally trau-
matized" by her failure. Reluctant to make a second attempt
the following February, she was persuaded by family and
friends, but again she failed. This time, however, she was not
humiliated, but extremely angry. As she said, "There I was,
representing people, doing a really good job, and they tell me
I'm not qualified to practice law." Because her work was excel-
lent, her office kept her on, strongly encouraged her to make a
third attempt, paid for a Bar Re-Take Course,549 and gave her a
month's leave to study for the next administration where she
was, finally, "successful." This graduate was, by all accounts,
an excellent lawyer who was performing well in a competitive
situation.550 Bar passage in another state allowed her to appear
pro hace vice, and to keep her job551 during two retakes. Under
other circumstances, she says she would probably have "given
up"-and so been forever lost to the profession. Her story illus-
trates the costs, both actual 5 2 and potential, of "eventual pas-
sage" and the concurrent potential for the "persistence gap."55 3
549. The graduate's finances did not permit her to take the course before her
second bar attempt. She credits the course-and her union's work to make it
available-as one of the prime reasons for her ultimate success on the New York
bar. The parallels here to another of our graduates, see surpa note 543, are strik-
ing, demonstrating the financial barriers which can frustrate successful retakes
(as well as, she points out, exacerbating the "persistence gap," which caused a
number of her friends to give up after failing on the first attempt).
550. The IOLA grant gives a legal services office a "free" lawyer for two years,
but does not create a new position, so the IOLA fellow must prove herself as excep-
tionally competent in order to land one of the few, and highly-coveted, legal ser-
vices jobs, which might be available at the end of her grant.
551. In this respect, her situation was unlike another less fortunate graduate,
a single parent with no family support, who was unable to afford the bar prep
course for his first two attempts. Although he was performing well in his job, the
Legal Aid Society had no choice but, regretfully, to let him go after the second
failure. He worked in construction for a year, finally, at our urging, borrowing
from everyone he knew to pay for the course and take off a month to study. The
"happy ending" is that he finally passed; the sad part of the story is that his clients
and potential clients were deprived of an excellent lawyer for more than a year-
not because, as he says, he knew more law the third time, but because he could
afford to master the test-taking skills necessary for success.
552. In telling me the details of her story, some of which I had not known, the
graduate stressed the huge sacrifices her family made because of her two retakes,
and the cost to her own and her family's life.
553. See supra text accompanying notes 180-84. "Disidentification relieves
the pain of stereotype threat by breaking identification with the part of life where
the pain occurs, which necessarily includes a loss of motivation to succeed in that
part of life." Understanding the Performance Gap, supra note 251, at 64.
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It is also testament to the absurdity of conflicting judgments by
the bar examiners in neighboring states about this graduate's
otherwise well-demonstrated "minimum competence to practice
law. 554
The point of these not atypical stories is more than how dis-
turbing it is that these excellent lawyers have had such diffi-
culty passing the New York Bar. It is also, significantly for this
argument, that they have excelled in supervised practice, utiliz-
ing all the MacCrate lawyering skills, in the course of actually
working as lawyers. Their stories strongly suggest that when
graduates are observed and evaluated, over time, in a real-life
practice setting, the issues which interfere with successful first-
time bar passage are diminished or absent.555 This is the first
reason that gives cause for optimism that the PSABE will not
have a disparate impact on non-majority bar applicants.
2. The Significance of Claude Steele's Work
The second hunch relates directly to my understanding of
Claude Steele's work. His carefully constructed studies 5 6
demonstrate clearly and repeatedly that where tests are
presented as a measure of ability, Black students perform worse
than Whites;557 where participants are not told that the test
measures ability, Blacks and Whites perform the same;558 and
where ability is not specified but participants are "race-primed"
by specifically asking them questions about their race, Black
students again are less successful.55 9 Steele has done similar
experiments in which other groups demonstrate "stereotype
fear" when tested in areas where the groups to which they be-
554. It is not only the different "judgments," but the different scores which,
individually or as a total, constitute bar passage.
555. This tracks a similar observation "that some people who may perform
well in an educational or work environment perform poorly under the unique cir-
cumstances of most testing conditions." Sturm & Guinier, supra note 22, at 976;
see also infra note 563.
556. Although I refer here to his work on stereotype threat affecting African
American students, Steele has convincingly done the same kinds of studies with
the same results using gender rather than race. See, e.g., A Threat in the Air,
supra note 195, at 619.
557. Steele & Aronson, supra note 195, at 408. The terms (and capitaliza-
tions) "Black" and "White" are Steele's and Aronson's.
558. Id. at 418-19.
559. Id. at 419.
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long are thought of as lacking ability. The most prominent ex-
ample, and the domain in which Steele began his work, is
gender and math. When told they were being tested for gender
differences in a difficult math exam, women substantially
under-performed compared to otherwise similarly situated men.
When they were given to understand that the test had already
been normed for gender, women performed equally to men. 560
Where math is involved, gender is not the only determinant.
When white men are tested against Asian-American men,
whom they are told "do better" in math, they also consistently
under-perform.561 This demonstrates that any group can poten-
tially suffer-and have their scores on high stakes tests artifi-
cially diminished-depending on the context. Stereotype fear is
not a theory about non-majority test takers, but about test tak-
ers from any group which has been stereotyped about its ability
in a particular area.
Steele's studies indicate that something negative is surely
going on. Identifying that "something" is critical to constructing
a different way to "weed" would avoid the distorted and discrim-
inatory results5 62 which Steele's experiments consistently
demonstrate. Carefully examining the data from a number of
tightly constructed studies, Steele posits some hypotheses about
the mechanism by which stereotype threat diminishes perform-
ance. All of the tests he employed were both difficult 563 and ad-
ministered under strict time constraints. Steele notes:
560. A Threat in the Air, supra note 195, at 613-14.
561. Expert Report, supra note 195, at 446.
562. They may be described as discriminatory because groups are divided (in-
tentionally in Steele's experiments, unintentionally in real life) by their race-based
response to racial stereotype, rather than by their actual abilities or capacities to
perform on the test. In this respect, I am wholly in the camp of those who label
such outcomes "discriminatory," see Braceras, supra note 355, at 1171, notwith-
standing the lack of any intent to discriminate (summarizing arguments that be-
cause "standardized exams fail to measure accurately the actual skill level or
knowledge base of minority test takers vis-A-vis their white counterparts-the ex-
ams themselves discriminate"). Braceras, supra note 355, at 1171.
563. Steele asks whether there would be a difference for well-prepared Afri-
can American students on tests which they perceived as "easy." Steele & Aronson,
supra note 195, at 424. As virtually no law graduates approach the existing bar
exam with this view, Steele's surmise that there might be some ambiguity of re-
sults on "easy" tests should not concern us here. But, of course, if measurement of
ability on a test perceived as "easy" did not trigger stereotype threat, the challenge
would be to create conditions fostering such confidence. If non-majority students
473
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Stereotype threat seems to exert its influence by reducing effi-
ciency. Participants who experience stereotype threat spend
more time doing fewer items less accurately. This reduction in
efficiency of mental processing is probably the result of dividing
their attention, alternating between trying to answer the items
and trying to assess the significance of their frustration. 564
If this is the mechanism-or even one of the mechanisms-
by which performance is diminished, an obvious solution sug-
gests itself: give test takers a lot more time. There is already
some modest evidence that substantially increasing the time
permitted for taking a law school exam can decrease the dispa-
rate affect on non-majority takers which occurs when it is of-
fered in a more traditional, three-hour period.5 65 It seems
unlikely that bar examiners would willingly do this across the
board,5 66 although it would be an extremely interesting experi-
performed consistently well in a clinical setting over a semester or more, and then
were asked, over a period of time, to do legal tasks which seemed no more complex
or difficult, we could hypothesize that this might diminish or eradicate stereotype
threat which would otherwise undermine their performance.
564. Steele & Aronson, supra note 195, at 423. Steele also hypothesizes that
"[s] tereotype threat may also increase test anxiety for blacks"-this is another psy-
chological mechanism which interferes with test takers' ability to do the work of
which they are clearly and demonstrably capable. Id.
565. Audio tape: Stanford Law School Professor Pamela Karlan, Presentation
at panel, Learning Theory and Student Evaluation: Throw out those Blue Books?
AALS Annual Meeting (Jan. 4, 2003) (on file with author) (informal study compar-
ing differing results for non-majority students on a three-hour, in-class, open-book
exam, with results on a similar exam in which students were given eight hours, "to
have lunch, take a walk, or think more about the questions"). Although it did not
consider the racial/ethnic background of applicants, a 1981 study by
psychometrician Stephen Klein demonstrated that when more time is allowed for
the MBE and essay portions of the bar exam, mean scores rise quite dramatically.
See discussion infra note 709.
566. The history of litigation by applicants who request increased time as an
accommodation to their disabilities suggest that bar examiners are unlikely to
abandon what seems to be their belief in the importance of time pressure in assess-
ing ability. See, e.g., the seemingly endless history of one applicant's attempt to
obtain additional time as an accommodation to her disability, Bartlett v. N.Y.
State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 970 F. Supp. 1094 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (judgment for plain-
tiff), reconsideration denied by 2 F. Supp. 2d 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), affd in part,
vacated in part by 156 F.3d 321 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. granted, vacated by 527 U.S.
1031 (1999), remanded to 226 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 2000), remanded to No. 93 Civ. 4986,
2001 WL 930792 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2001). Interestingly, the District Court,
Sotomayor, J., sitting by designation for trial, eschewed the Board's reliance on
objective psychometric exam scores in determining the plaintiffs disability.
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ment, 67 and one worthy of support.568 Here, however, the possi-
ble implications for the PSABE are apparent, even in the
absence of empirical study. Watching/evaluating people per-
form the "real" tasks that lawyers do-interviewing a client or
pro se litigant, conducting a mediation, doing research, writing
a bench memo or making an oral presentation of one's legal con-
clusions over periods of weeks is very different from "testing"
those same people in two minute-or even fifty, sixty or ninety
minute569-slots.
No one denies that lawyers work under pressure, but, at
least to some extent, they can exercise some degree of control by
allocating their time in ways that other workers cannot. An as-
sembly line worker must complete a certain number of (gener-
ally repetitive) tasks within a prescribed shift. A lawyer is
usually able, even with court or other deadlines, to give a prob-
lem more time-albeit often at the expense of family, social life
or sleep-than originally intended, if that is what it takes to do
it right. Would we not approve of a PSABE taker who chose to
spend her weekend polishing a legal memo, or preparing an in-
terview plan, even though she was only required to spend 35
hours a week in the PSABE? Wouldn't we prefer lawyers who
know what is needed, and who accept the responsibility of find-
ing or making the time to do it as well as possible? I hope the
answers to these questions are affirmative. If they are, then the
567. Suppose, for example, that we allowed applicants two whole days, rather
than one, for the MBE, or that we simply told them they had as much time as they
needed? Do we have any basis for confidence that the general ability to practice
law unsupervised is dependent on "quickness," or would we instead imagine that
thoughtfulness and care might be more important qualities, especially for neo-
phyte lawyers?
568. The BAR COMMITTEE REPORT proposes a written component similar to the
MPT, but without its time constraints. See BAR COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5,
at 16.
569. Two minutes is slightly more than the time allocated for each question on
the MBE. See supra note 13. In New York, for the first day, which tests New York
law, applicants are advised to spend 1.5 minutes per multiple choice question, and
forty minutes for each of three essays administered in the morning session. In the
afternoon session, the recommended time is forty-five minutes for each of two es-
says, and ninety minutes for an MPT question. State of New York Unified Court
System, New York State Board of Law Examiners, Multi-State Performance Test
(MPT), available at http://www.nybarexam.org/MPT.htm (last modified Mar. 12,
2003). One wonders at the calibration necessary to design morning essay ques-
tions that are 88.8% as time consuming as those offered in the afternoon.
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PSABE would look to results, giving participants "enough" time
to accomplish those results, but would also offer the ability
(which lawyers have in practice) to take-if they are willing to
"make"-more time as necessary. If I read Steele correctly, the
expansiveness of the PSABE might well avoid triggering stereo-
type threat, thus permitting non-majority takers to more accu-
rately demonstrate their abilities. 570
3. Support from Social Psychology
There is a theory in social psychology which describes a
phenomenon most people have experienced, although they may
not have named it. Denominated "locus of control,"571 the the-
ory posits that individuals perform differently depending on
whether the necessity of performance is internally or externally
generated. Thus, if I "choose" to do something, I am more likely
to overcome frustration in accomplishing the task, to persevere,
and to complete it successfully. If, on the other hand, the task is
imposed on me from outside, particularly if I am otherwise re-
sistant, I am more likely to become frustrated quickly, and to
give up on the task, or give it less than my best effort.
Locus of control theory resonates with Steele's work, and
suggests an alternative reason for believing that a PSABE could
make a difference to non-majority takers-including non-major-
ity takers who, instead of electing the PSABE, choose the ex-
isting bar. My hypothesis is that the choice itself-for whatever
reasons an applicant might decide572-can make a difference in
the way a non-majority applicant performs on the exam.
Rather than a feared, externally-imposed, single method of ad-
mission, the existing bar exam would be one of two options. The
ability to choose which option might, itself, lead to an appli-
570. Having been taught, and already been favorably assessed on these skills
in law school clinics should also improve the likelihood that performance on the
PSABE will more accurately approximate applicants' actual capacity to practice
law.
571. See, e.g., ELLEN J. LANGER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONTROL (1983) (describ-
ing the positive benefits of a sense of control in a given problem-solving situation
as contrasted with a decrease in success when limitations or belief about lack of
control are present). I thank Gail Mellow and Kay Deaux for this insight.
572. An applicant might want to concentrate on a series of specialized subject
matter electives rather than taking the number of credits in skills courses required
as a prerequisite, or might be uncertain about her ability to meet the subsequent
pro bono obligation to the court system after successfully passing the PSABE.
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cant's performing in a manner more directly and accurately re-
lated to her actual ability.573
In the end, there are substantial reasons to believe that a
PSABE, which incorporates the EEOC's requirement of job re-
latedness by utilizing a true performance test, rather than dis-
tant and discriminatory proxies, 574 will prove to negate the
disparate impact of the existing bar exam. Being evaluated-
and "weeded," rather than "sorted"-in the context of actual, al-
beit supervised lawyering holds promise that the PSABE could
eliminate the disparate impact which non-majority bar appli-
cants have consistently experienced to their-and the profes-
sion's-detriment. 575
These are my "hunches" about why the PSABE might avoid
the disparate impact of the existing bar exam while, at the
same time, better assess the lawyering skills necessary for min-
imum competence to practice law unsupervised. Like the hopes
and untested hypotheses of the concerned bar examiners who
created the 1980 California experiment, I believe they should
impel us to action, limited and tentative as a pilot project might
be. The cost of losing and/or unfairly delaying competent non-
majority law graduates from entrance into the profession is
alone sufficiently great to justify trying an alternative when
there is some basis for believing that it might be better.576
573. This is another area for research which could bolster the argument for a
PSABE, or improve its design and execution. See infra Part XIV(a).
574. Griggs is a perfect case in point. Instead of testing prospective employ-
ees in the skills of employment, the employer, relied on a standardized test, not
clearly related to the relevant skills and duties, as a proxy. Because the test was
not closely tailored to the job for which it was "weeding," and because it had a
demonstrably disparate impact, it was held to be a prohibited employment practice
under Title VII. See Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424, 433 (1971).
575. Steele notes that while his research has focused on school admissions
and performance, the "findings can be applied to the workplace as well." Under-
standing the Performance Gap, supra note 251, at 61.
576. There is some parallel between the two-day long assessment exercise uti-
lized in the 1980 performance experiment, and the observation and evaluation
which would be encompassed in a PSABE. However, because that experiment was
divided into time-limited segments, it necessarily replicated at least some of the
time pressures which may operate to diminish performance where stereotype
threat is present. This is, I believe, a plausible explanation for why it did not re-
duce the disparate impact on non-majority takers. The more expansive time per-
mitted by a PSABE-not just the number of weeks, but the optional, personal time
which characterizes professionals-suggests that any lack of "efficiency" generated
by knowledge that ability was being tested could be overcome. And, in contradic-
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Given all of the reasons stated above for considering a test that
has a much greater relationship to the job of being a lawyer, the
burden should surely shift to those who defend the status
quo.
5 7 7
4. Larger Questions About Testing
A more ambitious and expansive analysis of the existing re-
gime of high stakes testing could move us away from, or at least
reposition, the issue posed here. Rather than asking whether a
test can be designed so as not to affect non-majority students
disproportionately, we could instead question whether there is
something deeply flawed about what and how we are testing. It
is not necessary to pursue this analysis in order to accomplish
the more modest goal of a "better," less-discriminatory means
for determining minimum competence to practice law, or to pro-
vide minimal protection for consumers of legal services. None-
theless, discussion of whether non-majority students would or
should do better, or at least as well as their white counterparts,
on a PSABE begins to place this issue578 in sharp relief, and
raises a number of "bigger" questions.
If instead of testing for what we actually need to know-
about someone's ability to do a job, or to succeed in an educa-
tional setting-we utilize proxies which are largely unexam-
ined, and validated 579 only by reference to other tests58 0 which
tion to the 1980 experiment, anecdotal evidence from high performing graduates
suggests that being evaluated on "real" work might also make a positive difference
for non-minority applicants.
577. In Griggs, Title VII analysis demonstrating an alternative mode of as-
sessment which has no disparate impact and serves the employer's (here, the pub-
lic's) needs ends the argument. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
578. The larger analysis on which my understanding is premised is derived,
in part, from Sturm and Guinier's statement that "because of the importance in a
democracy of ensuring opportunities to perform, we can start by shifting the model
of selection from prediction to performance." Sturm & Guinier, supra note 22, at
19.
579. See Olivas, supra note 452, at 1081:
An explanation of [the use ofl correlation coefficients [in test validation] is
likely to stress the robustness of the mathematical relationships, rather
than the underlying social construction, societal values, or intrinsic political
assumptions of the statistical study itself. That societal values inhere in
statistical equations often surprises observers who may have come to be-
lieve that such equations are value-free or apolitical.
Id. at 1081.
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utilize similarly unexamined proxies, 58' isn't there a risk (or
worse) of disparate results which will continue to reproduce the
power and status relationships of the status quo? Isn't there a
danger that proxies for competence will embed and obscure a
history of past discrimination?5 2 When we use inaccurate prox-
ies for an ability, skill, or competence, instead of testing that
ability, skill or competence itself, we are often backed into the
uncomfortable corner of asking for special treatment to compen-
sate for the disparate effects produced by the proxies, instead of
insisting on a different, real test of ability, skill or competence.
In many ways, these questions lie at the heart of what is
called the affirmative action debate. In actuality, however, both
the questions and the debate itself need to be reframed. If
"merit,"583 as we test and measure it, is not demonstrably con-
580. LSAT scores are predictive of first-year law school grades, see supra note
45, but, according to Wegner, what is taught in law school, especially in the first
year, is not necessarily what is tested, and, therefore, graded. See Wegner, supra
note 15. Law school grades correlate to bar pass rates, see LSAC Study, supra note
43, at 77, and bar pass rates are correlated to LSAT scores, see Howarth, supra
note 11, at 927 n.5; Hunt, supra note 152, at 766-67. This entirely self-referential
mobius loop (which almost certainly also includes the presently hotly-contested
SAT's, see, e.g., infra note 589) meets the psychometric requirement for generaliza-
tion-i.e., whether we can infer from one test performance that the applicant will
perform similarly on another test iteration, see infra note 645, but has not, at any
level, been demonstrated to correlate with the skills and values necessary for the
competent unsupervised practice of law, see, e.g., Thomas D. Russell, The Shape of
the Michigan River as Viewed from the Land of Sweatt v. Painter & Hopwood, 25
LAw & Soc. POL'Y 507, 512 (2000) (commenting on the Lempert et al. study, "The
gap [they] discovered is intriguing. The numerical criteria for admission [to law
school] are largely irrelevant to career success"). Russell, supra note 580, at 512.
581. See, e.g., Rothmayr, supra note 124, at 732; Daria Rothmayr, Decon-
structing the Difference Between Bias and Merit, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1449, 1491-92
(1997).
582. Rothmayr, supra note 124, at 734. Utilizing antitrust analysis,
Rothmayr argues:
[We might usefully understand white dominance of legal education and em-
ployment to be the product of a locked-in culturally specific network stan-
dard that favors whites. Anti-competitive conduct by whites during the
segregation era created an overwhelming initial advantage, if not an out-
right monopoly, in early market competition. This monopoly, which lasted
well over a century, may have produced a de facto standard [exemplified by
the LSAT] that favors white cultural performances and disproportionately
excludes people of color.
Id.
583. Rothmayr, supra note 124, at 734. The term meritocracy was coined by
British sociologist Michael Young in THE RISE OF THE MERITOCRACY 1870-2033
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nected to the opportunities it screens for, why not redefine
merit instead of fighting increasingly losing battles for pro-
grams which only partially correct for the fundamental error?58 4
This question grounds Sturm and Guinier's challenge that we
"confirm" equality by moving from prediction to performance, 58 5
and is inherent in Judith Wegner's painstaking examination of
law school teaching and testing.58 6 It is, in many ways, the
same question raised by the current debate about the almost
exclusive use of the SAT to determine admission to higher edu-
(1958) who "argued that a meritocracy is a set of rules put in place by those with
power that leaves existing distributions of privilege intact, while convincing both
the winners and the losers that they deserve their lot in life." Id. at 1870-2033
(paraphrased in Lani Guinier, Confirmative Action, 25 LAW & SoC. INQUIRY 565,
573 (2000) [hereinafter Confirmative Action]). For similar radical critiques of
merit, including standardized tests as measures of merit, see, e.g., Lawrence, supra
note 518, at 945; Robin West, Constitutional Fictions and Meritocratic Success Sto-
ries, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 995, 1018 (1996); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Tenth
Chronicle: Merit and Affirmative Action, 83 GEO. L.J. 1711, 1719, 1740-45 (1995).
584. See, e.g. Equality in Law School Admission, supra note 72, at 1455-62.
The author argues that affirmative action-which I otherwise support and de-
fend-grew out of the realization that the old "equality-of-opportunity" paradigm
was, by itself, inadequate to achieve the goal of greater representation of women
and people of color in public institutions of all kinds. In education, as standardized
tests were increasingly used to define "merit," and minority students faced "neu-
tral" barriers to admission,
civil rights activists focused on advocating for affirmative action programs
rather than challenge the validity of the tests as fair and accurate means of
measuring the skills and talents necessary for success at a college or univer-
sity and beyond. Affirmative action programs "evolved as a low-cost patch
solution to the enormous problem of improving the lot of [minorities]."
Equality in Law School Admission, supra note 72, at 1455-56. The author would
instead focus on a critical inquiry into "whether the definition of merit used to
determine which opportunities are made available is fair or legitimate." Equality
in Law School Admission, supra note 72, at 1457 (utilizing a contextualized redefi-
nition of merit analogous to bona fide occupational qualification in the Title VII
context). Until then, however, more traditional affirmative action is critical to
remedy past racism and/or to promote diversity.
585. See Sturm & Guinier, supra note 22, at 956, 957:
It is time to discuss how conventional assessment and predictive criteria do
not function fairly, democratically, or even meritocratically .... We need to
show that the current one-size-fits-all ranking system of predicting "merit"
is no longer justified or productive for anyone .... It is underinclusive of
those who can actually do the job. It is deeply problematic as a predictor of
job performance. Across the board, it does violence to fundamental princi-
ples of equity and "functional merit."
Sturm & Guinier, supra note 22, at 956, 957.
586. See supra text accompanying notes 93-105.
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cation.58 7 Instead of compensating for a fundamentally-flawed
testing regime, why not change the way we test?
Within the context of this argument, the question that be-
gan this section could become irrelevant. Just as there is no
demonstrable basis for believing that non-majority law gradu-
ates are any less competent lawyers than their majority coun-
terparts, s8 there should be no reason to expect that they would
do any less well on a true, performance-based test of compe-
tence for beginning law practice. Predictive proxies can obscure
locked-in discrimination. Honest observation and evaluation of
real work-what a PSABE might offer-should not.
k) What Other Benefits Might be Expected from a PSABE?
1. Positive Effects on Legal Education
Utilizing the Griggs analysis, this essay has argued prima-
rily that a PSABE would be a better test of minimum compe-
tency to practice law unsupervised than the existing bar exam,
and that it might not have the same disparate impact on non-
majority takers, as the existing bar exam. Other potential ben-
efits have been mentioned in passing-for example, that the in-
stitution of a PSABE would positively affect reform in legal
education such that "law schools will embrace their responsibil-
ity to educate students for the practice of law and ... marshal
587. See, e.g., DEREK BOK & WILLIAM G. BOWEN, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER:
LONG TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY AD-
MISSIONS 106-10 (1998) (Despite opposition to the exclusive use of SAT's and
GPA's, accepting the general predictive power of the SAT, but limiting its impor-
tance is a solo measure for potential success.); Ihan Kim, Book Note: College Ad-
mission and Affirmative Action-Consequences and Alternatives, 4 MICH. J. RACE
& L. 145, 152 (1998). The social construction, rather than assumed "pure objectiv-
ity" of the SAT was first brought to wide public attention by NICHOLAS LEHMAN,
THE BIG TEST: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN MERITOCRACY (1999).
588. David Chambers' work suggests, instead, that non-majority lawyer grad-
uates of the University of Michigan are, by criteria he uses, as "successful," if not
more "successful," than their white counterparts. In the area of social contribu-
tions, or public service, there is also a negative correlation with the high admission
scores attained typically by white students. See Lempert et al., supra note 155, at
468-69. Guinier notes of their study, "[tihe cumulative effect of [their] findings is
to challenge the conventional faith in [a] test-driven admissions policy ... It tells
us that affirmative action critics' much-touted reliance on objective measures of
merit have little to recommend them over the life span of a lawyer." Confirmative
Action, supra note 583, at 468-69.
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their resources toward that goal."58 9 That is, where exhorta-
tions from the profession, legal educators and law students
have failed to produce significant change, 590 a bar examination
which actually tests lawyering skills might result in greater
success because of law schools' concern with bar pass rates. 591
2. Additional Training and Feedback
An experientially-based test like the PSABE offers addi-
tional advantages. Although it is not intended as a post gradu-
ate "clerkship" or "tutelage,"592 the time spent doing supervised
work593 would, in addition to providing the basis for skills as-
sessment, create a real learning opportunity. 594 Supervision, as
clinical law teachers know, is a powerful tool in learning,5 95 es-
pecially when it incorporates feedback from the supervisor.5 96
589. Stuckey, supra note 10, at 650. In his 1996 article, Stuckey opined that
"Itihe MacCrate Report and recent changes in ABA accreditation standards" would
at least "assure that law schools will consider these possibilities," but saw the
main "impediment to reform . . .[was] the effect of the bar examination on the
curriculum." Stuckey, supra note 10, at 650. His hope that there were "sufficient
catalysts" for reform has proven unfounded, but the institution of a PSABE might
provide just that additional impetus for law schools to more seriously respond to
the challenge of the MacCrate Report.
590. See, e.g., Rodney J. Uphoff et al., Preparing the New Graduate to Practice
Law: A View from the Trenches, 65 U. CIN. L. REv. 381, 383 (1997) (surveying new
graduates on their preparedness to practice law); Stuckey, supra note 10, at 659.
591. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
592. It is important to reiterate that, for reasons I have previously described,
see Glen, supra note 4, at 1701-02 n.15, the PSABE is not an abbreviated version of
the clerkship system employed in Canada or the U.K. See Hansen, supra note 11
(proposing a variation on the Canadian model); see also Curcio, supra note 14, at
398 (considering the value of same) for reasons I have previously described. While
grounded in practice, the PSABE is intended to provide a setting which permits
real-life, real-time performance evaluation, rather than primarily as a teaching
vehicle, followed by yet another test.
593. For an excellent model of employee supervision, see Alexander & Smith,
supra note 431.
594. An applicant's placement would not only present opportunities to im-
prove or polish existing skills, but would also permit the applicant to learn a whole
variety of valuable lessons, including working in a diverse environment, under-
standing the limits of the law's power and the need, often, to engage with other
institutions, etc. See supra Part XIII(a).
595. For an excellent discussion of the many aspects of supervision, and par-
ticularly its capacity to foster learning, see Meltsner et al., supra note 447.
596. See Meltsner et al., supra note 447:
[Performance] evaluation, which serves as a summing up, is a familiar attri-
bute of our educational system in the form of grades and particularly char-
482
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Good feedback can help the applicant obtain relevant, detailed,
immediate information on how she is doing-and can assist in
helping her adjust her behavior and performance so as to be
more successful at the tasks in which she is engaged. Since any
decisive assessment in the weeding process would come at the
end of a supervisor's interaction with the applicant, 597 the use of
good feedback during the supervision could and should improve
the applicant's lawyering skills, with corresponding benefits for
her future clients. 598
Put another way, if we believe that excellent clinical train-
ing, of the sort envisioned by the MacCrate Report, is necessary
to obtain essential lawyering skills, the quasi-clinical 99 experi-
ence of the PSABE, following and building upon prior experien-
tial and/or clinical instruction, 600 creates a substantial601
acterizes legal education with its reliance on final examinations as an index
of performance. In work life in general, and supervision in particular, such
evaluations are far less important to learning than is feedback .... Without
feedback, we cannot effectively evaluate and change behavior to bring it
closer to our goals.
Id. at 439. In the context of a PSABE, then, there is potential for moving closer to
the "goal" of competent practice because of the potential for feedback, as opposed to
a purely evaluative "final exam" which is the existing bar examination.
597. For example, using the example of placement in the New York Civil
Court, see supra note 354, an applicant working the Self-Representation (Pro Se)
office would engage in a number of instances of interviewing, fact-gathering and
counseling during her rotation. A well-trained supervisor could help her assess
and hone those skills during the course of supervision, prior to the supervisor's
final assessment of whether the applicant was "minimally competent" in those
skills.
598. See Uphoff et al., supra note 590. In a survey of recent graduates hired
as new public defenders, finding that those who had had a "quality clinical experi-
ence" were better prepared to represent their clients "because they ... had a signif-
icant taste of actual practice in a structured setting under the tutelage of an
experienced lawyer... who provided them the opportunity to discuss and to reflect
about the positive and negative aspects of that experience." Uphoff et al., supra
note 590, at 403.
599. Obviously, supervisors in the PSABE will not, nor should they, be solely
concerned with the pedagogical success of the experience. With training, however,
they should, like supervisors in externships, be able to assume a teaching role in
addition to assessment and getting their own work done.
600. See supra notes 474-79 (discussing the pre-requisites for a PSABE, in-
cluding clinical experience).
601. Law school clinics range from 2 to 16 credits, with students expected to
spend approximately three hours per credit per week. Although weeks spent in
the PSABE proposed here would be slightly less than a semester of law school, the
hours devoted to it would exceed all but the most intensive and demanding law
school clinics.
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opportunity for enhancing minimum competence. In this re-
spect, the PSABE could also answer Sturm and Guinier's call
for a dynamic, interactive model which derives assessment from
performance, while simultaneously promoting learning60 2. It
would also benefit employers of graduates who chose a PSABE
over the existing bar exam, from which little is learned, and less
retained.
3. Fostering Pro Bono and the MacCrate Values
Pro bono is another area where the PSABE can benefit both
participants and the profession. For the former, the public ser-
vice work which applicants perform, like other non-bar exam-
related pro bono, has the capacity to provide young attorneys
with "valuable training, trial experience, and professional con-
tacts"60 3 while developing capacities to communicate with di-
verse audiences and building problem-solving skills and
expanding their perspectives. 604 Similarly, their work assisting
litigants "of limited means [can] provid[e] exposure to the ur-
gency of unmet needs and the law's capacity to cope with social
problems." 60 9 As to the latter, performing public service is "a
way for the bar to improve the public standing of lawyers as a
group."
6 0 6
More important, pro bono provides a valuable contribution
to the justice system, and to society as a whole. As a decade-old
New York judicial report has noted:
Much of... what lawyers do is about providing justice, [which is]
nearer to the heart of our way of life.., than services provided by
602. See Sturm & Guinier, supra note 22, at 1010. "We are proposing a shift
in the model of [assessment] from prediction to performance. This model builds on
the insight that the opportunity to participate creates the capacity to perform ... 
Id.
603. Cultures of Commitment, supra note 330, at 2420; see also, Donald W.
Hoagland, Community Service Makes Better Lawyers, in THE LAW FIRM AND THE
PUBLIC GOOD (Robert A. Katzman ed., 1995).
604. Deborah L. Rhode, Essay: The Pro Bono Responsibilities of Lawyers and
Law Students, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1201, 1213 (2000) [hereinafter Rhode
Essay].
605. Id.
606. Cultures of Commitment, supra note 330, at 2420; Gary A. Hengstler,
Vox Populi: The Public Perception of Lawyers: A.B.A. Poll, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1993, at
60-61 (demonstrating higher opinion of the legal profession when lawyers provide
free service to disaster victims).
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other professionals. The legal profession serves as an indispensa-
ble guardian of our lives, liberties and governing principles ....
Like no other professionals, lawyers are charged with the respon-
sibility for systematic improvement of not only their own profes-
sion, but of the law and society itself.60 7
Despite the importance of pro bono service and its central-
ity to professional responsibility, 608 there remains an enormous
"gap between professional ideals and professional practice"60 9
with only a small percentage of lawyers contributing meaning-
ful service. 610 In the face of many questions raised about rea-
sons for this gap, attention has focused on the responsibility of
legal education for instilling a sense of professional responsibil-
ity and a pro bono commitment that, it is hoped, will follow
graduates into their practice years. 611 Although there is no de-
finitive research on whether pro bono service in law school actu-
ally results in continued post-graduate pro bono work,612
anecdotally, "[s]chools with pro bono requirements have found
that between two-thirds and four-fifths of students report that
their experience has increased the likelihood that they will en-
gage in similar work as practicing attorneys."613 In the same
607. COMMITTEE TO IMPROVE THE AVAILABILITY OF LEGAL SERVICES, FINAL RE-
PORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (1990), reprinted in 19 HOF-
STRA L. REV. 755, 782 (1991).
608. "Every lawyer ... has a responsibility to provide legal services to those
unable to pay and personal involvement in the problems of the disadvantaged can
be one of the most rewarding experiences in the life of a lawyer." MacCrate Re-
port, supra note 1, at 140. Note that one of the MacCrate values includes,
"[Clontributing to the Profession's Fulfillment of its Responsibility to Ensure that
Adequate Legal Services are Provided to Those who Cannot Afford to Pay for
Them." MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 140.
609. Cultures of Commitment, supra note 330, at 2415.
610. Rhode Essay, supra note 604, at 1201.
611. For an excellent description and summary of this effort, see ASSOCIATION
OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS COMMISSION ON PRO BONO AND PUBLIC SERVICE OPPOR-
TUNITIES IN LAW SCHOOL, LEARNING TO SERVE: A SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE AALS COMMISSION ON PRO BONO AND PUBLIC SERVICE
OPPORTUNITIES (1998), available at http://www.aals.org/probono/report2.html.
612. See, e.g., Kristin Booth Glen, Pro Bono and Public Interest Opportunities
in Legal Education, N.Y. ST. BAR. J., May-June 1998, at 20-21 (arguing for the
need for good research on whether law school pro bono experience carries over into
practice).
613. Rhode Essay, supra note 604, at 1212; Richard L. Abel, Choosing, Nur-
turing, Training and Placing Public Interest Law Students, 70 FORDHAM L. REV.
1563, 1567 (2000) (reporting that "volunteer activity, especially contact with cli-
ents and lawyers, powerfully sustains commitment.").
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way that law school pro bono programs aim to create "a culture
of commitment to public service,"614 the PSABE could instill an
appreciation of the value of service, and the satisfaction of help-
ing the disadvantaged. 615 The additional post-PSABE pro bono
commitment proposed here could reinforce the benefits of the
PSABE 616 as well as help successful applicants learn to create
time and space for pro bono in their practices.61 7 The continued
public service commitment which successful PSABE takers
would carry into the first years of their professional lives could
also serve as a compelling example for their colleagues and
other newly-admitted lawyers.
The PSABE would also allow us consciously to combine, in
a concrete and powerful way, the MacCrate skills and values.
Those values are: provision of competent representation, promo-
tion of justice, fairness and morality, improvement of the pro-
fession, and professional self-development. 618 All are implicit in
the public service work a PSABE applicant would perform; de-
signers of a pilot project would do well to make them explicit.619
The MacCrate Report itself is clear about the indivisibility of
"skills" and "values,620 noting that "[t]he process of preparing to
represent clients competently is a matter both of accepting cer-
614. Cultures of Commitment, supra note 330, at 2442-43.
615. Rhode Essay, supra note 604, at 1210. "Providing face to face exposure to
the human costs of social problems could prove . . . important [to increase post-
graduate participation]." Id. Such exposure would be assured if the PSABE were
located in a court like the New York City Civil Court that, in its Housing Part,
processes evictions for tens of thousands of poor and unrepresented New Yorkers.
616. Id. (i.e., the experience that pro bono is "important in giving meaning
and purpose to their professional lives").
617. It is a reasonable hypothesis that young lawyers who make time for pro
bono during the first two or three years of practice, as a result of their post-PSABE
commitment, will be better equipped and more likely to continue to make time
after the formal commitment has ended.
618. MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 213-21.
619. This could be accomplished both in a pre-service prep course and by
training supervisors and providing opportunities for reflection, during the PSABE
itself.
620. The fact of somewhat artificial division and ordering was seen as neces-
sary "to promote clarity in examining the components of each one," recognizing "a
basic difference in the kinds of discourse best suited to express skills, on the one
hand and values on the other, particularly in a prescriptive format. Legal skills
are illuminated by dissection and precise elaboration; values are better explicated
in broad formulations nuanced by discussion." MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at
136.
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tain professional values and of acquiring the skills necessary to
promote those values."621 Done well, the PSABE could illumi-
nate and model the importance of connections, not only for
PSABE applicants, but for legal education and the profession as
a whole.
Finally, serious attention to constructing and evaluating a
PSABE will, in its necessary emphasis on the elements of "com-
petence" and "success as a lawyer,"622 require us to re-join and
re-invigorate that important conversation about lawyering and
the profession of which the MacCrate Report is only the most
recent iteration.
4. Potential Benefits for the Courts
There are also potential benefits for the courts in which the
PSABE would be conducted, as well as for the court system gen-
erally. Organizational transformation, or even modest improve-
ment, necessarily begins with reflective practice. In the hectic
environment of most courts623 there is little time for, or encour-
agement of, reflection. There is always more work to do than
time in which to do it. For judges and other court attorneys
involved in the PSABE, supervision and evaluation of appli-
cants provide a rare opportunity and incentive to think deeply
about what they-and the institution in which they work-are
doing. 624
621. Id. at 137.
622. The reference here is to measuring for the "job" in the job-related re-
quirement of Griggs. See Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424, 435-36 (1971).
623. Describing the New York City Civil Court, perhaps the busiest in the
state system, the Office of Court Administration notes: "The combination of mas-
sive caseloads, litigants largely unfamiliar with the legal process and limited judi-
cial resources has resulted in an environment that more closely resembles a
hospital emergency room than a court." THE Hous. PART OF THE N.Y. CITY CrVIL
COURT, NEW YORK STATE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/
hctprg.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2002).
624. I owe this insight about the potential for, and potential benefit of, reflec-
tion to Susan Sturm. In my experience on the bench, the process of supervising
student interns inevitably brought a fresh perspective and altered my own percep-
tions of the work I was engaged in, both in substance (including the effect it had on
the parties, public perception, and the law) and process. Most of my judicial col-
leagues, as well as their court attorneys, reported a similar effect.
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Training provided by clinicians 625 would also facilitate and
reinforce reflective practice. It is difficult to foretell what conse-
quences might result from such reflection on the part of judges
and court personnel, 626 but it is reasonable to believe that the
results would be positive including, perhaps, improved morale.
Second, the court system needs more members of the pro-
fession to understand and advocate for it. There has long been
a disconnect between legal education and the courts. 627 Bring-
ing clinicians and other legal educators into the courts to plan
and execute a pilot program and to work collegially with judges
and other court personnel would expose a new and important
group of stakeholders to the courts' many problems-and many
possibilities. Once the connection was made, participants from
legal education might well remain engaged in issues of court
reform and the courts' justice initiatives. They might also take
back to their classrooms and their colleagues a more realistic
and nuanced picture of the court system than can be gleaned
from casebooks and most law review articles. 628
625. The BAR COMMITTEE REPORT proposes day-long orientation and training
sessions for what it calls, "Placement Supervisors," prior to the beginning of each
placement period. The curriculum for the sessions would be developed by a State-
wide Administrator in consultation with clinical law professors or professional le-
gal trainers, and would "provide for the opportunity for supervisors to work
together in small groups to design assignments, practice giving feedback and use
the standard evaluation instruments. Live or videotaped demonstrations . . .
[would] model appropriate feedback techniques and serve as a baseline for evalua-
tion." BAR COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 13-14. Supervisors would receive
feedback during the orientation and at monthly meetings with clinicians during
the pilot placement. Id.
626. The effect of training and subsequent responsibility for supervision and
evaluation could be usefully studied as one of the research agenda flowing from a
pilot project.
627. As one effort to create closer cooperation, the New York State Institute
on Professionalism, initiated by Chief Judge Judith Kaye, held its first convocation
on legal education, and included a panel on Legal Education and the Courts. See
THE NEW YORK STATE JUDICIAL INST. ON PROFESSIONALISM IN THE LAW, CONVOCA-
TION ON THE FACE OF THE PROFESSION, PANEL II: SOCIALIZATION OF LAW STUDENTS
INTO THE PROFESSION 61 (Nov. 13, 2000), available at htttp//www.courts.state.ny.
us/jipl/NYSProfJournal-p3.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2003).
628. An increased, contextualized knowledge of and attention to the operation
with the court system would also, correspondingly, be of benefit to legal education.
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1) Who Will Pay for the PSABE?
Hidden, but hardly opaque, is the question of cost. Who
will finance a PSABE pilot, including, perhaps most impor-
tantly, its subsequent evaluation, which ought to extend over a
considerable time?629 History suggests some possibilities, espe-
cially insofar as the PSABE is intended, to some degree, to af-
fect change in law schools. One of the great stories in legal
education is the extraordinary transformation brought about by
the Ford Foundation's enormous and consistent commitment to
creating and nurturing law school clinical programs.630 That
commitment, initially premised in encouraging law schools to
provide legal services for poor people, has substantially altered
legal education.631
Many opportunities remain to make constructive change in
areas supported by the profession, such as the skills training
recommended in the MacCrate Report, and, in the case of the
call for diversifying the profession, the larger society as well.
Many foundations continue their concern and commitment to
these and related social justice goals, 632 as well as to the
629. If, for example, we want to look at disciplinary actions, complaints and
malpractice-or other measures of incompetence or success-it would be necessary
to follow lawyers' careers for a number of years after admission.
630. In the early years of modem clinical education, 1959-65, Ford provided
small grants totaling $500,000 to a number of law schools, with an additional
grant of $950,000 to the Council on Education in Professional Responsibility
(COEPR) later renamed the Council on Legal Education for Professional Responsi-
bility (CLEPR). From 1968-78, Ford funded CLEPR (which, in turn, awarded
grants to law schools) in the amount of $11 million. Barry et al., supra note 145, at
18-19; see generally RICHARD MAGAT, THE FORD FOUNDATION AT WORK: PHILAN-
THROPIC CHOICES, METHODS AND STYLES (1979). When Ford support came to an
end in 1978, the Department of Education continued and expanded funding
clinical legal education, appropriating approximately $87 million from 1978-97.
Barry et al., supra note 145, at 18-19.
631. See Barry et al., supra note 145, at 19-20.
If the nearly $13 million from the Ford Foundation was instrumental in
jump-starting clinical legal education in most of the law schools in the
United States during the first 20 years of the second wave of clinical educa-
tion, then the $87 million from the Title IX program over the last 20 years of
the second wave of clinical education was responsible for developing these
budding clinical programs into integral parts of the curriculum at almost
every law school in the United States.
Id.
632. For example, the Rockefeller Foundation's recent publication, "Louder
Than Words," demonstrates its ongoing commitment to utilizing the law and law-
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broader goals of education 633 and professionalism. 634 There is
reason for optimism that the foundation community, with its
long and generous involvement with legal education and profes-
sionalism, could be engaged in an experiment that proposes to
increase skills training in law school, increase the diversity of
the bar,635 provide substantial pro bono legal services to public
and/or public interest institutions, 636 carefully examine the ten-
ets of traditional high stakes testing,637 and offer the possibility
of supplements or alternatives. 638
yers to achieve racial justice. See PENDA D. HAIR, LOUDER THAN WORDS, LAWYERS,
COMMUNITIES AND THE STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A REPORT TO THE ROCKEFELLER
FOUNDATION (2001), available at http://www.rockfound.org/Documents/431
louderthanwords.pdf. The Open Society Institute has provided substantial fund-
ing to support public interest law, through Equal Justice Works (formerly NAPIL,
the National Association for Public Interest Law) fellowships and the Law School
Consortium Project/Community Legal Resource Network which ties law schools to
their graduates in small and solo community- based practices with justice mis-
sions. OPEN SoC'Y INST., PROGRAMS ON LAw & SOCIETY, at http://www.soros.org
(last visited Aug. 21, 2003).
633. The Carnegie Foundation's multi-year study on professional education,
including legal education, is a major undertaking which can be expected to have
substantial impact on all five of the professions studies. See Wegner, supra note
15.
634. For example, the Keck Foundation has been a major funder on issues of
professionalism and professional responsibility.
635. The PSABE seeks to accomplish this by creating a non-discriminatory
alternative to the present bar with its negative disparate impact on non-majority
students, thus increasing diversity, but also making legal education-without a
daunting and often disabling barrier at its end-more attractive to non-majority
students.
636. The need for pro bono services is clearly not being met by the large firms,
see Greg Winter, Legal Firms Cutting Back on Free Services for Poor, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 17, 2000 at 1, nor is it ever likely to be. As public institutions, like the courts,
also seek pro bono assistance, the situation will only grow worse. By tapping a
new resource, bar applicants, including their post admission commitment, the
PSABE increases pro bono services with minimal institutional cost.
637. The increasing criticism of our testing culture, see supra note 104 and
accompanying text, and the growing appreciation that there is a serious disjunc-
tion between learning and testing, see, e.g., Wegner, supra note 15, underscores
the need to think more expansively about what we are actually doing, including
sorting and weeding, when we test. The Ford and Mott Foundations have funded
the work of Susan Sturm and Lani Guinier in exploring the correlation between
standardized testing and racial discrimination. See Subotnick, supra note 235, at
142-43 & nn.7-8.
638. The choice law school graduates would be given as a result of a PSABE
could make the entire licensing system appear fairer, thus boosting public confi-
dence. In New Mexico, for example, where the Supreme Court implemented vari-
ous "procedures designed to professionalize the admissions process and assure
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The 1980 California experiment, claimed as foremother of
the PSABE, is another relevant example. The experiment grew
out of research and proposals funded by the NCBE and the
state's own bar examiners. 639 It is possible that a similar coali-
tion could be formed to provide the drive behind a new approach
like the PSABE.
Finally, the announcement by LSAC of the creation of a re-
search fund of $10 million 640 creates a possible source of fund-
ing. LSAC has long been deeply committed to diversity, and in
the past has committed substantial resources, including funds
for the LSAC Bar Study.641 One of the avowed purposes of the
new research fund is to educate law schools about the appropri-
ate uses of the LSAT. 642 While the LSAC Bar Study and other
studies have demonstrated correlations between LSAT scores,
law school performance (measured by grades) and bar pas-
sage,643 there has been no way to separate out, or account for,
basic lawyering competence. A PSABE pilot would necessarily
generate questions about what we mean by minimal compe-
tence to practice law, and how we measure it.644 As such, it
could provide an important new lens for examination of the
LSAT and its legitimate uses. 645
XIV. Strategies For Creating a PSABE
As we have seen above, the PSABE is a feasible alternative
practice to the existing bar exam, which would meet employers'!
bar examiners' needs. From an analysis premised in Title VII
fairness to all candidates," "'upgrading' . . . the bar examination process had a
positive effect [and added] to the enhanced perception of fairness and integrity...
." Vaughns, supra note 37, at 450 & n.109.
639. See Carrizosa, supra note 284.
640. Rick Haggerty, LSAC Commits $10 Million to Help Schools Examine Ad-
mission Policies, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 31, 2001.
641. See supra Part VI.
642. See Haggerty, supra note 640.
643. See LSAC Study, supra note 43.
644. LSAC has already demonstrated its interest in the question of what con-
stitutes success as a lawyer by funding a study currently underway at the Univer-
sity of California at Berkeley Law School. See Shultz & Zedeck, supra note 432.
645. I exclude here the use of LSAT scores in U.S. News and World Report,
now perhaps the most powerful verifier of these scores. LSAC itself has always
discouraged this "mis" use of its scores, and has cooperated with the AALS and law
deans in their attempt to counter the effect of U.S. News and World Report in
application decision making.
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law, the existing bar examination is highly questionable in
terms of its job relatedness and validation, and unquestioned in
its discriminatory impact. From a practical, as opposed to a le-
gal, standpoint then, the questions are: How do we get there
from here? What strategies do we need to pursue to make a
PSABE a reality?
a) Research
One strategy is to create a research agenda which will sup-
port the arguments for a PSABE, help structure a pilot, and cre-
ate a design for meaningful evaluation. That strategy could
begin with a question like: Why do we believe that lawyers who
have taken the bar are better at practicing law than those who
have not? If they are not, then, at least for graduates of ABA-
accredited law schools, there is no justification for the bar at all.
Fortunately, there are large cohorts of lawyers in both catego-
ries.646 Identifying such lawyers would permit those with di-
ploma privilege or veterans' exemptions to be compared with
those who have entered the profession by the more traditional
route of bar passage. This might resolve the otherwise untested
premise that the bar exam somehow "weeds" out bad lawyers
and ensures minimum competence to practice law. If those who
never took the bar proved every bit as competent, the necessity
for rethinking the bar examination regime would be obvious
and, perhaps, even inescapable. If the results were more am-
biguous, we might be impelled to deal more creatively with the
ambiguity.
Comparison is a particularly interesting aspect of the re-
search agenda, because the larger question is "comparison of
what to what?" How do we begin to divide lawyers, for this pur-
pose, into those who are competent and those who are not, so as
to compare those who passed the bar exam the first time, with
those who did not? There are at least two easily quantifiable
events which would seem to relate to competence or, more accu-
rately, lack of competence, in a modest way: disciplinary actions
and malpractice cases. 647 The two cohorts of lawyers, bar takers
646. See supra notes 8 & 507-15 and accompanying text (discussing diploma
privilege and veterans' exemption lawyers).
647. Obviously there is a need for subtlety and caution in using these indica-
tors, as well as a special difficulty posed by confidentiality restraints in discipli-
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and those who were otherwise admitted, could be compared on
both of these scales; it would be surprising to see if there was a
substantial difference between them.648
The larger question, which ought to engage those in legal
education responsible for training the profession and those in
the bar regime responsible for admitting them, is what values
we believe lawyers bring to society and to their clients, and how
we can measure them. Issues here could include peer evalua-
tion and reputation, client satisfaction, and overall contribution
to the effective resolution of disputes, public and private, within
society. Some notion of contribution to increasing access to jus-
tice for all segments of the population 649 might also find its way
into the measurement. 650 These are clearly not easy things to
nary cases. Filing a complaint with a disciplinary authority may reflect as much
on the individual who files-who may be motivated by many factors, including
unhappiness with a fair but unfavorable outcome-as on the alleged incompetence
of the respondent. Careful analysis of charges and results, extremely difficult to
operationalize, would be required if disciplinary complaints were utilized as a
stand-in for incompetence. This is because a "no finding" does not necessarily en-
sure that the respondent's practice was competent, but might instead reflect proof
or procedural problems. Similarly, in the case of malpractice actions, improper
motives would need to be sifted from actionable behavior, and results analyzed in a
way more nuanced than simply whether the plaintiff prevailed. There is another
reason for caution. In my experience on the bench, malpractice counterclaims
were routinely interposed in actions to collect attorneys' fees for not always legiti-
mate reasons. Although looking at disciplinary and malpractice actions would be a
very crude tool, it may be one of the few available for making comparisons.
648. The New York Bar Examiners have eschewed the value of a comparison
in measure of competence (or incompetence), based on these factors, but have of-
fered no alternative ideas. Report and Recommendation, supra note 18, at 12-13.
While I agree that malpractice and disciplinary complaints are a weak measure,
they may be more important to the public, whose confidence is implicated, than to
rigorous social scientists designing a study, or even to most lawyers. More signifi-
cant, however, the tactic of throwing up one's arms and claiming "it can't be done"
seems inappropriate when those eschewing responsibility are those who are erect-
ing barriers to entry based on entirely untested (and, according to them, untest-
able) premises.
649. A study of Michigan Law School graduates defines success as a measure
of the Law School's mission, including career satisfaction, financial earnings after
graduation, and contribution to society. See Lempert et al., supra note 155, at 443.
For an argument that this contribution to society should be an important consider-
ation, see Curcio, supra note 14, at 380 nn.72-73.
650. It is no coincidence that my choices for describing the assessment of law-
yer competence incorporate, in large part, though different formulation, the Mac-
Crate "values" which Robert MacCrate himself has said are the most important
part of this eponymous Report. Interview with Robert MacCrate, Chairperson of
the American Bar Association Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the
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quantify, but difficulty in doing so makes them no less impor-
tant. Comparing cohorts of bar-examined and non-bar-ex-
amined lawyers might usefully employ those same techniques
in measuring the value of the legal education which our law
schools provide to their graduates. 651
An additional research agenda might focus on a previously
untested and unrefined argument against the existing bar
exam. Based on existing evidence, it is basically uncontroverted
that the bar exam has a disparate impact on non-majority tak-
ers, but there is virtually no corresponding data about economic
status.652 Although there is some anecdotal information, no one
has thoroughly explored the effect of poverty-or relative pov-
erty-on bar success. The LSAC Bar Study considered the SES
of bar takers,653 but not their more contextualized economic sit-
uations at the time of bar administration. 654 If we were to focus
on actual economic position, a number of questions would
emerge. For example, does it make a difference to bar passage
rates that applicants have other obligations, including working
for income, during the time they study for the bar? Does the
ability to pay for review courses create a greater likelihood of
success, as opposed to prospects for those who cannot afford
Bar Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap, New York,
N.Y. (Oct. 2, 2001).
651. Guinier notes of the Lempert et al. study that, "[i]t redefines what it
means to be truly 'qualified' based on the work one does as a lawyer rather than as
a law student. It identifies the need to connect our view of qualifications at the
admission [to law school] stage with competence after graduation." Confirmative
Action, supra note 583, at 572.
652. We do know, however, that test scores and comparable measures of 'legal
aptitude' " tend to correlate with parental income (i.e., with the applicant's socio-
economic status and wealth)." Confirmative Action, supra note 583, at 572 & n.23;
Lawrence, supra note 518, at 945. SES correlates with LSAT scores and law school
performance. See Rise of the Testocracy, supra note 251.
653. SES, as traditionally measured, does not accurately describe the eco-
nomic situation of non-majority subjects because it only measures income, and not
capital accumulation, where, for a variety of reasons, non-majority persons lag far
behind majority whites. See Rise of the Testocracy, supra note 251, at 184.
654. The LSAC study looked at family income at the time students began law
school, how much they worked during their undergraduate educations, and how
much paid work they estimated they would need to do in law school, not their own
level of debt, cost of living, or income at graduation. See LSAC Study, supra note
43, at 67-68.
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such courses? 55 Does working an extra job or an extra shift to
pay for the review course negatively impact the applicant's
chances? 656 Regardless of the inability to make successful legal
arguments based on the possibility that the bar exam discrimi-
nates against those of meager means, in order to begin to rem-
edy economically-based disadvantages and to seek out
solutions,657 research to answer such questions is long overdue.
A different research agenda arises out of the hypothesis,
based on Claude Steele's work, that non-majority students will
not suffer the negative consequences of stereotype anxiety if
they are evaluated in a real-life practice setting.658 Even before
a PSABE, we might identify a numerically significant cohort of
non-majority graduates working for large employers like Legal
Aid and District Attorneys' offices 659 where periodic evaluations
are routinely made. Assuming permission and confidentiality,
we could look at how graduates' evaluations correlated with bar
passage. If there were significant disparity, 660 or if poor evalua-
tions were distributed equally among those who passed and
those who failed, it might be possible to make much stronger
655. See supra note 551; Wong, supra note 360, at 231-32 (writing about the
LSAT, noting that higher SES students can buy their way to higher scores, since it
is about test-taking skills, which can be taught in expensive prep courses).
656. Professor Paula Lustbader conducted an informal unpublished study at
the University of Seattle from which she concluded that graduates' financial and
familial obligations impact negatively on their ability to pass the bar. See Curcio,
supra note 14, at 391 & n.133.
657. At CUNY, we have often surmised that paying for the bar review course
(we already offer the MBE preparation course for free) and supplying childcare
and similar substitutes for our graduates' familial work and community responsi-
bilities would be the most effective strategy for raising bar pass rates. Our own
lack of resources has, however, made this hypothesis impossible to test.
658. See discussion supra Part XIII(j)(2); Confirmative Action, supra note 583,
at 575. "[H]igh stakes testing does not reproduce the [debilitating] challenges
within the [real life] environment in which minority lawyers function and do fine."
Id. at 575.
659. This would require reporting from employers who hire multiple gradu-
ates each year. In New York, both defenders' and prosecutors' offices hire substan-
tial numbers of non-majority graduates who could be compared with each other.
Both offices generally offer good supervision and evaluation of new hires. If, as
seems unlikely, there are large firms that hire substantial numbers of non-major-
ity students, they would also provide a useful comparison. They key is to have the
same evaluators doing similar evaluations for a meaningful group of new hires.
660. The more graduates with high evaluations who do not pass the bar, the
greater the support for the hypothesis that it is exam-taking, not competence, that
is being disproportionately measured for non-majority students.
153
496 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:343
assumptions about the examination's role in creating false
negatives or false positives.661
It might be possible to do more sophisticated bar-related re-
search which takes as its starting point the work Jay Rosner
has done on the SAT exam.662 His research demonstrates that
SAT questions are pre-tested, including for race, and that the
questions which ultimately appear on the SAT are dramati-
cally-and disturbingly-weighted towards those on which
whites perform better than non-majority students. While Ros-
ner's primary interest is whether this same pattern holds true
for the LSAT, making it, as he describes the SAT, a "race cho-
sen" exam, we might want to ask the same questions about the
bar, particularly the MBE, where questions are repeated from
exam to exam. I know of no literature on exactly how bar exam
questions are pre-tested 63 or whether there is racial data,664
but insofar as Rosner's inquiry goes to the construction of the
test, rather than seeking to find causal explanations for per-
formance, this could be an important area of research.
There is also a variety of research which could be done in
anticipation of a pilot. This might include surveys of employers
to ascertain whether the means by which prospective employees
661. See discussion supra notes 452-54 and accompanying text.
662. Oral presentation, High-Stakes Testing, Society of American Law Teach-
ers Conference: Teaching, Testing and the Politics of Legal Education in the 20th
Century, (Oct. 21, 2000); See also William C. Kidder & Jay Rosner, How the SAT
"Creates Built in Headwinds": An Educational and Legal Analysis of Disparate
Impact, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 131 (2002); Jay Rosner, Disparate Outcomes By
Design: University Admissions Test, 12 LA RAzA L.J. 377 (2001).
663. According to the NCBE:
All items on the MBE are reviewed for potential bias. Men and women
serve on each Drafting Committee, and members of ethnic minority groups
assist in the preparation and review of items at both the Drafting Commit-
tee level and at the level of MBE Committee and State Board review. The
National Conference of Bar Examiners is committed to diverse representa-
tion on all its Drafting and Policy Committees.
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS, Myths and Facts about the MBE, at
http://www.ncbex.org/tests/mbe/myths.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2003). This does
not, however, directly address Rosner's issue.
664. Because the vast majority of states do not collect bar data by race, it is
unlikely that the same circumstances described by Rosner exist for the bar exam;
there would be no way to know the race of those who answered particular ques-
tions correctly or incorrectly. If and when such data is collected, it would be impor-
tant to ascertain what, if any, racial differences individual questions might
prompt.
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were admitted (i.e., by the PSABE, or the existing bar exam)
would matter to them in hiring, retention or promotion. Law
students could be surveyed to determine how many of them
might elect a PSABE if it were offered. Consumers of legal ser-
vices could be questioned as to whether they knew-or cared-
how many times their lawyer had taken the bar, or whether
they would have differing views of, or concerns about, compe-
tence depending on how a lawyer was admitted. Courts where a
PSABE might be situated would have to be carefully studied to
determine whether placement there would permit applicants to
perform-and be evaluated on-the full range of MacCrate
skills. There would need to be detailed and informed projec-
tions of how to expand the PSABE if the pilot were successful.
The project of moving the PSABE forward requires the engage-
ment of law teachers, social scientists and other allies in these
and other inquiries which constitute a useful and, in some in-
stances, necessary research agenda.
b) An Alternative Minimum Test
Because of the profession's historic confidence in the bar
exam, some kind of written test might still, as a political mat-
ter, be necessary. One possibility, proposed by the Bar Commit-
tees' Report, is to require those electing an alternative
experientially-based bar to take both the MPRE 665 and a writ-
ten test similar to the MPT, but without the latter's time
constraints .666
There is another possibility. This would require thinking
about the kinds of things we want lawyers to actually "know,"
in the sense of having that information in their minds at all
times. What, if anything, should all lawyers have to memorize?
Obviously this cannot be the entire body of substantive law;
there would be no room left for application or analysis. There
665. I have taken no position as to whether the MPRE, which is normally
taken while applicants are still in law school, should continue to be required, al-
though I do not believe that it actually tests professional responsibility, or the
MacCrate skill of resolving, as opposed, in a very limited and non-contextualized
way, to recognizing ethical dilemmas. See MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 140.
666. BAR COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 16. Lengthening the time for
the written test is intended to decrease the operation of stereotype threat for non-
majority takers, to the extent that it operates by decreasing efficiency. See supra
notes 564-65 and accompanying text.
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are, however, things that lawyers ought to know without look-
ing them up, where failure to know, or to subsequently look it
up can be disastrous. Among these, I would include common
statutes of limitations, filing deadlines, and similar limitations
in administrative proceedings, basic ethical rules and rules of
professional responsibility. Just as we test such simple but im-
portant facts on exams for drivers' licenses (for example, how
many car lengths should be between cars at given speeds, or
how often you have to renew your license), 667 a similar short
test might be appropriate. As a precondition, however, we
would need to think and agree about what is really important to
have on such a test, what must be memorized, and most impor-
tant, whether it is necessary to be a competent and ethical
lawyer.
c) The Need for a Pilot Project
My proposal is not intended to replace the traditional bar
exam overnight, if at all. As I have noted throughout this arti-
cle, the PSABE should initially be proposed as a pilot project. A
pilot is important for a number of reasons. First, training, eval-
uating and credentialing a relatively small number of law grad-
uates is easier than flooding the courts with unprepared helpers
who would need supervision and evaluation from untrained
court personnel. It is important that the project work, and a
carefully designed small pilot has a far greater chance of suc-
cess. One, two or three receptive courts, with receptive admin-
istrators and personnel could, with good training and
preparation, generate results which would be sufficiently at-
tractive to other courts to garner system-wide support.
It also seems likely that a small pilot would be more palat-
able to bar examiners and their constituencies. It is important
to reiterate that the bar examiners are, and have been, operat-
ing in good faith, undoubtedly doing the best they can within
the constraints of the time and money they are allocated. As
bar examiners in New York have said, while it would be optimal
to do real performance-based evaluation with videotaping, cri-
tique, open file questions, etc., this is simply impossible for the
667. NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF MOTOR VEHICLES INTERNET OFFICE, Driver's
Manual, chs. 1, 8, available at http://www.nydmv.state.ny.us/dmanual (last visited
Nov. 16, 2003).
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10,000 or more law graduates they must evaluate each year. 6 8
Limiting an initial pilot in New York to a few hundred students
would not devalue or inappropriately challenge what bar exam-
iners do, but would test an alternative not presently available
on the mass scale on which they work. As a political matter, it
is also more likely that an integrated bar, an Institute on Pro-
fessionalism, or some other prestigious legal organization would
support a pilot 669 which could be carefully evaluated than it is to
effect wholesale change in the way in which lawyers have been
admitted for most of the last century. And, as Sturm and
Guinier point out, "[tlo be workable, strategies [like the PSABE]
may need to be implemented on an experimental basis to gain
insight into their actual effect, not just their predicted effect,
and to fine-tune them over time."670
Finally, almost too obvious to mention, there are innumera-
ble issues, both large and small, which would have to be identi-
fied, researched, 671 considered and decided in the course of
actually designing a pilot and subsequently evaluating its re-
sults. It is not surprising that more than one hundred profes-
sionals from diverse disciplines worked to create and evaluate
the 1980 California Experiment. Many areas of social science,
testing and other expertise, all beyond my limited capacity, will
be required. Only a well thought-out design can appropriately
test the hypotheses behind the PSABE, and create a feasible
model for replication and expansion. And, as with all ideas for
change, the results will undoubtedly look far different from
what was originally envisioned.
668. Statements made at meeting of the NYSBA Committee on Legal Educa-
tion and Admission to the Bar with members of the New York State Board of Law
Examiners (Oct. 24, 2002).
669. This is precisely what the Committees on Legal Education and Admis-
sion to the Bar of the two major bar associations in New York have already done.
See BAR COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 1.
670. Sturm & Guinier, supra note 22, at 104.
671. As one small but illustrative example, suggested by Susan Sturm, in
planning the supervisory and evaluative roles that judges might play in the
PSABE it would be important to analyze job patterns to create incentives for par-
ticipation and to maximize accountability.
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d) Allies
Allies are critical in any strategy for significant change.
Potential allies exist in a number of important institutional set-
tings, including the organized bar, legal education, and the
court system. Within the organized bar, and particularly criti-
cal state bar associations, support should come on at least one of
two grounds. Many members of the practicing bar are con-
cerned about the lack of lawyering skills possessed by gradu-
ates. This is a phenomenon which surfaces every twenty or so
years in bar association reports and pleas that legal education,
in its most recent form, "MacCrate" the curriculum. Bar lead-
ers with these concerns should be major allies for testing an ex-
perientially based, professionally validated certification of
lawyering skills prior to admission. In addition, the organized
bar has spoken out strongly and repeatedly about its concerns
for the necessity of increasing diversity. This oft-stated position
should be used to support a pilot to test and/or ameliorate
causes of the negative, disparate impact of the existing bar ex-
amination on non-majority students.
Legal education may, paradoxically, be a tougher nut to
crack, but there are allies within academia. SALT and its mem-
bers are an obvious base because of the commitment of the or-
ganization to examining and working creatively around issues
of diversity and the bar examination. The interconnections be-
tween SALT and the AALS, and the demonstrated commitment
of the AALS 672 to the same issues which should engage bar lead-
ers suggest that AALS itself would be an enormously valuable
ally in creating a pilot program. There may well be principled
and/or self-protective resistance on the part of some traditional
law school teachers, but the small number of participants in a
pilot PSABE should allay their fears. Certainly a pilot will have
little effect on their lives, scholarship and teaching responsibili-
ties; an anticipatory assessment of how many students might
elect a PSABE, if it were freely available, would probably do the
672. For example, AALS accreditation standards require member schools to
demonstrate commitment to diversity in hiring and admissions. AALS is an active
participant of the AALS/ABA/LSAC Joint Committee on Racial Diversity and has
a large and active Section on Minority Groups.
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same.673 The art of compromise is not to be underestimated;
this concession to skills teachers and other faculty who value
lawyering skills is one which might be obtained by principled
conversations among colleagues in legal education.
Foundations are also important allies, both for the critical
funding they might supply and for the legitimacy a pilot associ-
ated with them would possess. Delivering the resources to do a
pilot project makes it much more likely to happen. The prestige
of a Carnegie, Ford or Rockefeller 674 Foundation's support
should help convert the skeptical, and enhance professional and
public acceptance. Foundations have also become increasingly
skilled at evaluating the projects they fund and may have tech-
nical 675 as well as financial resources to ensure that a PSABE
pilot will be thoroughly and properly evaluated.
Finally, the support of the court system is critical. Mem-
bers of the highest state court, responsible for supervising the
bar examiners in most states, need to be convinced of the value
of a pilot without unduly threatening their long-term commit-
ment to the existing bar exam. Studies and reports from court
administration on diversity and the need for professional skills
and values can provide fertile ground for persuasion.676 In
states with ambitious pro bono programs, the vision of trained
and supervised free help to accomplish the many valuable pro-
grams which have been envisioned but provided with inade-
quate resources may be persuasive. In New York, for example,
it is clear that the court system needs "bodies" to fulfill its ambi-
tious plans and justice initiatives; calls for pro bono services
from large law firms and law schools have not produced any-
673. A useful step, which does not necessarily rise to the level of research,
might include an inquiry of students at several representative schools. While the
benefits of additional training should attract many, and might also, in turn, result
in encouragement by employers, the subsequent pro bono requirement might sub-
stantially decrease their numbers.
674. These three foundations (listed in alphabetical order) have particular
public recognition, but there are many, many others, committed to similar goals
and with histories of creative and path-breaking funding which would be equally
valuable to engage.
675. Foundations may have researchers on staff, or may have a group of re-
searchers with whom they have worked successfully who could plan and execute
evaluation and follow-up on any pilot project.
676. See JCM Report, supra note 158. Many states have established Commis-
sions on Taskforces on Gender and Racial Diversity.
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where near sufficient help.677 The need for, and ability to cre-
atively and effectively use trained law graduates is something
which can be argued, but which is best demonstrated and actu-
alized by an effective pilot. This leads to the last group of pro-
spective allies.
When we think of the courts, we must also, where applica-
ble, include the unions to which court employees belong, and by
whom they are represented. Union leaders-and rank and file
members-must be persuaded that a potential wave of PSABE
applicants descending on the courts will not threaten jobs678 or
impose unwanted, and unbargained-for obligations on existing
court personnel. 679 Instead, training in supervision and evalua-
tion that would be given selected court personnel should be
presented thoughtfully as a model of skills enhancement. In ad-
dition, with the assistance of PSABE applicants, employees
might experience at least some decrease in the time expended
in their duties. In my experience, court personnel-and their
unions-have genuine concern for the justice function of the ju-
dicial system, as well as the more traditional labor-manage-
ment issue of increased status through training. With
appropriate and respectful communication, the unions should
prove allies, not adversaries, in the effort to some day establish
a PSABE.68°
677. No state has yet adopted mandatory pro bono, and few even have
mandatory reporting systems. Whether or not mandatory pro bono is a good thing,
without it, and given the enormous number of needs which pro bono service can
fulfill in any given jurisdiction, the courts are unlikely to benefit from the generos-
ity and professionalism of members of the Bar in their personal decisions about
where to spend non-billable hours.
678. Since PSABE applicants would largely be used to staff pro bono initia-
tives which would otherwise not exist, or be severely limited, and since their pres-
ence would be time limited, the PSABE should not be seen as creating a serious
threat.
679. I owe this observation to Josh Pruzansky.
680. In my experience, many court personnel, a substantial number of whom
are persons of color, aspire to, and ultimately attend law school, often in part-time
programs. The potential opportunity to establish their competence to practice law
by performance in a system with which are already familiar and successful could
provide an additional base for their support of a PSABE.
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XV. The Special Case for New York
Thus far, this article has considered criticisms of the bar
exam as it is administered everywhere in the United States,
and has proposed an alternative bar exam which could be em-
ployed in any jurisdiction. 68 1 There is, however, a special argu-
ment for adoption of the PSABE in New York.
In 1992, responding in part to the critical Report by the As-
sociation of the Bar of the City of New York68 2 and the Report of
the New York State Judicial Commission on Minorities, 6 3 the
New York Court of Appeals commissioned a study of the New
York bar examination. The study, entitled an "Evaluation,"
was conducted by an "evaluation team"68 4 of psychometricians
and testing professionals. By intention, it was confined to the
New York portion of the exam, was to be "thorough and wide-
ranging," and was to be "entirely independent."68 5 It covered a
number of areas, 68 6 of which three, the sections on content va-
lidity, construct validity and race/ethnicity, and gender and bar
examination performance are particularly relevant to the
PSABE proposal. Its findings in each area fully support the
681. The New York City Civil Court has been used as a model here and else-
where in proposals for a PSABE. See, e.g., Glen, supra note 4; BAR COMMITTEE
REPORT, supra note 5. However, the model is intended to be transferable to other
courts in other jurisdictions.
682. ABCNY Bar Report, supra note 9.
683. JCM Report, supra note 158.
684. The team consisted of Professors Jason Millman, Cornell University,
William A. Mehrens, Michigan State University, and Paul R. Sackett, University
of Minnesota, each of whom had authored a number of books, scores of articles,
been elected officers of professional organizations and edited one or more profes-
sional journals. Judge Richard Simons was liaison to the Court of Appeals. Mill-
man study, supra note 7, app. 1.1.
685. Millman study, supra note 7, at 2-1.
686. Other areas included accommodations for applicants with disabilities,
test security, grading, test reliability, score reports, and appeals. One final sub-
ject, the passing score, is highly relevant to the ongoing debate about raising bar
passing scores. See supra notes 16-26 and accompanying text. Significantly, the
Evaluation (which, like the more recent Klein studies cited in support of a pro-
posed score increase, utilized expert panels in a standard setting exercise) recom-
mended "that the passing score of 660 be retained for the present. If the Bar
Examination evolves to a noticeably different character, the Board might consider
a standard-setting study that is more extensive than the one described here." Mill-
man study, supra note 7, at 8-5. There has been no such "substantial change" in
the character of the bar exam since 1993.
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proposal to design and pilot a PSABE as does its conclusion and
recommendations.
a) Content Validity68 7
This section posed several questions including, "What areas
of law do experienced lawyers think should be tested, and with
what emphasis? What, besides knowledge of law, appears to be
tested on the examination? What other competencies should be
tested?" The Court of Appeals appointed two panels of six law-
yers each, one representing upstate and one the New York Met-
ropolitan Area,688 who evaluated the existing bar examination
(New York essays and New York multiple choice questions) for
substantive subject matter coverage and for skills tested. As to
the latter, the team and the panels distinguished between skills
necessary to be a competent lawyer, and those necessary to be a
successful lawyer, determining that only the former were appro-
priate to the bar examination's stated purpose of protecting the
public. Skills necessary for competent practice were defined as
those whose absence would be apt to harm a client.
Recognizing also that "if only a limited number of skills can
be tested, those that are pre-requisite to important skills de-
serve preference,"68 9 the skills rated most important by panel-
ists were, in this order: legal analysis and reasoning; legal
research; factual investigation and analysis; problem solving
and case planning; written communication; personal qualities of
integrity, diligence, timeliness and sound ethical awareness;
knowledge of ethical mandates, including when refusals are
necessary because of lack of time, knowledge or ability, inter-
personal tasks, such as interviewing, counseling and negotiat-
687. The Evaluation uses the categories of validation which are employed in
EEOC Guidelines. See supra notes 259-64 and accompanying text. Content
validation asks whether "a representative sampling of specified job functions or
the underlying skills necessary to perform those functions" are being tested. See
Rogers, supra note 51, at 625. As discussed below, the Evaluation identified those
"skills" and found virtually none of them tested. Hence, under the technical
meaning of the term, the bar exam should be said to lack much content validity.
688. The criteria for appointment was to "includ[e] as broad a spectrum as
possible of attorneys of varying ages, years of practice and areas of concentration
who were employed in public and private practice and different size firms." Mill-
man study, supra note 7, at 3-11.
689. Id.
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ing;690 trial advocacy, oral communication and advocacy in the
motion and appellate contexts; and law office management.
The knowledge elements deemed important to competence
were: knowledge of some core body of doctrinal and procedural
law; and knowledge of basic concepts underlying the common
law and constitutional and statutory interpretation. In their
assessment of prerequisite skills, the panelists indicated that
factual investigation, problem solving and case planning were
prerequisites for interpersonal tasks, but trial advocacy and law
office management were not, so the former were to be preferred
over the latter.691
Limiting the knowledge and skills elements to the most im-
portant, both for protecting against harm and as prerequisites
for other important skills, the panelists selected legal analysis
and reasoning, legal research, factual investigation and analy-
sis, problem solving and case planning, knowledge of ethical
mandates, etc., and personal qualities of integrity, diligence,
timeliness and sound ethical awareness and the two knowledge
areas. 692 The Evaluation noted that while "a strong case can be
made for assessing [these seven skills and knowledge bases]"
the skill "referencing behavioral dispositions, cannot be well as-
sessed in a traditional examination context."693 As a result, it
concluded that "the test format found on the present Bar Exam-
ination can be advantageously expanded" because "the test is
far from a perfect sampling of all the important lawyering
skills."694
What is significant-even stunning-about the Evalua-
tion's treatment of, and recommendations about, content valid-
ity are how closely they parallel both criticisms of lacunae in the
existing bar exam and the potential of the PSABE to test every
skill, including the "behavioral dispositions"695 found most im-
690. Note that two separate MacCrate skills, counseling and negotiation, are
lumped together here with one aspect of a third MacCrate skill, fact investigation,
i.e., interviewing. See MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 138-39.
691. Millman study, supra note 7, at 3-14.
692. Id.
693. Id.
694. Id. at 3-15.
695. These characteristics, which can only be poorly approximated on any
written test, are precisely what supervisors would observe and could evaluate dur-
ing a ten to twelve week placement.
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portant to assessment of competence as a lawyer in order to pro-
tect the public. It is also apparent how much more nuanced
they are than the skills allegedly tested on the existing bar
exam (i.e., "fact analysis" vs. "factual investigation and analy-
sis, problem solving and case planning").
If we are to take the extensive Evaluation commissioned by
the Court of Appeals seriously, the PSABE precisely meets the
recommendation or the "Concluding Comments" that "[i]n the
longer term, we encourage experimentation to overcome the lo-
gistical, cost and testing-technology impediments to increased
content validity."696 The PSABE does just that.
b) Construct Validity697
This section posed questions such as "What does the Bar
Examination measure? Is it a measure of overall knowledge
and legal reasoning? Or is it a measure of rote memorization?
Of skill dealing with multiple-choice item formats? Of ability to
work quickly?" 698
In examining the three components of the bar exam, the
MBE, New York essays, and New York multiple-choice ques-
tions, the Evaluation found "a very strong relationship among
the underlying characteristics as being measured by the test
components." 699 That is, that all three components "are mea-
suring a common underlying characteristic." 70 0 That character-
istic is "generalized legal knowledge and legal reasoning" not
any of the skills, or even necessarily the knowledge bases 70 1
found important for lawyer competence. Looking at one admin-
istration of the bar exam, and the various substantive areas
tested, the Evaluation concluded that while some questions pri-
marily tested memorization, and others tested more generalized
696. Millman study, supra note 7, at 3-15, 16.
697. Under EEOC Guidelines, see supra notes 259-64, construct validation
looks to a relationship between what is tested and some trait like intelligence,
needed to perform the job. "Construct validation is difficult, if not impossibly to
prove and requires a presentation of substantial empirical data." SCHLEI &
GROSSMAN, supra note 261, at 154.
698. Millman Study, supra note 7, at 9-1.
699. Id. at 9-2.
700. Id.
701. It would be difficult to claim that any of the three components test
"knowledge of basic concepts underlying the common law and constitutional and
statutory interpretation." Id. at 14.
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"reasoning,"70 2 memory and reasoning items tested the same
thing.703
One psychometric conclusion that can be drawn from this is
comforting: the test is valid because it is measuring what it says
it is measuring, 70 4 and doing so consistently (reliably). The next
necessary step is, however, missing; there is no "extensive em-
pirical data" connecting that which is measured to the job of
competent lawyering. A common sense look, like the work done
by the content evaluation panels, strongly, if not dispositively,
suggests that the "general legal reasoning" and memorization
tested consistently and reliably by the bar examination is far
from adequate to constitute competence, or to protect the
public.70 5
The Evaluation's findings about "speededness" are even
more important to concerns about the existing bar which could
be remedied by the PSABE. The Evaluation first considered
whether the exam was "speeded," i.e., requiring speed for suc-
cess, and then whether such "speededness" was relevant to, or
important for, competence as a lawyer. Applicants generally
believe that they need more time, and that with more time they
would perform better. Evidence obtained in California, cited in
the Evaluation, bears out the truth of these beliefs, demonstrat-
ing that "doubling the time allowed for the MBE would produce
a mean change equivalent to 30 New York common scale
points."70 6 Research on the essay portion in California produced
702. Remember that on the MBE there is often no "right" answer, just an an-
swer which is least wrong. This may be good test construction, but it is not neces-
sarily the way in which lawyers need to know or to think. That is, there is a right
answer and only one right answer to many legal problems, like the applicable stat-
ute of limitations. In many other, more complex situations, there are far more
than four possible answers, see Bahls, supra note 87, and the competent lawyer
must draw on a more complex skill set to analyze the situation and then chart a
course of action. This observation supports the Evaluation's finding of the impor-
tance of the skill of "factual investigation analysis, problem solving and case plan-
ning" as it is necessarily employed in tandem with "legal analysis and reasoning."
That is, the latter skill, by itself, is generally not enough to solve a client's problem,
which is seldom, if ever, presented as a one or two paragraph, fact-fixed exercise.
703. Millman study, supra note 7, at 9-6.
704. See, e.g., Mueller, supra note 32, at 211.
705. See supra Part III(d).
706. Millman study, supra note 7, at 9-8 & n.11 (citing STEPHEN KLEIN, THE
EFFECT OF TIME LIMITS, ITEM SEQUENCE AND QUESTION FORMAT ON APPLICANT PER-
FORMANCE ON THE CALIFORNIA BAR EXAMINATION (1981)) (Report prepared for the
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similar results. 70 7 While there is apparently no data on how an
increase in time affects applicants by racial or ethnic categories,
this finding also gives very substantial support to a hypothesis
about increasing time based on Steele's work,708 and argues for
a less-speeded test-unless, that is, the "speededness" required
by the test is also required for competence as a lawyer. Intui-
tively, this is false, and the panels utilized by the Evaluation
came to this conclusion, summarizing their findings as "speed
in reading fact patterns, selecting answers, and writing essay
responses [is] not the kind of speed needed to be a competent
lawyer."70 9 A major characteristic which the bar exam tests,
and for which there is good reason to believe disparate impact
occurs,710 is not necessary for competence and may, indeed, be
contraindicated.7 11
c) Race/Ethnicity, Gender and Bar Examination
Performance
This section of the Evaluation is important because it but-
tresses the findings of disparate impact reported nationally by
the LSAC712 and the New York State Judicial Commission on
Minorities. 713 The Evaluation's study, albeit of only one admin-
istration of the bar exam, July 1992, is arguably more compre-
hensive than the latter, since it relied on questionnaires placed
on all applicants' seats at the July administration asking about
gender, race/ethnicity, and whether English was the applicant's
Committee of Bar Examiners of the State of California and the National Confer-
ence of Bar Examiners).
707. Millman study, supra note 7, at 5-18.
708. See supra Part VII(b).
709. Millman study, supra note 7, at 9-8. In an earlier section, looking prima-
rily at accommodations for people with disabilities, the Evaluation tied the issue of
speededness to construct validation, writing:
It is generally believed that the defense of what constructs should be mea-
sured on a licensure exam should be based on an analysis of the tasks on
which an individual must be competent to not endanger the public. We are
unaware of any formal documentation that speededness is an essential com-
ponent of a minimally competent attorney.
Id. at 5-20 (original emphasis).
710. See supra Part VII(j)(1) (discussing "inefficiency" resulting from stereo-
type fear).
711. See supra Part XIII(j)(3); Bahls, supra note 87, at 16.
712. See LSAC Study, supra note 43, at 80.
713. See JCM Report, supra note 158.
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native language. Accordingly, unlike the JCM study, it in-
cluded graduates from both in-state and out-of-state law
schools.7 14 The passing results, however, were painfully simi-
lar, and were reported as follow:
Asian Americans 53.0
Blacks 37.4
Hispanics 48.6
Whites 81.6
The results in the study commissioned by the Court of Appeals,
and the only instance in which the bar examiners collected data
thus confirm the disparate impact 715 of the New York bar exam
on all non-majority groups. 716
The Evaluation contains two other pieces of important in-
formation. First, as to gender, although performance on the es-
say portion of the bar exam was virtually identical, men
performed a significant .26 standard deviation units better than
women. Because the essay scores are scaled to the MBE scores,
this can result in an artificially diminished score for women
who overall had a slightly lower passing rate (73.1%) than men
(75.7%).717 The findings on applicants with a native language
other than English are far more disturbing. The results of the
data collected indicate that native English speakers score 35
points higher than ESL takers, "holding other questionnaire
variables constant."718 One highly likely explanation is the
exam's emphasis on "speededness," which could reasonably be
expected to disadvantage those for whom English is not their
first language. But precisely because the communities from
714. 7490 applicants took the bar exam in July 1992; 7099 answered the race/
ethnicity question, and 7183 answered the gender question, giving a very large,
though admittedly incomplete, sample of the entire population. Millman study,
supra note 7, at 10-2.
715. See supra note 247, defining presumptive disparate impact for Title VII
purposes.
716. In other sections, the Evaluation utilizes statistical and psychometric
techniques to demonstrate that "there is nothing in the analysis [of how different
racial groups did on different portions of bar exam] to suggest that the Bar Exami-
nation is functioning in a different way for one group than for another," Millman
study, supra note 7, at 10-7, except, of course, that whites are more than twice as
likely to pass as blacks. The inability to find a reason for the disparity does not
reduce the pressing need to do something about it.
717. Millman study, supra note 7, at 10-5.
718. Id. at 9-11, 12 & tbl.7.2.
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which those applicants come are already severely under-
served, 719 the exam's requirement of this non-essential skill
works to disqualify those law graduates who would both in-
crease the diversity of the profession and create increased ac-
cess to justice for their communities of origin. The New York
bar exam thus has a demonstrably "perverse effect," highly
likely to be unrelated to minimum competence on two major
values and aspirations of the profession, diversity and increas-
ing access to justice.7 20
The comprehensive Evaluation commissioned by the New
York Court of Appeals thus reiterates and supports the argu-
ments made more generally for a PSABE. This is true espe-
cially insofar as it underscores the disparate impact of the exam
on non-majority takers, and specifically calls for experimenta-
tion to overcome logistical, cost and testing-technology impedi-
ments-which the proposed pilot would do-to increase content
validity, i.e., testing the skills necessary for competence, all of
which could be evaluated by the PSABE.
The strong correspondence between findings and recom-
mendations in the Evaluation and arguments for the PSABE
should make the latter especially appealing for New York, and
to the New York Court of Appeals which supervises and ulti-
mately decides the bar admission process.
XVI. Conclusion
With its commitment to innovation and access to justice in-
itiatives, New York is a promising state to pilot a PSABE. Be-
cause of my own personal experience, I have drawn on New
York-based observations about the court system in sketching
out what a PSABE might look like. The idea, however, has va-
lidity for virtually every jurisdiction, and another may be able
to move more quickly. This article is intended to provide the
framework for experimentation in planning and creating a per-
formance-based alternative wherever the idea takes hold, as
well as to provide some theoretical, analytical, historical and
practical grounding for the experiment.
719. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
720. See supra notes 155 & 414 and accompanying text.
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There is a final note of caution, echoing some old and excel-
lent advice: anything, a PSABE included, worth doing, is worth
doing well. The work of design, implementation and evaluation
is formidable, yet it is, as history teaches, well within the capa-
bilities of legal education and the profession. History teaches
another, equally important lesson. A profession which is com-
mitted to serving the public and improving the legal system
must hold firmly to core values, like those enumerated in the
MacCrate Report, and also seek always to improve the means
by which those values are embodied. A century ago there was
no written bar examination. The time has come for exploration
of new ways to make the existing bar examination a better
means of entry into the practice of law. Piloting the PSABE is
an important step in that process.
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